Legal Aspects of European Space Activities : ESA Convention, EEC Internal Market and Common Commercial Policy ; A study commissioned by EUROSPACE, Paris by Micklitz, Hans-W. & Reich, Norbert
Hans W. Micklitz/Norbert Reich 
Legal Aspects of 
European Space Activities 
ESA Convention, EEC Internal Market and 
Common Commercial Policy 
Astudy commissioned by EUROSPACE, Paris 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 
Baden-Baden 
CIP-Titelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek 
Micklitz, Hans W.: 
Legal Aspects of European Space Activities: ESA Convention, EEC Interna) 
Market and Common Commercial Policy / Hans W. Micklitz; Norbert Reich. 
- 1. Aufl. - Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl.-Ges., 1989 
(Schriftenreihe des Zentrums für Europäische Rechtspolitik an <lcr Universität Bremen 
(ZERP); Bd. 9) 
lSBN 3-7890-1875-9 
NE: Reich, Norbert:; Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik <Bremen>: Schriftenreihe 
des Zentrums ... 
1. Auflage 1989 
© Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 1989. Printed in Germany. Alle 
Rechte, auch die des Nachdrucks von Auszügen, der photomechanischen Wieder-
gabe und der Übersetzung, vorbehalten. 
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or 
part of the material is concerned, specifically those of translation, reprinting, 
re-use of illustrations, broadcasting, reproduction by photocopying machine or 
similar means, and storage in data banks. Under § 54 of the German Copyright 
Law where copies are made for other than private use a fee is payable to »Verwer-
tungsgesellschaft Wort«, M unich. 
Preface 
The present study, commissioned by EUROSPACE, Paris, analyses 
the legal position under Community law of European space activities under 
the ESA Convention, and, to a lesser extent, of national space agencies. lt 
has been primarily concerned with the industrial policy provisions which -
in combination with R & D, competition, regional, and employment 
objectives - form part the ESA scheme of financing and procurement, most 
notably of optional programmes. 
The concentrated efforts by the EEC institutions to complete the 
Interna! Market before the end of 1992, their demand for open competitive 
bidding in public procurement of goods, and more recently, services, the 
strict enforcement of state aid rules, and the growing Community 
competence in the Common Commercial Policy raise serious doubts 
whether and for how long the ESA industrial policy scheme can be 
maintained. 
The paper tries to give first answers to this complicated set of 
questions. lt reviews EEC Iaw requirements for procurement concerning 
space activities from two different angles: from the Interna! Market 
perspective (Chapter 1), and from the Common Commercial Policy point of 
view (Chapter II). Since EFTA-countries participate in the ESA-scheme, it 
is not surprising that the rules on the Common Commercial Policy are 
somewhat more open to the ESA industrial policy objectives than the EEC 
Interna! Market rules. During the transitional period until the completion 
of the Internal Market, therefore, certain derogations from the strict 
enforcement of the EEC rules on open competitive bidding can be 
maintained. On the other hand, the study emphasises the necessity for 
renegotiating the ESA industrial policy with the participation of the 
Community, before the lst of January of 1993. 
Chapter 1 was prepared by Norbert Reich, Chapter II by Hans 
Micklitz. The authors collaborated very closely and discussed their results 
for which each one of them bears the final responsibility. They were assisted 
in the editing phase by Ms. Deirdre Leahy, BA., LL.B., Galway, IRL. 
They hope to have found rational legal solutions to the outstanding 
problems, which allow both for a continuation of European space 
programmes serving peaceful purposes as outlined by the ESA-Convention, 
and emphasise the need for an increased Community presence in European 
R&D and industrial policy. lt should however be mentioned that problems 
of the ESA Convention in relation to GA TI, legal problems in the 
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marketing phase of space systems, and legal protection of undertakings 
could not be explored. 
At several occasions, earlier versions of the paper were discussed with 
representatives of EUROSP ACE, its member enterprises, their 
consultants, and with collaborators of ESA. These discussions were 
characterized by frankness and expertise. They have helped a great deal in 
understanding the issues which were critically presented by the authors. 
The authors finally wish to thank M. Demerliac, Secretary General, 
EUROSP ACE, for the help and support in preparing the study and its 
discussion, and, most of all, for allowing scientific freedom without which 
the research would not have been possible. 
Hans W. Micklitz / Norbert Reich ZERP-Bremen, Summer 1989 
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LEGAL PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN SPACE ACTMTiES 
ESA-Convention, EEC Interna/ Market, and Common Commercial Policy 
(Summary) 
Chapter 1: 
ESA Procurement Rules, National Procurement Rules, and EEC Law 
1. ESA procurement rules, based on the ESA Convention and its 
implementation by the ESA Council of Ministers resp. the Industrial 
Policy Committee (IPC), seek to guarantee countries who participate 
- especially in ESA's optional programmes - a "fair return" for their 
contributions. The "fair return" policy aims at encouraging State 
participation in optional programmes by giving them the greatest part 
of their money "back". This principle helps, therefore, to develop State 
industries in the space sector, to promote national R & D activities in 
the high-tech area of space systems, to safeguard employment, and to 
support an equitable regional distribution of income. ESA carefully 
monitors these rules in order to guarantee an 0.95, and at minimum an 
0.90 return coef:ficient. lt should, however, not be forgotten that the 
"fair return" policy is clearly characterised by its anti-competitive 
effects, by restricting entry to ESA procurement to undertakings based 
in those Member States not participating in the programme or who 
have used up their quota, even if these undertakings can offer the 
goods or services at better prices. These anti-competitive effects of the 
"fair return" princple have to be carefully balanced against its 
consequences for R & D, industry, employment, and regional 
objectives (Nos. 1-11). 
2. The EEC Interna! Market provisions introduced by the Single Act, 
though not enjoying direct effect, are nevertheless adverse to 
procurement policies with objectives like those of the ESA industrial 
policy. The Gustified) purpose of the ESA Convention to stimulate 
peaceful R & D activities in the space sector does not exempt its 
procurement rules from the applicability of the Interna! Market 
provisions. The EEC itself, in implementing the new provisions of the 
Single Act on "Research and Technological development", wants to 
ensure their conformity with the Interna! Market objectives, as 
demonstrated by Art. 130 F (12-14). 
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3. The EEC rules on the free movement of goods (15-17), naroely Art. 30 
et seq., prohibit every discriminatory treatment of goods imported by 
undertakings of EEC-countries, even if the state measures in question 
have a mere indirect or potential effect on intra-Community trade. 
This discrimination must be considered within the operation of the 
"fair return" principle in the ESA Convention, because the award of 
contracts for the supply of goods is not exclusively detennined by 
objective criteria like price, quality etc., but also takes the origin of the 
supplier into account. A similar interpretation can be presented for 
the rules on the freedom to provide services, namely Art. 59 et seq. 
(24-26). According to the new case law of the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities (CJEC), these provisions seek to guarantee 
undertakings from every EEC country a right of entry into public 
supply or service markets, as weil as safeguarding consumer's and 
customer's freedom of choice. They may be directly invoked by 
undertakings established in EEC countries which are not treated fairly 
in public procurement. 
4. ESA itself, being an agency established under international law, is not 
directly subjected to the EEC prohibition on discriminatory 
procurement policies. EEC Member States, however, must obey their 
obligations under Community law and therefore not violate its "effet 
utile". This principle is laid down in Art. 5 and has found an ever 
growing importance in the case law of the CJEC, and by which any 
Member States autonomous policy which contradicts EEC rules may 
be restricted e.g. in finance and participation in international 
conventions, in allowing restraints to competition, and in granting state 
aids. Member States should not continue to participate in the 
financing of international organisations whose procurement policy is in 
clear contradiction with the objectives of the EEC Interna! Market, 
unless they can justify their actions under specific provisions of 
Community Law (18-20). 
5. Protectionist and discriminatory procurement policies, whether 
implemented by ESA or national agencies, cannot be justified under 
primary Community law. Arts. 36/66, according to the case law of the 
CJEC, allow only "non-economic" reasons as a justification for 
discriminatory procurement policies. They seem to exclude 
justifications based on R & D, industrial or regional policies. The 
"rule-of-reason" approach developed in the "Cassis-de-Dijon"-case for 
remaining restrictions in the free movement of goods and in similar 
cases for restrictions on the freedom to provide services do not justify 
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a discriminatory procurement policy based on the "fair return" 
principle, even if it serves to stimulate the R & D activities of 
undertakings in Member States (21-23, 27). Therefore, EEC Member 
States who participate in the ESA Convention have an obligation 
under primary Community law to align their commitments in ESA with 
the principles of the EEC Treaty. 
6. The EEC directives on public procurement, especially Directive 
88/295/EEC, exempt service contracts (with the exception of public 
works according to Directive 71/305/EEC), energy supply, 
transportation, and telecommunication from the requirement of 
Community wide procurement. New Commission proposals (Doc 
Com. (88) 377 & 378 final) seek to abolish these exemptions before 1 
January 1993 (36a). The proposals are in line with the development of 
primary Community law. 
7. International organisations like ESA are not required to observe the 
Community procurement regime, even if EEC Member States finance 
their R & D and commercial programmes. This exemption must, 
according to the new case law of the CJEC, be construed narrowly. lt 
only relates to the transparency requirements which the directives 
establish. The directives cannot liberate Member States from their 
obligations under primary Community law, nor do they apply to the 
procurement of service contracts alone (34-36). Derogations from the 
requirements of primary Community law in public procurement may 
be permitted only under the Common Commercial Policy, not under 
the Interna! Market rules. 
8. The free trade agreements between the EEC and EFI'A countries, 
who also participate in ESA, prohibit discriminatory procurement 
rules such as those in the ESA industrial policy, as far as goods are 
concerned. The "direct effect" of the agreements is, however, subject 
to doubt. Therefore, the principles of EEC law cannot be simply 
transferred to the interpretation of the free trade agreements. 
Deviations from the principle of non-discrimination for economic 
reasons may - under exceptional circumstances - be justified by 
invoking the safeguard clause of the free trade agreements (28-33). 
9. The GATT rules on public procurement for goods which have been 
transferred into EEC law confirm the principle of non-discrimination 
in public procurement for the supply of goods, even though they are 
not directly applicable to ESA (37-39). The Uruguay round of GATT 
will probably extend these principles to the supply of services, even 
though no specific rules have been enacted so far. 
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10. The EEC state aid provisions are applicable only if space systems are 
commercially exploited. Neither ESA itself nor its contracting parties 
are subjected to these rules, unlike undertakings which market space 
systems (Ariane Space, Spot Image etc.). State aids illegally paid out 
by Member States or out of Member state funds, e.g. by their 
contributions to ESA, have to be repaid if they have not undergone the 
Community review procedure of Art. 93. The case law of the CJEC is 
very strict on enforcing the repayment obligation. Undertakings 
confronted with a recovery action by a Member State usually cannot 
argue that they have received the aid in good faith or have used up the 
funds. Member States must do everything to fu1fil their obligations 
under Art. 5 to recover the illegally paid out aid. The Community 
review procedure will be applicable only to those aids whose purpose 
or effect is distort competition in the Interna! Market. One might 
argue that this would only remain the case until a competitive 
European space industry has been built up. More details of the 
financing of European space activities must be known before a 
reasoned comment is possible ( 40-45). 
Chapter II: 
ESA Convention and EEC Law on External Relations 
11. Infringements of EEC law, the EFf A agreements and the GATT 
agreement by ESA procurement rules concern the inner European 
Market, composed of EEC Member States and EFf A countries. 
These are legally obliged to provide for open non-discriminatory 
competitive bidding procedures on the inner European Market. But 
the non-compliance of the ESA procurement rules with primary EEC 
law, and, as far as goods are concerned, with EEC/EFI'A and GATT 
agreements does not make them invalid in relation to ESA ( 47). ESA 
is an international organisation constituted under international public 
law. The second chapter examines the right of states to establish rules 
on public procurement under international public law while acting 
within their capacity as members of ESA, these rules however 
deviating from the requirements of primary Community law. This 
essentially concerns the discrepany between (1) the Member States' 
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autonomous right to shape an industrial policy within ESA ( as a 
member of that organisation) which is also based on the fair return 
principle and falls under the scope of international law and (2) the 
diametrically opposite EEC policy and law requiring open competitive 
bidding. 
12. The EEC Member States are not completely free in shaping their 
external relations. The Treaty provides for a Common Commercial 
Policy which will be imposed on all Member States in order to 
coordinate their external relations and to harmonize the rules 
governing the Interna! Market. The existence of a Common 
Commercial Policy requires an analysis of the relationship between the 
EEC Interna! Market rules and their repercussions on the shaping of a 
Common Commercial Policy. Are the Member States under an 
obligation to impose the economic freedoms of the EEC law, namely, 
the right of entry for every EEC undertaking, on ESA procurement 
rules? In legal terms : does the Common Commercial Policy determine 
and restrict the Member States' ability to engage themselves in 
international organisations which establish procurement rules 
deviating from that policy? And even if Member States are bound 
under Community law to shape a Common Commercial Policy which 
excludes the possibility of providing for differing procurement rules in 
the ESA Convention it might weil be that the Member States are free 
to do so under the rules of international public law. 
13. In the search for a possible solution to the conflicting procurement 
rules of the ESA Convention on the one hand and the EEC on the 
other, there are two different approaches possible for deciding on the 
Member States' freedom in the ESA Convention to deviate from the 
Treaty of Rome: 
(1) on examining the rules regarding the conflict between 
international treaties having different contents and 
analysing whether the ESA procurement rules benefit 
from priority over the EEC procurement rules or vice 
versa; 
(2) by forming a prospective solution for the conflict by 
elaborating the Member States' obligation to 
renegotiate the ESA Convention in order to reconcile 
the divergent rules of the different treaties and achieve 
a long term solution. 
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To our mind the dynamic extension of the EEC policy on external 
relations since the adoption of the Treaty of Rome requires us to 
analyze the possibilities of a prospective solution to the divergent 
procurement rules (55a-g). 
14. The issues which must be considered with a view to renegotiating the 
ESA Convention may be grouped into three legal options: 
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(1) A legal obligation to renegotiate the ESA Convention 
presupposes that the ESA procurement rules interfere 
with the Common Commercial Policy or the R&D 
policy of the Community. If the ESA procurement 
rules do not affect Community law there is no reason 
to renegotiate the ESA Convention; if however the 
ESA procurement rules interfere with Community law, 
than the Member States are under an obligation to 
align the ESA Convention to the EEC law. 
(2) Shared or exclusive competence for the Community to 
enter into the process of renegotiating the ESA 
procurement rules in external relations: The option 
makes sense only if we assume that the EEC law on 
external relations affects the ESA procurement rules. 
Therefore, the institution which governs EEC 
procurement rules in external relations and which 
leads the negotiations with ESA must be identified. lt 
may be the Community through the Commission and 
the Council, i.e. the operation of exclusive power, or 
the Member States themselves (also an operation of 
exclusive yet separate power), or the parallel/ 
concurrent power of the Community and Member 
States operating jointly. Therefore, are the Member 
States allowed to uphold their exclusive competence as 
recognized within ESA, or are they obliged to share 
their power with the Community, or, again, have they 
even lost their power to the Community organs which 
will then be the only appropriate organ to enter into 
negotiations with ESA? 
(3) The third option concerns jurisdiction of Member 
States to justify derogations from primary Community 
law in external relations (49-55): The analysis of the 
capacity, within the inner European market, of the 
EEC Member States as weil as the EFfA countries to 
derogate from primary Community law or from the 
EEC/EFf A agreements respectively, has clearly shown 
that exemptions from the basic economic freedoms can 
be justified for non-economic reasons only. If it is 
possible to transfer the very same solution to the law in 
external relations, Member States would have no 
opportunity to reject the Community's request to enter 
into negotiations with ESA. We hesitate, however, 
whether such a rigid principle can be upheld within the 
objective of building up a European space industry 
which is able to compete on the world market. 
15. Competence of the Community depends on whether the R & D 
activities or the commercial activities of ESA are concerned: the 
Community has no competence as far as ESA activities can be 
associated with R & D (56-63). Commercial activities of ESA, 
however, fall within the ambit of Art. 113 which requires a uniform 
Common Commercial Policy (64-74). The solution of this legal 
question depends on where to draw a line between ESA's R & D and 
ESA's commercial activities. lt is not possible to associate the concept 
of space activities entirely with the R & D sector. This concept is 
inseparably linked to an industrial policy favouring the specific 
sectoral and regional priorities of Member States which justify their 
financial contributions. lt is at the same time related to trade policy in 
broad terms, as far as the "fair-return principle" affects the free 
circulation of goods and services within the territories of the Member 
States to the Convention. The consequences of the double character of 
ESA activities are evident: The Member States cannot evade the scope 
of Art. 113 simply by referring to the R & D purpose of the 
agreement. The Community's competence cannot be presumed to 
have existed already in 1975 when the ESA Convention was concluded. 
At that time the Community was not yet engaged in the regulation of 
public procurement in external relations. But in 1980, when the 
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Community adopted the Council Decision 80/271 concerning the 
Multilateral Agreement and after publishing the Council Resolution of 
22 July 1980, the Community has made clear that it is definitely 
determined to integrate the regulation of public procurement in the 
shaping of a Common Commercial Policy (72). 
16. Because of the EEC's competence in the Common Commercial Policy, 
the ESA procurement rules for optional programmes must 
correspondingly be aligned with the EEC Internal Market 
requirements. Alignment means that the Member States have to use 
their influence on the ESA in order to begin a process of 
renegotiation, with the overall objective of adapting the ESA 
procurement rules to the EEC procurement rules. According to Art. 5 
para. 2 of the EEC-Treaty, they are under a "stand-still" obligation to 
avoid a tightening of the "fair-return" principle. They have violated this 
obligation in 1987 during the Hague Conference of ESA when they 
increased the return coefficient. The EFf A Countries are bound by 
the EEC/EFf A agreements to accept the extension of the 
Community's competence in external relations. They profit from the 
concept of an inner European market which guarantees access to all 
undertakings irrespective of whether they are located in an EEC 
Member State or an EFfA Country. They have to bear the burdens 
which result from the growth of the Community's powers in public 
procurement (74). 
17. The Community has no exclusive power to enter into negotiations with 
ESA (76-77). Member States and the Community are required to 
follow a joint approach (78-80). The Member States' power is based 
on their competence in R & D and their legitimate interests in 
financing ESA directly and not through the Community (80). The joint 
competence of the Community and the Member States exists only for a 
transitional period. The power to regulate public procurement will 
shift to the Community, yet not before 1993 due to the evolutive 
character of Community law (80). 
18. The derogation from primary Community law provided for in directive 
88/295/EEC for international organisations, like ESA, might be 
justified under Art 115, because the Member States and the EFf A 
countries are entitled to protect their newly built-up space industries, 
to promote R & D, and to guarantee security of investments and 
highly specialized jobs (83-91). The Member States position in the 
process of renegotiating the ESA Convention would then be 
strengthened. This conclusion, however, cannot be directly deduced 
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from the wording of Art. 115. As there is no case-law which discusses 
the precise meaning of "economic difficulties" in Art. 115 and which 
simultaneously determines the role of R & D and regional policies, we 
have based our conclusion on the general framework into which must 
be integrated the Common Commercial Policy and its exemptions. lt 
lies within the logic of our argument that the notion of "economic 
difficulties" should be given a broader scope of application by 
including indirect effects on trade resulting from the working of ESA 
procurement rules, thus going beyond the classical field of "deflections 
of trade" which Art. 115 explicitly mentions. 
19. The "block exemption" of Directive 88/295/EEC is valid, however, for a 
limited time only. This is due to the reasons which justify the "block 
exemption". "Block exemptions" can be considered for long as the 
measures protecting the home industry are necessary for setting up a 
competitive European space industry. The time to reconsider this will 
come once the directive on public procurement is renegotiated. The 
process has already started, as the publication of a proposed directive 
(Com.(88) 377, 378 final) indicates (36a). Although the draft does not 
provide for an amendment of the "block exemption", it might well be 
that the opening-up of telecommunication, energy and transportation 
markets for competetive bidding will influence the procurement rules 
in external relations already before 1992 (92). 
20. The "block exemption" of Directive 88/295/EEC does not, however, 
embrace services alone. Here the Member States have to choose 
whether they provide for open competitive bidding by ESA or whether 
they request the Commission to grant them an authorization which can 
be given in the form a "block exemption". Member States would then 
have to call upon the ESA Council and its IPC which monitors the 
"fair return" principle. If the Member States have equipped the 
Commission with the necessary arguments and if they have requested 
an authorization for exempting service contracts in Phase A and B 
from Directive 88/295, the ESA procurement rules might be regarded 
as respecting Community law for a transitional period of time. Since 
they have not done so they have an obligation under primary 
Community law to insist on open competitive bidding for service 
contracts by ESA in the industrial committee, thereby initiating the 
process of renegotiating the ESA procurement rules with a view to the 
completion of the Interna! Market by 1992 (93-96). 
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Chapter 1 
ESA PROCUREMENT RULES, NATIONAL PROCUREMENT RULES, 
AND EEC INTERNAL MARKET LAW 
1. The Legal Basis of ESA Procurement Policy under the 
"Fair Return" Principle 
a) ESA and European space activities 
The European Space Agency (ESA), which was established as an 1 
organisation under public international law by the ESA Convention of 30 
May 19751, is responsible for the coordination and execution of peaceful 
European space activites. lt continues the former R & D activities of ESRO 
(European Space Research Organisation) and ELDO (European Launcher 
Development Organisation), two separate agencies founded in 1964. ESA 
has been successful in developing the launcher Ariane 1-4, the latter being 
designed to carry heavier payloads. Its manufacture and commercial 
marketing is, however, left to Arianespace, a commercial company under 
French law whose shareholders are the French space agency, CNES 
(Centre national d'etudes spatiales), and 36 European aerospace and 
electronics firms as weil as European banks. Arianespace has lately been 
very successful in marketing launching systems for commercial uses.- ESA 
also participated in the NASA space transportation system by developing 
Spacelab which was first put into orbit on board the US-American shuttle 
Columbus in 1983. In 1986, this programme came to a temporary end due to 
the Challenger catastrophe. - Finally, ESA's space activities became weil 
known when Giotto, a research satellite launched by Ariane in July 1985, 
passed within 500 km of the nucleus of Halley's comet in March 1986. 
The 1985 Rome meeting of the ESA Council approved ambitious 
programmes for a larger launcher,Ariane 5, and the European contribution 
for an international space station, Columbus. In 1986, the French 
government proposed the development of Hermes, a mini-shuttle 
spaceplane to be launched by Ariane 5. The Hague Council of November 
1987 approved these projects as optional programmes (No. 4) and specified 
Cf. the documentation by Courteix/Manin, La cooperation spatiale europeenne, La 
documentation fran~aise No. 583, 1988. The Convention formally came into force 
through ratification by the Member States on 30 October 1980. The members are, from 
EEC·Countries, Belgrnm, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, 
the United Kingdom, and Ireland (which did not number among the predecessors of 
ESA), from EFTA-countries Sweden, Switzerland and, as full members since 1987, 
Austria and Norway; Finland is associated since lst January 1987. Canada has an 
agreement for close cooperation since January 1979. For further details, c.f. v. 
Preuschen, I.C.L.Q. 1978, 46; Bueckling, ZLR 1975, 106; Kaltenecker, ZLR 1974, 244. 
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2 
the considerable Member State contributions for the financing of Ariane 5 
(total estimated costs about 3356 M$, French contribution 44,7 %, Fed. 
Rep. of Germany 22 %, Italy 15 %, etc.; the UK is the only country not to 
participate ), Columbus (3564 M$, France 13,8 %, Germany 38 %, Italy 25 
%; UK 5,5 %; Spain 6 %; Belgium 5 %, Netherlands 1,3 %, Danmark 1 %, 
Norway 0,4 %; 5 states will not participate) and Hermes ( 4252 M$, France 
43,5 %, Germany 27 %, Italy 12,1 % etc; the UK and Ireland will not 
participate) in the next decade, to be approved in installments. 
b) Imporlance of ESA industrial policy 
In defining the purposes of ESA, the Convention puts great emphasis 
upon industrial policy in Article II ( d). Article VII of the Convention further 
outlines the preferred method of implementing this industrial policy, which 
it says, shall be designed ... 
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"in particular to 
a) meet the requirements of the European Space 
Programme and the coordinated national space 
programmes in a cost effective manner; 
b) improve the world-wide competitiveness of European 
industry by maintaining and developing space 
technology and by encouraging the rationalization and 
development of an industrial structure appropriate to 
market requirements, making use in the first place of 
the existing industrial potential of all Member States; 
c) ensure that all Member States participate in an 
equitable manner, having regard to their financial 
contribution, in implementing the European Space 
Programme and in the associated development of 
space technology; in particular the Agency shall, for 
the execution of its programmes, grant preference to 
the füllest extent possible to industry in all Member 
States, which shall be given the maximum opportunity 
to participate in the world of technological interest 
undertaken for the Agency; 
d) exploit the advantages of free competitive bidding in all 
cases, except where this would be incompatible with 
other defined objectives of industrial policy''. 
Annex V sets out procedures designed to realize the industrial policy 
- which is one of the basic purposes of the Convention. Article II of Annex 
V imposes a legal obligation on the Agency as regards the exercise of its' 
power to place contracts, namely the duty to give preference to the industry 
and organisations of the Member States. 
"However, within each optional programme ... 
particular preference shall be given to industry and 
organisations in the participating states". 
The Council of ESA is empowered to derogate from this preference 
clause. The Director General may only make proposals to that extent in 
accordance with Article III. 
In order to determine geographical distribution, Article II (3) sets out 
the following criteria: 
"Location of the enterprise's registered office, 
decision-making centers and research centers, and 
territory on which the work is to be carried out. In 
doubtful cases the Council shall decide whether an 
enterprise shall be considered to belang to one of the 
Member States or not". 
In the matter of the return rates to which each Member State 
generally, and the undertakings established on its territory (in particular) 
are entitled, Art. IV of Annex V sets out some specifically detailed criteria: 
1. A Member States' overall return coefficient shall be 
the ratio between its percentage share of the total value 
of all contracts awarded among all Member States and 
its total percentage contributions ... 
2. For the purpose of calculating return coefficients, 
weighting factors shall be applied to the value of 
contracts on the basis of their technologial interest. 
These weighting factors shall be defined by the 
Council. Within a single contract having a significant 
value, more than one weighting factor shall be applied. 
3. Ideally the distribution of contracts placed by the 
Agency should result in all countries having an overall 
return coefficient of 1 
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6. The distribution of contracts between formal reviews of 
the situation should be such that, at the time of each 
formal review, the cumulative overall return coefficient 
of each Member State does not substantially deviate 
from the ideal value ... 
The return coefficient shall never be lower than 0.8. 
The ideal distribution should be 1. The formal review 
procedure of industrial policy is to enable ESA to 
avoid distortions from the proposed return coefficient. 
Article VI of Annex V finally gives Member States a veto right 
concerning the exclusion of a particular firm or organisation from 
competing for the Agency's contracts. 
3 The Convention of 1975 is quite e:xplicit in the establishment of an 
industrial policy. The Council of Ministers regularly reviews the industrial 
policy according to Art. I of Annex V. lt may adopt rules for the attainment 
of the industrial policy objectives by a two-thirds majority according to Art. 
VII (1) last paragraph, of the Convention. In fulfilling its task, it is assisted 
by an Industrial Policy Committee (IPC) composed of Member States' 
representatives. lt monitors the industrial policy of ESA, · ( e.g. by being 
consulted in the decision-making process on the award of larger contracts) 
and it makes recommendations for its implementation. Under international 
law it is a legal obligation of both the participating Member States and of 
ESA as a subject of international law itself, to ensure that the return co-
efficient of 1.0 for each Member State is established or will at least be 
within reach, unless the criteria for derogation are met. If the threshhold of 
0.8 is not reached, the Council and the Director General have a specific 
obligation to review the procurement policy of ESA. Although the 
Convention does not e:xpressly recognize the right of enterprises based in 
the Member States to be awarded contracts under the industrial policy 
rules, Member States are free, in order to fulfill the desired return co-
efficient, to take the necessary steps which will allow the particular 
enterprise to be awarded the contract sought. 
4 The important position which the industrial policy rules have in the 
ESA Convention may be e:xplained on the following grounds: 
(1) When a formal European space policy was created, both US-
American and Soviet space programmes were quite advanced. The Member 
States therefore had to attain the creation of an industrial structure which 
would meet the challenges of US-American and Soviet space programmes. 
The industrial policy therefore presupposed the foundation of a competitive 
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European space industry which needed some sort of safeguard for the 
investments to be taken in space research, technology, and development. 
(2) In order to have the Member States participate in programmes of 
ESA, they had to be assured that participation would contribute something 
to their "home industry". The rules on industrial policy may therefore be 
regarded as a sort of quasi-contractual arrangement which guarantees that 
every mark, pound, franc or kronor spent would, after the necessary 
deductions for the general research and administrative overhead of ESA, 
flow back to home industry. In order to get Parliaments' support for the 
ESA Convention, it was probably necessary to show that, via ESA, money 
contributed would at the same time be money spent for and by home 
industry. The ESA Convention must therefore be regarded as a quasi-
exchange contract which is quite common in international law but, as we 
shall show later, foreign to Community Iaw. 
(3) The importance of the "fair return" principle can be seen in the 
growing significance of so-called optional programmes as opposed to 
mandatory programmes. Mandatory programmes contribute to basic 
research in space activities. Optional programmes, on the other hand, 
according to Article V 1. (b) of the Convention include 
"the design, development, construction, launching, 
placing in orbit, and control of satellites and other 
space systems; the design, the development, the 
construction, and operation of launch facilities and 
space transport systems". 
The research objective of these programmes is to some extent 
therefore supplemented and overlapped by the imperatives of practical 
application of modern space technology and their usefulness, based on 
cost/benefit criteria. 
The financing of these cost-intensive programmes is different from 
that of mandatory programmes insofar as States unwilling to participate 
may opt out and will not be required to give the programme financial 
support. They will also be excluded from the decision-making process and 
from the privilege of having their enterprises participate in the placement of 
contracts. 
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c) Practical experience with the placing of contracts under the industrial policy 
objectives of ESA 
5 The industrial policy rules of ESA mostly apply to optional 
programmes. Therefore, firms participating in tender offers must fill out 
geographical distribution forms. These forms are designed to enable the 
Agency determine the proportion of work which may be allotted to each of 
the Member States. These figures are collected and are used to compute 
the return coefficient and to initiate review procedures, as foreseen by 
Annex V of the Convention. More sophisticated forms have been proposed 
recently by the IPC of ESA (cf. sub d). 
As far as the placing of different types of contracts is concerned, one 
must distinguish between separate phases, namely phases A, B, C and D in 
the realization of optional programmes. Tender offers of phase A, the 
"study-phase", contain so-called "prefeasibility studies" in order to enable 
the Agency establish whether and under what conditions a certain project 
or part of a project may be initiated. A contract arising from that phase 
must be regarded as a service contract, if we apply the terminology of EEC 
law (No. 24). Phase B, the definition phase, concerns feasibility studies 
specifying and defining the project to be developed. This phase again leads 
to the possible placing of service contracts, these however being far more 
specific and concrete with respect to the object to be developed ( a 
launching system, a satellite, or parts thereof). 
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Phase C and D of the tender offer concerns the actual project 6 
planned. Under ESA rules, a specific object will be developed and 
eventually produced or elaborated. This must be regarded as a contract 
concerning goods, not just services as under the EEC rules. Depending on 
the project to be implemented, also separate service contracts may be 
placed, e.g. concerning software development. This phase is the most 
important in financial terms. For the enterprises involved, it is certainly the 
most attractive in terms of guaranteeing jobs for their employees and 
ensuring a profit for their shareholders. lt is obvious that successful 
leadership or participation in phases C and D depends on positive results in 
phases A and B, concerning the elaboration of the project's prefeasibility or 
feasibility studies. In shaping cooperation agreements and in founding 
consortia, a participating enterprise or group of enterprises has a certain 
influence on the geographical distribution of the work to be contracted, 
which may be decisive (under the industrial policy rules of the ESA 
Convention) on whether and how the contract is awarded if competing 
offers exist. This effect will be increased when the contract is awarded to a 
leading enterprise (Systemführer) which cooperates with many 
subcontractors from different ESA-Member countries. lt should be 
mentioned that, due to the complexity of space technology, ESA has been 
lately more willing to award larger contracts for optional programmes 
through negotiation rather than competitive tender offers; this negotiation 
procedure amounts to about 1/2 of the current placement of contracts. 
A statistical evaluation demonstrates that ESA is increasingly 
concerned that the data it produces is in accordance with the "fair return" 
co-efficient - although some deviations can be shown. Member states 
carefully observe ESA performance as to industrial policy, especially 
through their representatives in the IPC. This is shown by the chart 
below': 
2 Chatham House Special Paper, Europe's Future in Space - A Joint Policy Report, 1988, 
p. 197 
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ESA:Industrial returns, from 1January1972 to 31December1984 (in 
thousands of EAU) 
Country Unweighted Weighted Ideal Surplus/ return 
amount amount amount deficit coefficient 
Austria 14866 11597 12481 884 0.93 
Belgium 174609 1633451 175390 - 11939 0.93 
Denmark 76696 62237 60551 + 1786 1.03 
France 1665255 1384526 1353034 + 31492 1.02 
W.Germ. 1204736 1118191 1085754 + 34437 1.03 
Ire land 4772 3933 2716 + 1217 1.45 
Italy 532404 497197 519210 - 22013 0.96 
Netherland 201864 142776 145633 2857 0.98 
Norway 7130 7053 7741 688 0.91 
Spain 120608 101257 120572 - 19315 0.84 
Sweden 92219 82672 89215 6543 0.93 
Switzerland 87123 78684 84303 5619 0.93 
UK 658996 592787 574134 + 18653 1.03 
Canada 55435 55435 61712 6277 0.90 
Total 4896713 4301896 
Phase D concerns the utilization of a certain space project (launching 
systems, satellites and so on). They may be used for scientific or commercial 
purposes, or for both. This distinction is important for the application of the 
state aid rules of EEC-law (No. 42). The "marketing" of space systems 
developed by ESA under its procurement and industrial policy rules is not, 
however, done by ESA itself, but by commercial undertakings like 
Arianespace (No. 1) which concludes contracts on the launching of 
satellites with governmental or commercial users. The procurement of these 
contracts is not governed by the ESA Convention, with the exception of 
Article IX para 3 of the Convention, which provides that: 
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(a) Products developed under a programme of the Agency 
shall be supplied to any Member State that has taken 
part in the funding of the programme in question and 
ask for such products to be supplied for its own 
purposes. 
The Council shall determine by a two thirds majority of 
all Member States the practical arrangements under 
which such products will be supplied and in particular 
the measures to be taken by the Agency in regard to its 
contractors to enable the requesting Member State to 
obtain those products. 
(b) This Member State may ask the Agency to state 
whether it considers that the prices proposed by the 
contractors are fair and reasonable and whether, under 
similar circumstances, it will consider them acceptable 
for the purposes of its own requirements. 
W e cannot assess the importance of this clause concerning the 
preferential treatment of participating Member States in the utilization of 
products developed by ESA. 
d) Recent modifications of ESA industrial policy 
The growing importance of the optional programmes of ESA, their 8 
increased financial volume and the duration of contract completion has led 
to a modification in the industrial policy of ESA. The Council of Ministers, 
which met in The Hague in November 1987 and put under way the optional 
programmes Ariane 5, Hermes, and Columbus (No. 1), demanded a new 
calculation of return rates in order to achieve the following objectives: 
Each participating state should be guaranteed an 0.90 
return coefficient, with a target value of 0.95. 
ESA should calculate more accurately than before the 
medium-term overall coefficients based on contract 
payments and outstanding commitments. 
Return estimates should be developed for the 
completion of programmes, even if no contracts have 
yet been placed due to the lang duration of these 
programmes. 
IPC developed proposals for attaining these goals. Though we cannot, 
within the framework of this paper treat with the discussion in detail, the 
following points3 deserve consideration: 
As before, the return coefficient is calculated by 
comparing the value of contracts placed in a given 
country with the ideal value based on the contributions 
of a participating country, corrected by the weighting 
factors. 
3 Based on IPC document (88) 94 of 29 July 1988. 
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ESA will use its financial accounting system facilities 
(EFSY) to calculate as accurately as possible medium-
term overall coefficients which include payments made 
and outstanding commitments, adjusted by price and 
currency changes. 
Estimates will be elaborated for the completion phase 
of a programme even when contracts have not yet been 
placed; this is particularly important if increased 
financial contributions become necessary because of 
the long duration of programmes (threshhold of 120 % 
of the agreed contribution of a participating state). 
Special consideration will be given to the purchase of 
components by industry: the purchase price will be 
reckoned as geographical return for the country in 
which the firm is established, while the value added is 
credited to the firm responsible for the centralised 
purchase. 
A ESA Council Resolution on the Regulation concerning calculation 
of the return coefficients used for the geographical distribution of 
contracts4, seeks to codify the new practice of calculating return 
coefficients. lt does not, however, include a guarantee of a 0.90 coefficient 
to a contributing state nor the target value of 0.95. 
In addition to the above mentioned reasons for these changes, we 
submit that they are due to the increased financial burdens and the 
different contributions of paticipating Member States (cf. No. 1) to optional 
programmes. In order to make them subscribe to the programmes, ESA 
must be sure that the overall return coefficients will not only be maintained, 
but will also be increased and guaranteed in the future. lt is therefore not 
surprising that the imperatives of the EEC Interna! Market seem to have 
been completely "forgotten" in the deliberations of the ESA Council of 
Ministers and its IPC, at least insofar as the policy of Member States of the 
EEC is concerned. 
4 Of 15 November 1988. 
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e) Procurement of national agencies 
Space products and objects are also developed by national agencies, 9 
most notably in France by CNES (Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales) and 
by the British Aerospace Agency. In Germany, the Ministry for Research 
and Development, through DFVLR (Deutsche Forschungs- und 
Versuchsanstalt für Luft- und Raumfahrt), a company established under 
private law, may award contracts and/or subsidies concerning space 
activities. The creation of a German space agency is under consideration 
and has recently been founded under the name DARA (Deutsche Agentur 
für Raumfahrtangelegenheiten). lt is also possible for states to cooperate 
bilaterally in the support of space activities. ESA has no exclusive 
jurisdiction extending to all Member State space activities. These activities 
may concern both civil and military uses; the latter do not come under 
Article II of the ESA Convention: 
"whereas the purpose of the Agency shall be to provide 
for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, 
cooperation among European states and space 
research and technology and their space applications, 
with a view to their being used for scientific purposes 
and for operational space application systems ... " 
W e have little information about the practical handling of 
procurement by national space agencies. We submit, however, that they will 
prefer national contractors in the placement of their contracts and only 
under exceptional circumstances request foreign companies for tender 
offers, for example if the technology needed is not available to them 
through national suppliers. This may still be justified by the existing 
exemptions from Community wide procurement in the area of transport, 
energy, and telecommunication services, even though they will be certainly 
abandoned before 1993 (cf. Nos. 36, 36a). 
f) Economic effects of the "industrial policy" of the ESA Convention 
(1) lt is not the purpose of our study to evaluate, from an economic 10 
standpoint, the effects, merits and possible distortions to competition 
resulting from the industrial policy of ESA. We refer for details to a 
thorough, yet critical, study by the well-known Royal Institue of 
International Affairs, London, and other research institutes5. This paper 
argues that an inherent contradiction exists within the ESA Convention 
itself, since it seeks to guarantee at the same time 
5 Chatharn House special paper, loc. cit. at Fn 2. 
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to use the advantages of competitive tender off ers, 
an equitable share of the contracts to each Member 
State, 
and to increase return rates of smaller countries which 
have not yet developed their own space industry. 
lt is quite critical of the "fair return" policy insofar as it contradicts the 
principles of competition and leads to difficult and time-consuming 
negotiations on the "fair return" rates. In the lang run, it prevents the 
establishment of a truly competitive European space industry which, until 
now, may not be subjected to demands for rationalization, cannot use the 
economies of scale, and will give preference to big companies from large 
countries6. lt comes to the conclusion: 
"The general goal of a strong autonomous European 
presence and identity in space will not · be attained 
without greater public support. Furthermore, a greater 
degree of democratic control and public awareness of 
the choices involved in European space policy is not 
merely desirable; it will become a necessity as that 
policy refches a higher degree of importance and 
maturity". 
Another paper by CNES8 is critical about "les effets pervers" of the 
"fair return" policy because it leads to a fractiolling of markets and, 
collsequently, a segregation of markets within the Member States of the 
ESA Conventioll. 
Concerning the problem of competitive bidding a theory-based 
economic critique has been voiced by Finsinger9. If bidding is truly 
competitive, there is a good chance that, in the long run, the most efficent 
supplier will win. If the process is distorted either by quasi-cartel effects Oll 
the bidder's side or by government-imposed return rates on the demand 
side, negotiation procedures will take place instead of true competition. All 
participating enterprises will try to get "part of the cake", and the 
procurement agency will be under pressure to award "fair shares" to every 
participant. A "fair return" principle imposes a quasi-cartel effect Oll the 
bidders who have to organise themselves in order to meet the conditions of 
the tender offers. In the short run, this negotiation procedure may be quite 
profitable for the participating undertakings and their employees, in 
6 Loc. cit. p. 159, 170, 181. 
7 Loc. cit. p. 185/6. 
8 Impacte de l'acte unique europeen sur les activites spatiales, Juin 1988. 
9 EER 1988, 69. 
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guaranteeing security for jobs and profitability of investments. In the long 
run, it may perpetuate inefficiencies and exclude these undertakings from 
world-wide competition for contracts in space activities. 
(2) On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the participating 11 
ESA Member States could probably persuade their Parliaments to 
participate in European space research and development only by imposing 
the fair return principle. This is the more true after the adoption of the 
ambitious projects Ariane 5, Hermes, and Columbus by the 1987 ESA 
Council with widely differing contributions of Member States to these 
optional programmes. As an incentive to promote European space 
activities, therefore, the "fair return" principle was a prerequisite for an 
independent European space policy and for the creation of a European 
"high-tech industry''. lt cannot be stated unequivocally whether this 
argument still holds true for the next future (1992!), when a competitive 
European space industry will ex.ist which does not need to be shielded from 
competition by the "fair return" principle10. This Statement is quite in 
contrast to the demands of the ESA-Council and the IPC for the allowance 
of a more precise monitoring of medium range return rates for participating 
governments and to guarantee under all circumstances a 0.90, if possible a 
0.95 return ratio. The conflict arising between the "fair return" principle of 
the ESA Convention on the one hand, and the insistence of the EEC Treaty 
and the free trade agreements of the EEC with EFf A countries on 
competition on the other, may weil be a useful stimulus for creating a more 
open and competitive European space industry. The following sections will 
therefore confront the ESA Convention with the imperatives of the Interna! 
Market which the Community wants to complete by the end of 1992. 
10 Cf. in this direction the Chatharn House Paper, loc. cit. p. 146-150. 
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2. The EEC Internal Market Policy as an Alternative to the ESA 
Principle of "Fair Return"? 
12 The importance of Community Iaw to industrial policies of Member 
States and international organisations like ESA has received increased 
political and legal attention after the ratification of the Single European 
Act. lt came into force on 1 July 1987. The Single Act, in Article 8 A para 2 
of the amended Treaty, imposes a definite policy objective on the 
Community, namely the creation of an 
"area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty". 
The Member States' government representatives 
"have declared their firm political will to take before 1 
J anuary 1993 the decisions necessary to complete the 
Internal Market defined in those provisions, and more 
particularly the decisions necessary to implement the 
Commissison's programme described in the White 
Paper on the Internal Market. Setting the date of 31 
December 1992 does not create an automatic legal 
effect". 
From its wording, the intention behind it, and its context in the Treaty, 
Article 8 A enumerates a political objective and not a specific legal 
obligation11. This can be seen quite clearly from the other provisions 
amending the EEC Treaty. The most important changes in the Treaty 
imposed by the Single Act have been the following: 
The establishment of a cooperation procedure with the 
European Parliament which allows for the adoption of 
directives and other measures necessary to establish 
and complete the Internal Market by qualified majority 
under Articles 100 A, 57, as amended. 
The inclusion of new policies like economic and social 
cohesion, research and technological development, and 
environment, which were gradually developed before, 
but have been reaffirmed by the Single Act and found 
their institutional and legal recognition. 
11 This point has been developed in greater detail in Reich, Schutzpolitik in der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft im Spannungsfeld von Rechtsschutznormen und 
institutioneller Integration, 1988. 
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Taken in context the provisions on the Interna! Market do not have a 
direct effect in the sense used in the case law of the Court of Justice12. If the 
Community does not take the necessary measures, most notably directives, 
or if the Member States do not implement them in due time, the Interna! 
Market will not arrive automatically. This is shown through Article 100 B of 
the Treaty and by the negotiations in the Commission and the Council 
before its insertion into the amended Treaty. Article 100 B creates a special 
procedure for establishing whether the provisions in force in a Member 
State may be regarded as being equivalent to those applied by another 
Member State or not. lt is up to the Council through a political decision 
under the procedures of Article 100 A to decide whether or not these 
provisions are equivalent. If the Council has taken this decision, then the 
safeguard clause of Article 100 A ( 4) shall apply by analogy. This means 
that a Member State will be able to oppose Community measures 
concerning the free circulation of goods to its existing national provisions 
Oll 
"grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36 (most 
notably to the protection of health and safety, NR), or 
relating to the protection of the environment or the 
working environment. .. " 
The completion of the Interna! Market therefore is a gradual process 
which will not necessarily be completed by 31 December 1992. 
Even if therefore the completion of the Interna! Market is not "self-
executive", the relevant provisions of primary and secondary Community 
law on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital must be 
interpreted in this spirit. This is especially true insofar as the basic 
provisions of the Treaty on the free circulation of goods and services are 
concerned. Articles 30 and 59, as we will show later, will become ever more 
important in the Community objective to establish the Interna! Market. The 
basic Community freedoms, as interpreted and extended by a growing and 
continuing Court of Justice case law, will have tobe accomplished in order 
to attain the objectives of the Interna! Market. There is no opposition, but a 
common spirit in the basic Community freedoms on the one hand and the 
political will and determination to create the Interna! Market by 31 
December 1992 on the other. The Single Act therefore has not changed, but 
12 Cf. the judgment of 3 December 1974, 1974 ECR 1299 - van Binsbergen concerning 
the direct effect of t~e proyisions on the freedom to provide services; the sa~e had been 
ruled for the free c1rculation of goods, but rejected for the free circulation of capital, 
1981ECR2595 - Casati. We will not go into the details of the discussion. 
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propelled the economic freedoms of the Treaty. As Ehlermann13, former 
head of the legal service of the Commission and one of the authors of the 
Single Act, has correctly stated, 
"far from watering down the EEC Treaty, the Single 
European Act enriched it by adding finer details". 
13 In this context, Articles 30 and 59 must be interpreted together with 
the provisions on the Internal Market in a dual sense: 
(1) The basic freedoms of the EEC Treaty, reinforced by the 
provisions on the Internal Market, have as one particular objective the 
guarantee to undertakings established in the EEC of access to the entire 
common market of goods, services and capital without discrimination and 
unreasonable restrictions. This basic right of entry into the common market 
which is granted to every EEC-based enterprise, as the Court of Justice has 
repeatedly stated, serves to create conditions of marketing similar, from 
1993 on identical, to those of an internal market14. The economic objective 
of this right of "entry'' has been clearly enunciated by Peter Sutherland15, 
the former EEC Commissioner on competition, as follows: 
" ... avec l'approche de l'echeance decisive de 1993, les 
efforts tenaces des autorites europeennes n'ont cesse 
de converger vers un seul but: mettre en place un 
veritable marche interieur et, simultanement restaurer 
et renforcer la competitivite des entreprises 
europeennes sur le marche mondial. L'un ne va pas 
sans l'autre: la libre concurrence, dans les limites 
autorisees par la loi, reste la meilleure fai;on 
d'atteindre ce double objectif'. 
(2) The basic freedoms guaranteed by the EEC Treaty and the 
objective of the Internal Market not only protect the basic right of entry of 
persons and undertakings, but also the freedom of choice of all consumers 
and customers within the entire common market16• This relates both to 
private consumers, to professional customers, and to public entities 
requesting the supply of goods or services. All customers have a 
fundamental right to choose among the most advantageous and competitive 
13 
14 
15 
16 
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CMLR 1987, 361 at 369; in the same sense cf. De Ruyt, L'Acte Unique europen, 1987, p. 
160, against the former judge of the Court of Justice, Pescatore, EuR 1986, 153 at 161. 
For an overview of the relevant case-law principles, cf. Steindorff, ZHR 1986 (150), 687 
at 697. 
Le 1janvier1993 - Ce qui va se changer en Europe, 1988, p 53. Even though we do not 
adhere to the exclusively market-oriented positions of Sutherland, they are characteristic 
of Community thinking. 
We have developed this point of view in Reich, Schutz und Förderung diffuser 
Interessen durch die EG, 1987, Nos. 8, 11. This freedom of choice is, of course not 
absolute, but any restriction must be justified under Community law principles. ' 
offers of goods and services within the entire Interna! Market without 
regard to the nationality of suppliers or the geographical distribution of 
offers. 
lt should be remembered that the objectives of the Interna! Market 
have also been written into the so-called new policies which have been 
either recognized or established by the Single Act. This is especially true 
with regard to the provisions on research and technological development. 
Article 130 F (3) says: 
"In the achievement of these aims, particular account 
shall be taken of the connection between the common 
research and technological development eff ort, the 
establishment of the Interna! Market and the 
implementation of common policies, particularly as 
regards competition and trade" 
The objectives of the EEC concerning the Interna! Market as laid 14 
down in the Single Act have been criticized for different reasons. This 
paper cannot go into a detailed discussion of this criticism, especially 
insofar as social policy is concerned. The following points however should 
be mentioned in passing: 
(1) From the very objectives of the Interna! Market it can easily be 
seen that the Single Act is opposed to an industrial policy of the type 
formulated in the ESA Convention. The requirements of the Single Act on 
competition, entry and free choice are difficult to reconcile with the 
opposite principle of safeguarding industrial policy, as expounded by the 
ESA Convention. W e will discuss the legal issues of this conflict more 
thoroughly in the later parts of this paper. One may wonder whether 
insistence on the Interna! Market may lead Member States of the ESA 
Convention to withdraw from the funding of space activities if they cannot 
get a fair return for their home industry. W e do not know whether this 
<langer exists. Such a withdrawal might be quite contrary to the objectives of 
the Single Act itself, namely its provisions on economic and social cohesion 
and on research and technological development. On the other hand, it 
should be pointed out that strengthening the European competitiveness and 
the safeguarding of an industrial policy (with emphasis on employment) 
should be accomplished through means which conform with basic EEC 
principles. We will therefore develop procedures which aim at bringing 
ESA industrial policy into conformity with basic requirements of EEC law 
and free trade agreements between EEC and EFTA countries. This may 
result in time-consuming adaptation processes whose goal is to give an 
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increased role to the EEC in European space policy17 without abolishing 
government commitments taken, and without interfering with the 
employment and industrial infrastructure already created. Therefore, not 
only the Internal Market considerations, but also the international law 
provisions of the EEC, in relationship with ESA procurement policy will be 
analysed in greater detail ( Chapter 11). 
(2) Industrial policy concerns not only industry as such but also 
employment policy in general and regional distribution of employment in 
particular. EEC law in these respects is only developing. lt is still the basic 
obligation of Member States to ensure employment and equitable regional 
distribution of incomes according to their constitutions and social policies. 
Even under the imperatives of the Single Market, the Community does not 
have an overall mandate to determine the employment and regional policies 
of Member States. This can be clearly demonstrated by the rather hesitant 
transfer of powers to the Community in this area, which the Single Act has 
affectuated through Articles 118 A, 130 A et seq. Community law therefore 
recognizes the primary responsibility of Member States for employment and 
regional development. This is indirectly corroborated by the provisions on 
state aids, most notably Article 92, (3) (c) (No. 45), and on safeguard 
measures relating to the Common Commercial Policy, namely Article 115 
(Nos. 83 ss). In any case, the Member States should take all steps necessary 
to ensure that their social policies conform with the requirements of the 
Treaty as amended by the Single Act. Different social policies are no 
pretext for avoiding application of the rules on free circulation of goods and 
services, and on the completion of the Interna! Market. Social policies on 
the one hand, and the Internal Market objective on the other, have to be 
awarded an equal status in the shaping of Community policy and in 
interpreting Community law. This is demonstrated by Article 8 C of the 
amended Treaty: 
"When drawing up its proposals with a view to 
achieving its objectives set out in Article 8 A, the 
Commission shall take into account the extent of the 
effort that certain economies showing differences in 
development will have to sustain during the period of 
establishment of the Interna! Market and it may 
propose appropriate provisions. lf these provisions 
take the form of derogation, they must be of a 
temporary nature and must cause the least possible 
disturbance to the functioning of the Common 
Market". 
17 Cf. the Document Com. 88 (417) final of 26July1988. 
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(3) Community law does not exempt certain policies, e.g. in the R & D 
sector, from an application of the basic freedoms and the competition rules, 
even if the Member States still maintain their sovereignty especially on the 
financing of research programmes. The Court of Justice has never 
recognized that certain areas are beyond the reach of Community 
jurisdiction, e.g. education, culture, research, but insisted that Member 
States pursue their policies in conformity with EEC law. 
Therefore, the purpose of this paper will be to present the legal 
instruments designed to coordinate the different objectives of the projected 
Internal Market and the industrial policy of Member States. 
43 
3. EEC Law Requirements on Public (ESA and National) Procurement 
(1): Article 30 as Guarantee ofFree Entry to Undertakings and Free 
Choice to Consumers/Customers 
a) The importance of Article 30 for establishing the Interna/ Market 
15 Article 30 as a basic rule of the EEC Treaty18 forbids "all measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports". Article 
30 does not specifically mention procurement rules as being measures of 
equivalent effect. We must therefore look at the interpretation of the notion 
"measures having equivalent effect" by the Court of Justice. If we analyse 
the case law correctly, the interpretation has increasingly been extended to 
measures which do not directly effect intra-community trade with goods, 
but which create conditions which indirectly disfavour goods coming from, 
or undertakings established, in another Member Country or which are, in 
general, unduly restrictive to trade within the Community. 
The scope and content of state measures coming under Article 30 has 
been subject to a long and contentious legal debate. We need not repeat the 
arguments because there now exists established case law and legislation 
which makes clear the broad application of Article 30 to measures of 
Member States having an impact on intra-community trade. The process of 
a broad construction of Article 30 was begun with Directive 70/32/EEC of 
17 December 196919 which concerned the establishment of the free 
movement of goods between Member States until the end of the transition 
period. lt follows from Articles 3(1) and 3(2), as weil as from the Preamble, 
that measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions include 
18 
19 
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statutory and other practices or other provisions which 
stipulate that a given government or public authority 
requirement must be wholly or partially met by 
domestic products, thereby excluding or limiting the 
procurement of imported goods, or 
those measures which stipulate advantages or 
preferences for domestic products when public 
contracts are put out to tender or placed for supply, 
where imported as opposed to domestic products are 
put at a disadvantage, by means other than taxation. 
Its i_mportance for the intex:ial marke~ policy of the Communi!Y was spelled out in the 
Wh1te Paper on the complellon of the mternal market, Com. (85) 310 final, No. 82. 
OJ L 13/1of19January1970. 
This approach has been continued by Directive 70/50 of 22 December 
196920. 
The case law of the Court went even further because it applied Article 16 
30 not only to discriminatory measures, but also to measures which are 
indistinctly applicable to home and foreign products or which have a mere 
potential effect on intra-Community trade: 
"All trading rules which are capable of hindering, 
directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures 
having an eff ect equivalent to quantitative 
restrictions"21 . 
This so-called Dassonville-formula which, after some discussion, has 
now been accepted by Member State courts of law, does not only cover 
product-related regulations but all rules restricting entry of undertakings to 
product markets. Further in our discussion, we will use this so-called 
Dassonville formula in order to discover whether and how state 
procurement rules come under Article 30 and, if that is the case, whether 
they may be justified. 
The following legal discussion will have to answer three questions: 
How far will Art. 30 apply to Member State practices 
which do not overtly discriminate against foreign goods 
or undertakings, but establish rules on the geographical 
distribution in placement of government supply 
contracts? 
Under what circumstances must procurement rules, 
being used either by Member State agencies or by ESA 
in space activity, be regarded as "state measures"? 
What possible justifications exist for discriminatory 
procurement rules under primary and secondary 
Community law? 
20 OJ L 13/29 of 19January1970. 
21 1974 ECR 837 at 852 No. 5 - Dassonville. 
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b) Applicability of Article 30 to rules an entry 
17 The case law of the Court of Justice in the eighties can be divided into 
two parts. One part concerns product-oriented regulations which were 
indistinctly applicable to home and foreign products. This discussion is 
centred around the so-called "Cassis-de-Dijon-doctrine"22. lt does not 
concern procurement policies because these are not product-related. We 
will therefore not go into the details of this case law23. 
The other part of the case law concerns an ever-growing extension in 
the sphere of application of Article 30, to measures which have a mere 
indirect or potential effect on intra-community trade. Most of them have 
some sort of overt or hidden discriminatory character. They are not so 
much related to products themselves, as to entry of foreign untertakings 
into product markets. For the purpose of our study, this case law is more 
interesting since certain conclusions can be drawn as regards Member 
States' procurement policy and their importance for procurement policies 
of international organisations to which Member States adhere. 
The case law of the eighties provides many examples where primary 
Community law was extended to state measures concerning the marketing 
of products and therefore the entry of undertakings. In the following are 
some examples of Court practice in striking down quasi-protectionist 
measures of Member States: 
(1) Health-related advertising regulations on alcoholic beverages 
which are more stringent for foreign than for home products24 or rules on 
fair competition that discriminate ~ainst imported products or 
undertakings from other EEC countries do not directly exclude these 
undertakings from the market. Rather, they make market penetration more 
difficult, force foreign undertakings to create subsidiaries in the receiving 
country, or make them adapt their marketing strategies to the legislation of 
the importing countries. These rules, even if they have a mere potential or 
indirect effect on intra-Community trade, fall under the prohibition of Art. 
30 and can only be justified by meeting some sort of public interest test 
which we will consider at a later point (Nos. 21-23). 
22 1979 ECR 649. 
23 Cf. Reich, Joc. cit. Nos. 13, 24 
24 1980 ECR 2299 at 2316 No. 18 - Advertising of alcoholic beverages. 
25 1981 ECR 181 at 195 No. 16 - Dansk Supermarked; 1982 ECR 4575 at 4587 No. 15 -
Osthoeck; 1984 ECR 3651 at 3663 No. 17 - Kohl. 
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(2) Similar principles apply where rules oblige the undertaking to 
purchase a certain proportion of its demand, e.g. of petroleum, from a 
national supplier organisation26. These rules limit the entry of undertakings 
who wish to import, as in the case at hand, to Ireland, at competitive prices. 
Such a regulation will fall under Article 30, even though it has only a 
potential effect on intra-Community trade (it may under exceptional 
circumstances however be justified on grounds of public policy in Article 
36). 
(3) The Duphar-case concerned the conformity of exclusionary lists of 
medicinal products reimbursed by the Dutch social security fund. The 
Court insisted that the list "must be drawn up in accordance with objective 
criteria, without reference to the origin of the products, and must be 
verifiable by any importer"27. The establishment of these lists may not be 
used to promote R & D of home based pharmaceutical enterprises. 
( 4) Another area of application of Article 30 has been government 
support programmes of harne industries through the funding of a sales 
promotion campaign or by disfavouring foreign enterprises in the purchase 
of goods. This broad application of Article 30 to indirect, yet discriminatory 
measures of Member States is clearly demonstrated by the judgment of 24 
November 1982 condemning the "Buy Irish Campaign"28: Even though the 
Irish government had not directly launched this campaign but set up an 
Irish Goods Council and a labe! "Guaranteed Irish" in order to induce 
customers to buy Irish products, its participation was condemned as a 
"measure of equivalent eff ect". The government indirectly participated in 
the campaign through funding, organisation, and monitoring. The campaign 
was part of its economic policy in order to secure employment and restore 
business efficiency in Ireland. In order to be successfull (which it was not!), 
entry for foreign undertakings into the Irish market was made more 
difficult, though not impossible: 
". . . those two activities form part of a government 
programme which is designed to achieve the 
substitution of domestic products for imported 
products and is liable t~ affect the volume of trade 
between Member States" 9. 
26 1984 ECR 2727 at 2747 No. 20 - Campus Oil. 
27 1984 ECR 523 at 542 No. 21. 
28 1982 ECR 4005. 
29 At. 40?2 N~. ~; this m~s~ b~ distinguished. from an information campaign based on 
obiecttve cntena, even 1f md1rectly prornotmg the marketing of local products, 1983 
ECR 4083 at 4128 - Apple Council. 
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Ireland had consequently violated its obligations under primary 
Community law and could not invoke any justification like the public 
interest test of Article 36, or of a specific safeguard clause. 
(5) The judgment of 9 May 1985 criticized French PTI's practice of 
disfavouring foreign goods and undertakings in the order of postal 
machines through means of certification delay. This practice was not 
written into law. The Court of Justice insisted that a "state measure" having 
equivalent effect according to Article 30 need not to be written into formal 
rules of procurement, but may derive from simple administrative practices 
with a certain degree of consistency and generality. If a Member State 
adopts a systematically unfavourable attitude towards imported machines, it 
has violated Article 3030. 
(6) The judgment of 14 March 1985 condemned the French 
preferential postal tariffs reserved for French newspapers and periodicals 
or to newspapers and periodicals printed in France. The Court did not even 
allow a de minimis defense: 
"A national measure cannot evade the prohibition 
under Article 30 merely because the hindrance to 
importation is slight or because it is possible for the 
imported product tobe marketed in another way ... "31. 
c) Criteria for applying Article 30 to the procurement policies of Member 
States or ESA procurement in which Member States participate 
18 This extremely broad interpretation of Article 30 by the Court means 
that Member States' procurement policies must be regarded as measures 
having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions. The Member State 
cannot defend itself by arguing that procurement rules do not guarantee the 
award of contracts to participating undertakings, but only give a choice to 
public authorities. Procurement rules concern the entry of undertakings 
into the Common Market and must therefore meet the criteria of Article 
30. They may not openly or covertly discriminate against undertakings 
having their established business seat in one of the 12 member countries. 
The only exception are defense contracts under Article 223 of the EEC 
Treaty. 
30 1985 ECR 1355 at 1364 No. 11 - French postal machines. 
31 1985 ECR 837 at 846 No. 10. 
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In its recent judgment against Ireland on 22 September 1988, the 
Court has affirmed on the application of Art. 30 to public procurement, 
even if the services demanded were exempted by the relevant Community 
directives (cf. No. 36): 
"L'art. 30 du traite a pour but d'eliminer toutes les 
mesures des Etats membres qui font obstacle aux 
courants d'importation dans le commerce 
intracommunautaire, que ces mesures portent 
directement sur la circulation des marchandies 
importes ou qu'elles aient indirectement pour effet 
~::~~~~;~tl:t~~1:~~~~~~J!~n des produits provenant 
These principles first apply to those Member State space agencies who 
are responsible for the implementation of national space policies. In their 
procurement policies, they are under the obligation of primary Community 
law to allow tender offers by undertakings from all EEC countries, which must 
be taken into consideration in the award of the contract by applying 
objective criteria. If they adopt rules on the geographical or regional 
distribution of contracts, they are applying protectionist objectives and 
therefore discriminating against undertakings which do not come from 
these areas. These practices are therefore forbidden under Article Jrf33. There 
may be cases where these regional policies may be regarded as subsidies or 
state aids according to Article 92 (cf below Nos. 40-44). But the Court has 
repeatedly said that the applicability of the state aid rules must not be used 
as an argument to circumvent the strict enforcement of Article 3034. In 
cases where a procurement policy based on geographical criteria is 
paralleled by state subsidies to undertakings or regions, both Article 30 and 
Article 92 will be applicable. As the Court of Justice has said: 
"(Both Art. 30 and 92 have a common objective) to 
ensure the free movement of goods between ~ember 
States under normal conditions of competition"3 . 
32 Case 45/87, 1988 ECR not yet published - Commission/Ireland. 
33 Müller-Graff, ZHR 1988 (152), 403 at 420; Weiss, ELR 1988, 318 at 319, 330; 
Vandamme, dans: Dutheil de la Rochere & Vandamme (eds.), Inteiventions publiques 
et droit communautaire, 1988, p. 106. 
34 1977 ECR 550 at 574 - Meroni; 1985 ECR 1339 at 1347 No. 13 - Tax advantages for 
newspaper publishers. 
35 er. 1986 ECR 1759at1774 No. 19 - Italian cars. 
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19 The problems are however much more complicated where the 
procurement policy of international organisations is concerned. 
International organisations do not come under the jurisdiction of the EEC 
Treaty. In these cases, the specific rules concerning the interrelationship 
between international law and Community law must be observed. We will 
elaborate on these rules in greater detail in the following chapter and then 
refer to the results drawn within this context. 
On the other hand, Member States who participate in international 
organisations must observe their obligations under primary Community law. 
They cannot act counter to their obligations under Community law by 
simply becoming a member of an international organisation which has 
different objectives and policies from that of the Community. This principle 
must be derived from Article 30. In connection with Art. 5, 116, 234, it can 
be shaped into an overall rule of good faith by Member States conceming their 
participation in international organisations36• 
The importance of this principle can be seen specifically in ESA: 
Member States participate in ESA in order to promote a European space 
policy. This objective, as we have mentioned above, is certainly not contrary 
to primary or secondary Community law. lt is also true that there is a trade-
off relation between the Member States' contribution to optional 
programmes on the one hand and to the R & D as well as industrial policy 
of ESA on the other. Community law, however, is critical of such trade-offs, 
which by their nature hinder an equal development of all areas of the 
Community, as can be shown by Article 2 and by the new provisions of the 
Single Act on economic and social cohesion, Art. 130 A, and on R & D, 
Art. 130 F. lt is therefore up to the Community and not the Member States 
to decide on the regional and geographical distribution of public supply and 
service (No. 26) contracts, even if this concerns R & D objectives. If 
Member States wish to encourage research and development in specific 
areas and thereby promote certain regions or industries, they may do so, 
but in the process must observe the Interna! Market and Common 
Commercial Policy rules; they may not unilaterally use their procurement 
policies for the purpose of developing R & D in certain regions or 
industries. Community law, under the broad interpretation of Article 30, is 
strictly opposed to protectionist R & D and industrial policies based on 
discriminatory procurement. The Member States may not escape these 
rules by becoming or continuing to be members of international 
36 
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1976 ECR 1279 at p11, Nos. 44/45 - Kramer; 1986 ECR 1425 at 1472 No. 77 - Asjes· 
for a comprehens1ve treatment cf. Söllner, Art. 5 EWGV in der R~chtsprechung de~ 
EuGH, 1985. 
organisations, unless they have been exempted from their obligations by a 
specific Community procedure under its state aid or commercial policy 
rules, namely Arts. 92, 115 (Nos. 40 ss., 83 ss.). 
This seemingly strict verdict is corroborated by another fact. U oder 20 
the principles of the Interna! Market, as shown above, undertakings should 
be free to decide on the place where they will establish their principal 
business seat and how they will co-operate in terms of respecting 
competition rules. A geographical relocation of these entreprenurial 
decisions by rules on the geographical distribution of public supply 
contracts is contrary to the very spirit of the Interna! Market, as an area 
where boundaries will not impede the free movement of goods. 
In this context it should also be mentioned that EEC law provides for 
new forms of Community-wide cooperation, like the European Economic 
Interest Grouping (EEIG) created by Council Regulation No. 2137/85 of 25 
July 1985, in effect from 1 July 198937. If a future EEIG, given its legal 
capacity under Article 2 of the Regulation, participates in a tender offer, it 
will be impossible to apply geographical criteria in order to determine from 
what country or region the off er came from: from the business seat as 
registered according to Article 6, from the establishment of a subsidiary 
according to Article 10, or from the business seat of one of the participants 
of the grouping? The EEIG serves as a legal famework for undertakings to 
"cooperate effectively across frontiers" according to Recital 1 of the 
Regulation. This cooperation purpose within the EEC would be frustrated 
if public bodies were allowed to impose geographical or regional criteria for 
the participation in and award of public supply contracts to undertakings. 
The same is true for the position of the potential dient in a public 
tender offer. The public body which calls for tenders in order to fulfill its 
statutory purposes must be free, in respecting merely objective criteria for 
the award of contracts, to choose among offers coming from all countries of 
the EEC. lt should not be under an obligation to graut preferential 
treatment to one geographical area in the Community. lt should not be 
prevented, by applying restrictive procurement rules to its o\vn purchases, 
to get the most favourable offers, as far as quality and price is concerned, 
from undertakings from all over the EEC. The problem of financing public 
supplies has to be strictly separated from the origins of the tenders. This is 
even the more true if the contracts attempt to stimulate R & D activities. By 
its very nature, the award of a contract should be determined here merely 
by objective criteria relating to the project to be developed, and not by 
37 OJ L 199/1of31July1985. 
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taking into consideration the nationality of the contractor which has nothing 
to do with the quality and outcome of the research and development to be 
undertaken. 
For the purposes of Article 30, there is no difference where state or 
international tender offers are concerned, provided that Member States 
participate in the financing of the supplied products like launching facilities 
or space systems. This is especially true for ESA optional programmes. 
These are financed by the participating states. The Member States would 
violate primary Community law if they insisted on a fair return for their 
financing to the home industries. They would violate Article 30 ( or Article 
59, respectively, if services are concerned, see No. 27), unless there is a 
specific justification under Community law. 
d) Possible justifications for the procurement policies of 
Member State agencies or of ESA 
21 A procurement policy which is based upon tbe fair return principle 
and not upon competitive principles is opposed, as we have shown, to 
Article 30 of the Treaty. lt may be justified under specific exceptions of 
Community law. lt should be made clear that Community law will interpret 
these exceptions very narrowly. The Member State will therefore be under 
an obligation to prove how its discriminatory procurement policy m.ight be 
specifically justified under the Treaty. As far as primary Community law is 
concerned, we would like to make the following comments with respect to 
possible justifications: 
(1) The most important justification is Article 36 which states that 
Community law is not opposed to state measures restricting free trade 
between the Member Countries if this is required by public policy or for 
public security reasons, or by the need to protect the health and lif e of 
human beings. As far as this exception is concerned, the Court of Justice 
has made it quite clear that only reasons of a non-economic nature justify 
the application of Aride 36 which is in effect an exception to a basic 
principle of the Treaty38. The desire of Member States to promote the 
development of certain regions, to sponsor R & D activities of business, or 
to create and keep up employment have not been regarded as justification 
of discriminatory practices. This can be demonstrated very easily by the 
wording of the Buy Irish judgment above. 
38 1984 ECR523 at542 No. 23 -Duphar; 1986ECR1759at ins No. 22 - Italian cars. 
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The only exception allowed so far by the Court of Justice has been the 
safeguarding of a minimum supply of petroleum in the Irish Camf us Oil 
Case ". . . transcending purely economic considerations ... "3 . This 
judgment does not justify a specific Irish industrial policy, but is based upon 
the safeguard of the supply of basic energy in times of need. Due to the 
geographical location of Ireland, the government could not be forced to rely 
solely on importers but could shape a policy enabling it to overcome a crisis 
situation. This specific "crisis management" exception cannot be equalled to 
an overall industrial policy concept by using procurement rules to promote 
employment and business activities in certain regions. There is no principle 
of EEC law stating that the tax-payer should get the money sent back in the 
form of investment or employment. The internal market principle, quite in 
opposition to the "tax payers return rule", wants to spread income within the 
Community as far as possible. 
(2) Another exception to the basic rule on the free circulation of goods 22 
of Article 30 has been developed by the so-called Cassis-doctrine of the 
Court. This rule-of-reason approach has been applied in justifying 
exceptions to the principle of free circulation of goods, especially to satisfy 
mandatory requirements relating to the 
eff ectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of 
public health, the fairness of commercial transactions 
and the defense of the consumers40.11 
There is agreement among legal writers that this so-called Cassis-
doctrine is not limited to the exceptions mentioned there, but can be 
extended to other mandatory requirements, e.g. relating to protection of the 
environment, or to saf eguarding cultural interests. 
On the other hand, the Cassis-rule cannot be used to justify a Member 
State R & D or industrial policy. This doctrine would mean that the 
restrictive interpretation of Article 36 could be circumvented by a broad 
construction of the rule of reason-principle under the Cassis-doctrine. The 
Court of Justice certainly had conceived such a broad reading of 
"mandatory requirements". The principle of fair return as established by the 
ESA Convention and/or by national space procurement policies can 
therefore not be said to protect a "fair trade or competition" within the 
meaning understood by the Court of Justice. This type of fairness implies a 
clear discrimination against undertakings from states which e.g. do not 
participate in optional programmes. lt is hostile to competitive tender offers 
from undertakings spread out all over the Community. lt determines the 
39 Loc. cit. at 2752 No. 35. 
40 1979 ECR 649 at 662 No. 8. 
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participation in government tender offers and the award of public contracts 
(by ESA or by national agencies) by criteria based on nationality, which is 
in opposition to the fundamental principles of the Treaty. The mere fact 
that a member country of ESA contributes to an optional project is no 
justification f or the fair retum principle und er primary Community law. These 
are considerations of a purely economic nature which have nothing to do 
with the idea of an Internal Market where the free flow of goods is assured 
without being hampered by boundaries. 
23 (3) A final justification for measures of equivalent effect will come 
from other provisions of the Treaty or from secondary Community law. As 
far as other provisions of the Treaty are concerned, the Common 
Commercial Policy, under certain circumstances, allows for derogations 
from Internal Market principles or at least enables Community procedures 
to exist under which Member States may be exempted from the strict 
application of these rules, Art. 115. This problem will be analysed in depth 
in chapter II of our study. 
As far as secondary Community law, especially directives are 
concerned, one could speculate that Article 30 does not apply if the 
directives allow for certain exemptions. We will discuss the sphere of 
application of the relevant EEC directives on public supply contracts to 
space activities later on (No. 36). We will show that their scope is not as 
wide as Article 30. This does not mean that the areas of procurement 
policy, which are not covered by the directives, fall automatically beyond 
the applicability of Article 30 or Article 59. The Court of Justice has 
resisted such a reading of the directives. In another context it has said that 
certain EEC Directives which attempt to improve the free circulation of 
goods must be 
"read in the light of Article 30 of the Treaty and ... may 
not be relied upon as a means of defeating the 
objective set out in that Article~ an objective which it 
itself is also intended to achieve'!Lf1. 
A similar view has been taken by the Court in the above (No. 18) 
mentioned judgement against Ireland of 22 Sept. 1988: 
"Le fait qu'un marche public de travaux concerne la 
prestation de services ne peut clone avoir pour 
consequence de soustraire aux interdictions de l'art. 30 
une limitation des materiaux a utiliser inscrite dans un 
avis d'appel d'offres". 
41 1986 ECR 1759 at 1774 No. 20 - Italian cars. 
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The Community itself, in its Interna! Market policy, is bound by the 
principles of Article 30. lt is therefore hard to imagine that secondary 
Community law could be used to frustrate the full effect of Article 30. The 
judgment of 29 February 1984 is quite explicit in that respect: 
"Although it is true, as the Commission emphasized in 
its observations, that Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty 
applied primarily to unilateral measures adopted by 
the Member States, the Community institutions 
themselves must also have due regard to freedom of 
trade within the Community, whiSh is a fundamental 
principle of the Common Market"4 . 
As a resume of the arguments set out above we should affirm that the 
ESA principle of "fair return", written into the industrial policy rules, 
violates primary Community law, as far as access for undertakings from the 
whole common market to public supplies is concerned. There is no 
justification for such a discriminatory policy under primary or secondary 
Community law, as far as the Interna! Market rules are concerned. How far 
and under what procedures Member States may escape from this obligation 
under primary Community law - by participating in international 
agreements - will be subject to a more thorough discussion in the next 
chapter. 
On the other band, it should be clearly stated that Article 30 only 
covers the free movement of goods. As far as service contracts are 
concerned, which do not relate to the provision of goods, Article 59, not 
Article 30 will apply. Therefore we will now turn to the relevant Community 
Iaw provisions on the supply of services, namely Articles 59 et seq. 
42 1984 ECR 1229 at 1248 No. 18 - Rewe. 
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4. EEC Procurement Policy (2): Rules on the Freedom to Provide 
Services (Articles 59 to 66) 
a) Scope of application 
24 Both ESA and national space agencies may award not only contracts 
relating to the supply of goods in a broad sense, especially launching 
systems, satellites and component parts, but also to services. This will be 
particularly true in phases A and B of ESA procurement where 
prefeasibility and feasibility studies are contracted, but it may also occur in 
later phases of the development of space technology. These studies will be 
engineering, software development, patent and know-how licencing, 
consulting, and other contracts which do not relate to goods but must be 
regarded as services under the provisions of the Treaty. If these service 
contracts are to be supplied across borders, Article 59 is applicable because 
this will normally be done for remuneration. 
The rules on free establishment will only cover the cases where an 
engineering, soft-ware, or consulting firm wishes to establish its business 
seat in a member country in order to conf orm to the principles of 
geographical distribution as set out in the "fair return" principle. lt lies 
beyond argument that a Member State may not prevent the establishment 
of a business seat by an engineering or consulting firm, in order to exclude 
it from participating in public procurement. Such a policy would amount to 
clear discrimination and would come directly under the rules on free 
establishment. 
The exception of Art. 61, whereby "freedom to provide services in the 
field of transport shall be governed by the provisions. . . relating to 
transport", is not applicable here. In the present stage of technological 
development in space activities, launching systems have not yet reached the 
state of belonging to transportation because no regular routes can be 
maintained. This may change when Europe has put a regular space station 
into orbit. 
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b) Applicability of Art. 59 to public procurement of service contracts 
There are as yet no precedents available concerning the applicability 25 
of Community law on the freedom to supply services (Article 59) to 
procurement policies. Legal doctrine is certainly inclined to apply the same 
principles as in the area of the free circulation of goods43. There is reason 
to believe that the Court's new case law will subject the service markets to 
the same principles as those for goods44, unless some very specific reasons 
allow for a different construction. 
This more or less parallel application of the rules on the freedom to 
supply goods and to supply services is corroborated by Article 8 A of the 
Treaty as amended under the Single Act. The achievement of the Internal 
Market by 31 December 1992 will allow not only for the free movement of 
goods but also of services. Even if Article 8 A does not have a direct effect 
from 1 J anuary 1993 on, it assists in interpreting and implementing primary 
Community law on the provision of services. 
According to legal doctrine, Article 59 covers three possible means of 26 
intra-community supply of services: 
The supplier moves to the customer in order to offer 
his services in the receiving country. 
The customer or client moves to the supplier of 
services in order to receive the service in the foreign 
country. 
The supplier offers his services across frontiers to 
possible customers in other EEC countries without 
having an established business seat or subsidiary. 
As far as procurement rules on services are concerned, we need not 
inquire further on the first two alternatives to rules on the freedom to 
provide services. Only the third alternative is important for the purpose of 
our study. The freedom to provide services in the entire Community 
includes, as we have developed above relating to the free circulation of 
goods, a right of entry for all undertakings into the different service markets, 
and a right to freedom of choice for all customers45: The free entry of 
service enterprises should not be impeded by discriminatory rules or by 
unreasonable restrictions. The potential customer has the basic right to 
43 Cf. Steindorff, RIW 1983, 831at832; Bleckmann, EuR 1987, 28 at 32. 
44 For a more detailed discussion, cf. Reich, Die Freiheit des Dienstleistun~erkehrs als 
Grundfreiheit, payer presented to the meeting of the Arbeitskreis Europäische 
Integration from 1 to 13January1989 and tobe published in ZHR 1989 forthcoming. 
45 Cf. Reich, loc. cit. Fn 16, Nos. 30, 33. 
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"shop for services" which he needs all around the Community, without being 
restricted by the mere fact that there are still borders or different legal 
regimes among the Member State countries. Therefore, procurement rules 
which reserve participation in public tender offers and award of service 
contracts to undertakings established in one Member Country, and which 
impose a rule of fair return according to geographical and not to 
competition criteria, limit at least indirectly the entry of those enterprises 
which are not established in the state privileged by the return principle. 
This restriction in the freedom to provide services cannot be justified by 
arguing that the undertaking might make use of its freedom of 
establishment by shifting its business seat or subsidiary to the receiving state 
and by these means participate in public procurement on the "fair return" 
principle. lt is an established rule of EEC law that the guarantee of one 
basic freedom of the EEC Treaty - provision of services - cannot be made 
dependent upon another freedom, namely that of establishment46. 
This broad construction of the rules on freedom to provide services 
also covers discriminations having a mere indirect or potential eff ect on 
intra-Community trade. Even if no undertaking has a legal right to be 
awarded a specific contract, it cannot be excluded from participation by 
arguing that it does not have its business seat in one Member State or that a 
certain quota provided for one region has already been used up. 
Participation in procurement and award of contracts should be based on 
objective criteria. This is even more true if procurement seeks to encourage 
R & D activities of undertakings established in the Member States: The 
most competitive offer and the best technology should be awarded the 
contract and not merely the offer from a certain privileged region. If the 
Member States want to encourage research and industrial policy in one 
region they should use the state aid-rules (cf. Nos. 40 et seq.), and not 
abuse the provisions on public tender offers for that purpose. Exclusion 
from participation and award for geographical or national factors of an 
undertaking therefore amounts to a "discrimination du fait " which, as the 
Court has said in its recent "kabelregeling"-judgment, is forbidden under 
EEC law47. 
46 1986 ECR 3577 at 3809 No. 52 - German insurance regulation. 
47 Cf. 1988 ECR unreport~d, Case 352/85, Ju~gment of 26 April 1988" No. 26 - Bond van 
adverterdeers, concernmg entiy of advertlsmg and cable compames into the (closed) 
Dutch market of TV-advertising. 
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c) Justifications for restrictions on the freedom to provide services 
Such a discrimination cannot be justified on grounds of public security 27 
or public policy according to Articles 66, 56. In the "kabelregeling" 
judgment, the Court of Justice has clearly stated that the requirements of 
Articles 56, 66 are not met by "objectifs de nature economique"48. The 
industrial policy of Member States is, according to the established case law 
of the Court in the area of products, a mere economic objective, i.e. to 
develop R & D in space activities, to create employment, to provide for 
higher tax return, and to improve regional distribution of income. 
The Court of Justice, in its new case law concerning justified 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services, has also developed a general 
or public interest test similar to that concerning the free circulation of 
d 49 Th . . . . f h . b goo s . e same restnctive mterpretation o t ese except1ons must e 
applied. Therefore, the "fair return" principle is not justified under the 
general interest test. The freedom of every undertaking to provide services 
within the EEC and the free choice of clients to purchase these services 
from undertakings of all EEC countries should not be impeded directly or 
indirectly. Therefore, ESA and Member State rules on the "fair return" 
principle violate the freedom to supply services, leading to consequences 
similar to the above mentioned violations in the free circulation of goods. 
As far as the relationship betweell primary and secondary Community 
law Oll governmellt procurement is collcerned, the Court applies the same 
principles to services as in the area of tlie free movement of goods. 
Commullity directives should be construed in accordance with primary 
Commullity law in order to make effective the freedom to provide 
services50. They should not impose additional restrictions Oll enterprises: 
"To make the provisioll of services in olle Member 
State by a colltractor established in another Member 
State conditiollal upon the possession of an 
establishmellt permit in the first State would be to 
deprive Article 59 of the treaty of all eff ectiveness, the 
purpose of that article being precisely to abolish 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services by 
persons who are not establi~hed in the State in which 
the service is tobe provided" 1. 
48 Loc. cit. No. 34. 
49 1980 ECR 833 at 856 - Debauve, concerning advertising restrictions. 
50 1986 ECR at 3812 No. 62 - Gerrnan insurance regulation. 
51 1982 ECR 417 at 427 No. 14 -Transportroute. 
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5. EEC Procurement Policy (3): Free Trade Agreements 
with EFTA Countries 
a) The problem 
28 The ESA Convention is comprised not only of EEC Member States, 
but also includes countries belonging to EFTA. lt is a form of cooperation 
going beyond the sphere of influence of the EEC. Therefore, member 
countries of EFTA cannot be bound by principles of EEC law, most notably 
those concerning the direct effect of the provisions on the free circulation 
of goods and services in order to establish the internal market. 
On the other hand, the EEC has concluded free trade agreements with 
EFI'A countries in 1972, i.e. with Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Sweden, 
who are also members of ESA, and Finland, which is associated with ESA. 
Therefore, the principles which have been established in these agreements 
must also be coordinated with the provisions of the ESA convention. One 
could say that EFTA countries, when concluding treaties under 
international law in which EEC Member States participate, should not 
violate basic principles of the free trade agreements between the EEC and 
EFTA countries. 
The provision which is important in this context is Article 13 of the 
agreement between the Community and Switzerland, which has been 
repeated in other free trade agreements. Article 13 says: 
"No quantitative restrictions on imports or measures 
having equivalent effect shall be introduced in trade 
between the parties". 
lt should be said that these provisions relate only to the free 
circulation of goods. The free trade agreements do not contain a provision 
on the freedom to provide services similar to Article 59 of the EEC Treaty. 
This may change when the free trade agreements will be renegotiated 
between the EEC and the EFTA countries. 
The free trade agreements create obligations only between the EEC or 
respectively its Member States, which are subjected to the supremacy of 
Community law, plus the specific contracting parties, and not obligations 
among the EFI'A countries as such. The latter, however, are bound by the 
EFTA Convention of 1960, namely Article 10 (2), and by the GA TI rules, 
especially Art. XXIV. These provisions seek to prevent the introduction of 
measures having an effect equivalent as quantitative restrictions on the import 
of goods. They introduce a rule of non-discrimination as far as the supply of 
goods from other EFTA countries is concerned. 
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b) Measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions of imports 
under the free trade agreements 
One could argue that the contracting parties are under obligations 29 
imposed by the free trade agreements and the EFTA Convention, which are 
analogous to the obligations which the EEC member countries have among 
themselves. This would mean that their procurement policies, whether 
conducted by national or international agencies, must obey the principle of 
non-discrimination, at least insofar as the trade in goods is concerned. Such 
an interpretation would have the advantage of a parallel application of EEC 
law and free trade agreement rules. lt would avoid EEC Member States 
being subject to stricter obligations than EFTA countries. All parties 
participating in the ESA Convention would therefore be under an 
obligation to change procurement rules in order to meet the principle of 
non-discrimination. The "fair return" principle should, under this 
interpretation, not only be disregarded by EEC-Member State policies, but 
also by EFTA countries. This interpretation would prevent a drifting apart 
among the contracting parties of the ESA Convention resulting from the 
imposition of different legal obligations upon them. 
Such a broad interpretation of the free trade agreements may be 
opposed by the simple fact that these trade agreements do not propose the 
creation of an Interna! Market between the Community and EFTA 
countries. Therefore, the obligations between the Community and its 
Member States, respectively, on the one hand and EFTA countries on the 
other should not be as strictly interpreted as among the EEC countries 
themselves. This somewhat more cautious approach to the construction of 
the free trade agreements is confirmed insofar as we have no case law or 
state practice which interprets Article 13 in the same broad sense as the 
Court of Justice with Art. 30 of the Treaty of Rome has done. The above 
mentioned Dassonville doctrine certainly cannot be directly applied to the 
relationship between the Community and EFTA countries. 
When the ESA Convention was ratified in 1980, the participating 
EFTA countries were probably of the opinion that they could include an 
explicit industrial policy in the document which was the prerequisite for 
their financing and cooperation. At this time, however, the GATT Tokyo 
round was under way, which opened up procurement of public supply 
contracts by imposing a non-discrimination rule for participation in tender 
offers (No. 37). EEC law itself had, on the other hand, not yet reached the 
state of development by which entry of undertakings and freedom of choice 
for customers and consumers were to be regarded as the essential objective 
of Article 30. The relevant judgments of the Court of Justice relating to 
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discriminatory Member State industrial policies, e.g. the Buy Irish case and 
the case of the French postal machines, have been handed down later. Since 
there is no judicial review in the interpretation of the free trade agreements, 
general principles of international law will apply. 
c) Possible approaches to interpreting the notion of "measures having an effect 
equivalent to quantitative restrictions of imports" in the free trade 
agreements 
30 A simple way out of this dilemma could be through the application of 
the classical rule of international law "/ex posterior derogat legi priori". This 
would mean that the ESA Convention, being concluded in 1975 and ratified 
in 1980, with its provisions on industrial policy, simply sets aside the 
obligations under the free trade agreements, which in most cases were 
concluded in 1972. Such an approach, however, is far too formalistic and 
does not satisfy the basic objective of the free trade agreements, namely to 
open up the markets of the contracting parties to undertakings in their 
respective territories. 
31 As far as the EEC itself is concerned, we have cases concerning the 
importance of the free trade agreements under the doctrines of supremacy 
and direct effect. The case law of the Court of Justice seems to be quite 
settled now insofar as the legal effects of the rules on non-discrimination in 
tax matters are concerned. In our opinion, they should be extended to the 
probleros of discrimination in trade in general. 
The Court has frequently stated that the Community is bound by the 
GATI-rules which have a spirit similar to the free trade agreements, even 
though it is not a member of GA 1152• The EEC, in its relationship with 
third countries, should respect the supremacy of international law which 
can be invoked against Member State action by the Community. 
Alternatively, the principle of direct effect concerning undertakings 
must be differentiated depending on whether the relationship is one 
between an undertaking and the Member State ( or the Community 
respectively) or whether the given problems which arise are rooted in the 
legal relationship among different undertakings themselves53. Only the first 
alternative concerns us here. lt was dealt with by the Kupferberg case. The 
52 1972 ECR 1219 at 1227, Nos. 10-18 - United Fruits; cf. the explaining remarks by 
Pescatore, CMLR 1979, 615 at 636. 
53 This pr?blem ~s decided to t~e.ne~tive by the Polydor-case, 1982 ECR 392; we will 
not go mto details, but must d1Stmgu1Sh very clearly the intellectual property cases on 
the one _hand from those arising out of discrimmatory practices of states against 
undertakings, on the other. 
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case concerned the direct effect of the non-discrimination rules in tax 
matters between an undertaking and a member country, which are written 
into the free trade agreements. There, the Court accepted the direct effect 
principle because the obligations are "unconditional and sufficiently 
precise". The Court elucidated further on the purpose of the free trade 
agreements (between the EEC and Portugal): 
"The purpose of the Agreement is to create a system of 
free trade in which rules restricting commerce are 
eliminated in respect of virtually all trade in products 
originating in the territories of the parties1154. 
The free trade agreements contain unconditional rules forbidding not 
only tax-discrimination, but also all measures having an effect equivalent to 
quantitative restrictions on imports. As far as the Community (and its 
Member States) in relation to the contracting EFTA-countries is 
concerned, the non-discrimination principle is directly applicable. lt forbids 
any discrimination which hinders the free flow of goods and the entry of 
undertakings from EFTA-countries to the common market, where such 
obstacles cannot be specifically justified (No. 33). Procurement rules 
between EEC- and EFTA-countries must therefore follow the same 
principles as among EEC-countries themselves, if we interpret the 
tendencies in the Kupferberg decision correctly. They should not be based 
on principles of "fair return" and "geographical distribution" in the placing 
of contracts, but on objective criteria, without discriminating as regards the 
origin of the undertaking participating in a public tender offer within the 
territory of the EEc55. 
54 1982 ECR 3641 at 3665 No. 24; cf. also the comment by Bebr, CMLR 1983, 35. 
55 In this sense cf. Winkel, NJW 1977, 1993 at 1996, referring to 1976 ECR 811 at 906 No. 
19 - EMI ('~e binding. effects of commitments undertaken by the Communio/ with 
regard to certam countnes cannot be extended to others"); this view is ind1rectly 
approved by 1980 ECR 1345 at 1386 No. 24 - Chatain. 
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32 This differentiation in the case law cannot be automatically applied to 
EFf A countries. Important studies by Bernitz56 and Bohrer57 have shown, 
however, that Swiss and Swedish law essentially follows rules similar to 
those of the Court of Justice. Therefore, the non-discrimination principle is 
directly applicable, as far as the legal relationship of an undertaking with an 
EFf A-country58 is concerned. On the other hand, the legal relationships 
between undertakings themselves, especially in industrial property matters, 
are not touched by the free trade agreements59. 
lf we take the above mentioned principles as being unif ormly 
applicable to the EEC Member States and to countries adhering to the 
EFf A - EEC free trade agreements, we might argue that the principle of 
non-discrimination is directly applicable in favour of undertakings in their 
relationship to governments which participate in the agreement. We can 
therefore apply similar principles governing entry of undertakings and free 
choice of customers. Therefore, procurement rules should be applied 
without discrimination and allow participation of all undertakings from the 
member countries. A tender offer from an undertaking cannot be rejected 
simply because it does not come from the geographical area which is 
protected by the industrial policy of the ESA Convention or of a national 
body. This interpretation allows the application of EEC law and free trade 
agreements to be paralleled - yet without creating a risk whereby the 
Member States' obligations would begin to drift apart. 
56 CMLR 1986, 567 at 574, sn, 580. 
57 Maßnahmen gleicher Wirkung Schweiz-EWG, 1988, p. 157; cf. also Baldi, WuR 1987, 73 
at 95. 
58 Cf. arr€t du Tribunal Federale Suisse du 13 octobre 1972, Recueil Officiel 98 Ib 385 at 
388, concerning the direct effect of the EFTA agreement of 1960has far as Switzerland is 
concerned. We have, however, no case law concerning the EtC-EFTA-free trading 
agreements. 
59 Cf. the famous Swiss OMO-case, 1980 CMLRep 664; the Austrian Austro-Mechana-
case, 1984 CMLRep 626. 
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d) Justifications for discriminatory procurement policies under the free trade 
agreements 
33 The free trade agreements which the EEC has concluded with EFr A 
countries contain a safeguard clause which allows it to 
"prohibit or restrict imports, exports or goods in transit 
on grounds of public morality, public policy or public 
security" (Article 20 of the free trade agreement 
between the EEC and Switzerland and similar 
provisions in other free trade agreements). 
The application of the safeguard clause is not controlled by 
jurisprudential means but governed instead by political principles of 
international Iaw. We have therefore no established case law on its 
application. As far as EEC-law is concerned, the existence of a safeguard 
clause does not prevent the direct application of the non-discrimination 
principle, at least as far as tax-matters are concerned60. 
One might argue that principles analogous to EEC law would apply. 
This would mean that only non-economic reasons would allow restrictions 
on imports or the imposition of discriminatoy rules on procurement, 
respectively. Opting for such a parallel construction of the safeguard clause 
stands to reason, since it would have the effect of bringing the obligations of 
the Member States, EEC and the parties adhering to the free trade 
agreements, into alignment. But again, there is no settled case law which we 
could rely on. 
Usually, EFTA countries will simply apply their own procurement 
policies which may or may not discriminate against EEC undertakings. If 
there is a conflict, the special arbitration procedures under the free trade 
agreements must be invoked. There is no judicial remedy, unless a court of 
law of an EFr A country will guarantee legal protection (which has not yet 
been the case, if we are correctly informed). 
EFr A countries could also argue that the principles of the ESA 
Convention on industrial policy are a justification for restrictions on imports 
on the grounds of public policy, including restrictions on the participation 
of foreign undertakings in public procurement. Article 20 of the free trade 
agreements could then be invoked by ESA, that is, with regard to the role 
which it places on industrial policy, which is a prerequisite for the 
participation of EFf A-countries in European space activites. Such an 
interpretation cannot be completely ruled out. On the other hand, EFr A 
60 1982 ECR at 3664 No. 21 - Kupferberg. 
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member countries have not explicitly insisted on such an interpretation by 
invoking the specific committee-proceedings of the free trade agreements. 
We should therefore rely on the general principles already mentioned 
above: 
Trade between member countries should be based on 
overall respect for the principles of free entry and 
freedom of choice. 
Exceptions should be construed narrowly and normally 
be allowed only for non-economic reasons. 
Undertakings should be protected against 
discriminatory measures, including the procurement 
policies of Member States, without necessarily awaiting 
reciprocal treatment. 
This point of view is corroborated by the GA TI rules on procurement 
(see sub 7) which impose principles of non-discrimination and equal 
treatment among with the contracting parties (including EEC-countries, 
Austria, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland; Finland as an associated 
member of ESA). This is true, as we have said above, only in relationship to 
goods and services attached thereto, not to services as such which do not 
(yet!) come under the free trade agreement rules. 
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6. Directive 71/305/EEC on Procurement of Public Works, Directives 77/62 
and 88/295/EEC on Public Supply Contracts, Proposed Amendments, 
and Their Importance for ESA and National Agency Procurement 
Practices 
a) Basic objectives ofthe EEC Directives on procurement 
The EEC has adopted several directives on Member State 34 
procurement policy. The first directive of 26 July 1971 (71/305/EEC)61 
concerned the coordination of procedures for the award of public work 
contracts. On 21 December 1976, Directive 77/62/EEC62 governing the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public supply contracts was 
adopted. This directive was amended in 1980 and, even more substantially 
in 1988 by Directive 88/295/EEC of 22 March 198863. 
In the following anal:xsis, we will emphasize the importance of the 
directive on public supplies64. The directive on public work contracts is not 
important in this context because ESA and national space agencies are only 
to a very limited extent engaged in the award of public work contracts. 
Their procurement activity in the supply area is much more important. 
The directives on the procurement of public supply contracts attempts 
to enforce and implement Article 30. Therefore, Recitals 1 and 2 of 
Directive 77 /62 read as follows: 
61 
62 
63 
64 
"Whereas restrictions on the free movement of goods 
in respect of public supplies are prohibited by the 
terms of Article 30 et sequitur of the Treaty; whereas 
that prohibition should be supplemented by the 
coordination of the procedures relating to public 
supply contracts in order, by introducing equal 
conditions of competition for such contracts in all the 
Member States, to ensure a degree of transparency 
allowing the observance of this prohibition to be better 
supervised ... " 
OJ L _185/5 of 25 August 1971 - Special English edition 1971 p. 682, modified by 
D1Tect1ve 89/440/EEC of 18July1989, OJ L 210/f of 21July1989. 
OJ L 13/1of15Januaiy1977. 
OJ L 127/1of20 May 1988. 
Cf. for a thorough and critical evaluation of these Directives Weiss, ELR 1988 318· 
Brechon-Moulenes, RFDA 1988, 753; their importance in completing the Internai 
Market is underlined by Mattera, Le marche unique europeen - Ses regles son 
fonctionennement, 1988, p. 311-339.. ' 
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Recital 5 of Directive 88/295 reads as follows: 
"Whereas it is necessary to improve and extend the 
scope of the directives by increasing the transparency 
of procedures and practices for the award of public 
supply contracts, and to make possible stricter 
enforcement of the prohibition of restrictions on the 
free movement of goods, which constitutes the basis of 
these directives ... " 
The directive should therefore be read in the spirit of Article 30 as 
outlined above, namely to open up public supply markets, to guarantee 
entry of enterprises and to allow for a freedom of choice for customers. The 
amended directive has been adopted in order to complete the Interna! 
Market as defined by the Single Act. lt is now based upon Article 100 A of 
the amended Treaty. The directive seeks to install a regime of EEC-wide 
competition, transparency, and standardisation in tender offers for public 
supply contracts65 . 
b) Scope of application 
35 Article 2 defines the sphere of application. Only the following 
contracts come under the rules of the Directives concerning community-
wide procurement: 
"Public supply contracts shall be contracts for 
pecuniary interests concluded in writing involving the 
purchase, lease, rental or hire purchase, with or 
without option to buy, of products ... The delivery of 
such products may in addition include siting and 
installation operations". 
This definition is wider than that of Directive 77 /62 because the latter 
only mentioned supplies, not leasing or hire-purchase agreements which 
may be more frequent now than in 1977. The definition also makes clear 
that services alone are not included, unless they fall under Directive 71/305. 
If the service is related to the delivery of products, especially installation, 
then again the Directive will apply. The feasibility studies undertaken in 
phase A and B by ESA or national space Agency contractors would 
therefore not be covered, but fall under the general rules of the freedom to 
supply services. The same would be true for pure software contracts 
unattached to goods. 
65 Cf. for details of the purposes of the Directives Brechon-Moulenes, Ioc. cit. at 755. 
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Article 3 of Directive 77 /62 which was left unchanged by Directive 
88/295 excludes from its application public supply contracts, which are 
awarded in accordance with the particular procedure of an international 
organisation. lt is not clear from the documents leading to the adoption of 
the Directive, whether the procurement procedures of ESA are thereby 
expressly excluded. On the other hand, ESA was de facto established before 
the adoption of the directive. Therefore the Council having adopted the 
directive in 1976 must have known of the specific procurement procedures 
of ESA under the industrial policy as written into the Convention. There is 
reason to believe that ESA procurement is implicitly excluded from the 
application of Directive 77/62. When adopting the new directive in 1988 
under the cooperation procedure in Article 100 A of the amended Treaty, 
the Community legislator did not want to change this scope of application 
even though the different procurement policies of the EEC on the one hand 
and of ESA on the other were known or must have been known. lt seems 
clear that ESA procurement policy must therefore be regarded as excluded 
from the scope of application of Directive 88/295. As we have argued above, 
this exemption for ESA only concerns the specific transparency obligations 
of the Directive, not the application of primary Community law, unless the 
rules on the Common Commercial Policy apply. 
c) Applicabi/ity of the directive to national procurement polices 
Procurement by national space agencies is not, however, exempted 36 
from the directive, unless certain conditions are met: 
(1) Article 3 (e) exempts contracts awarded pursuant to an 
international agreement concluded between a Member 
State and one or more non-Member States which cover 
supplies intended for the joint 
implementation/exploitation of a project by the 
signatory states; every agreement shall be 
communicated to the Commission. This would arise, 
for exa.mple in the cooperation between a national 
space Agency and the Agency of a non-member 
country like NASA, if this agreement has been 
communicated to ~he Commission. 
(2) If the national space agencies award defense contracts 
within the meaning of the new Article 2 ( a), inserted by 
Directive 88/295. 
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(3) If the threshold mentioned in the amended Article 5 is 
not met (200.000respectively130.000 ECU). 
( 4) Transport contracts according to Article 3 of the 
Directive 88/295, namely 
"public supply contracts awarded by carriers by land, 
air, sea or inland waterway". 
This wording must be narrowly construed. In our 
opinion, it does not concern the development and 
placing of launching facilities or space activities (No. 
24). 
(5) Production and distribution of energy. 
( 6) Public supply contracts of authorities 
"whose principle activity is to offer telecommunication services". 
Satellite procurement is therefore excluded as far as the 
marketing phase by the national PTTs or telecom is concerned. 
The Commission however is determined to abolish these 
exemptions when the Interna! Market will be completed by 31 
December 199266. 
(7) Article 7, replacing Article 6( 4) ( e) of Directive 77 /62, 
excludes the requirement for open procedures and 
allows for a negotiated procedure which concerns 
"articles ... manufactured purely for the purpose of 
research, experiment, study or development". 
Procurement related to development and marketing 
activities of space systems by national agencies 
therefore does not come under the exception. 
Consequently, open procedures should be the rule. 
Even if the directive is not applicable or applicable only to a limited 
extent to national procurement policies in the area of the supply of space 
systems, the basic principles of primary Community law must also be 
observed, as a minimum standard by national agencies, especially the rules 
on free movement of goods and services. Therefore, national agencies shall 
not discriminate against foreign undertakings by excluding them from 
tender offers or simply by rejecting the award of contracts for the supply of 
goods or services by reason of nationality or geographical distribution. 
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Some authors argue .~hat ~· 90 _will prohibit the P1Ts from discriminating in 
~W~urement, cf. J. Muller, D1enstle1stungsmonopole im System des EWGV, 1988, p. 
d) Proposed changes to Directives 71/305 and 88/295 in view of 
cornpleting the Internat Market 
The Commission, in documents submitted to the Council on 11 36a 
October 198867 and published afterwards68, is aiming at abolishing the still 
existing exemptions from Community procurement rules, namely in the area 
of water, energy, transport services, and telecommunication. Art. 1 of the 
proposal on telecommunication provides for Community wide procurement 
to the "award of supply, works and software service contracts by contracting 
entities which: 
(a) are public or granted special or exclusive rights by 
Member States, and 
(b) operate public telekommunications networks or offer 
one or more telecommunications services to the 
public". 
The Annex makes clear that the national postal services fall under the 
provisions of the proposed directive. Similar provisions shall be adopted on 
the other areas. 
lt should be mentioned that, as in the previous directives, excluded 
from its application are those "public supply and software service contracts, 
which are awarded in accordance with the particular procedure of an 
international organisation". The preparatory documents do not make clear 
whether all international organisations are exempted from the EEC rules 
even if Member States participate in them and contribute substantially to 
their fmancing for their own benefit, which is the case of ESA, or only those 
which have attained a specific status of independence under international 
law, like the UN and its auxiliary organisations. 
lt is also not clear whether this derogation could be used by ESA as a 
justification for continuing its "fair return" policy and whether Member 
States may be exempted from the Interna! Market rules under Art. 115 of 
the EEC Treaty (cf. Nos. 83 et seq.). We do not consider this to be the 
intention of the proposed directive. Recital (1) of the proposal of 11 
October 1988 refers to the aim of "progessively establishing the internal 
market during the period up to 31December1992 ... "; recital (3) mentions 
the prohibition of restrictions on the free movement of goods and on the 
freedom to provide services in the telecommunications sectors under Art. 
67 Com (88) 377 and 378 final. 
68 OJ C 319/2of12 Dec. 1988 and C 40/5 of 17 Feb. 1989. 
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30 and 59, and recital (8) insists on the necessity of a Community-wide 
competition. The Community policy quite obviously intends to open up 
public supply and services markets in all areas of economic importance 
without omitting such a large market as that of space systems. Therefore, 
once the proposed Directives enter into force in the areas of energy, 
transportation, and telecommunication, the "fair return-principle" can no 
longer be enforced by the Member States against the procurement policy of 
an international organisation like ESA. 
lt is not yet clear whether the Council will adopt the proposals without 
changes. The case-law of the Court of Justice, corroborated by the 
judgment of 22 Sept. 198869 which insists on the parallel applicability of Art. 
30/59 to the procurement policies of Member States even where exemptions 
exist, will certainly promote the legislative success of the proposals. 
69 Case 45/87. 
72 
7. The lmportance ofthe GATI Rules on Public Procurement 
As we have seen, the EEC procurement rules on public supply 37 
contracts have a relatively limited importance for space activities. As far as 
ESA itself is concerned, they will not apply at all. For national agencies, 
they will only apply to a limited extent. In addition, the EEC has adopted 
the results of the GATT Tokyo round by decision 80/27170 of the Council. 
This "Agreement on government procurement"71 is part of EEC law and 
must be respected by the Community in its commercial transactions, in its 
Interna! Market policy, as well as by the Member States. EFTA countries 
are bound by the agreement if they have adopted it in due form, like most 
Member States of ESA. Therefore, the agreement on government 
procurement links the procurement policies of both the EEC and the 
EFTA countries. 
The scope and range of the agreement is enunciated in Article 1. The 
Article reads as follows, in its most important parts: 
"The agreement applies to 
(a) any law, regulation, procedure and practice regarding 
the procurement of products by the entities subject to 
this agreement. This includes services incidental to the 
supply of products if the value of these incidental 
services does not exceed that of the products itself, but 
not service contracts per se; 
(b) any procurement contract of a value of SDR 
150.000 ... 
( c) procurement by the entities under the direct or 
substantial control of parties and other designated 
entities, with respect to their procurement procedures 
and practice". 
The entities are listed in Annex A of the agreement. ESA procurement 
policy is not covered. On the other band, the parties to the GATT 
agreement are under an obligation to 
"inform the entities not covered by this agreement. .. of 
the objectives, principles and rules of this agreement 
" 
70 The decision, published in 01 L 71/1of17 March 1980, was based on Art. 113; cf. the 
comment by Bourgeois, CMLR 1982, 5; Brechon-Moulenes, loc. cit. at 755. 
71 OJ L 71/44 of 17 March 1980. 
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We do not think that ESA must be regarded as an entity belonging to 
the EEC, the Member States or to EFTA countries. lt is, as an international 
organisation, an autonomous subject of international law and is therefore 
not covered by the GA IT agreement on government procurement. 
38 On the other hand, the EEC-Member States and the EFTA- countries 
which adhere to GA IT and at the same time to ESA are bound by the 
obligations of the agreement. These obligations are included in Article II on 
national treatment and non-discrimination. Paragraph 1 reads: 
"With respect to all laws, regulations, procedures and 
practices regarding government procurement covered 
by this agreement, the parties shall provide 
immediately and unconditionally to the products and 
suppliers of other parties offering products originating 
in the customs territories. . . of the parties, treatment 
no less favourable than (a) that accorded to domestic 
products and suppliers; and (b) that accorded to 
products and suppliers of any other party ... 
Paragraph 3 reads as follows: 
"The parties shall not apply rules of origin to products 
imported for purposes of government procurement 
covered by this agreement from other parties, which 
are different from the rules of origin applied in the 
normal cause of trade and at the time of importation to 
imports of the same products from the same parties". 
39 Article VIII contains the exceptions to the agreement, namely para 2: 
"Subject to the requirement that such measures are 
applied in a manner which constitutes a means of 
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination in countries 
where the same conditions prevail or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
agreement shall be construed to prevent any party from 
imposing or enforcing measures necessary to protect 
public morals, order or safety, human, animal or plant 
life or health, intellectual property, or relating to the 
products of handicapped persons, of philantropic 
institutions or of prison labour". 
This exception from the rules on non-discrimination and national 
treatment is similar to that of Article 36 in the EEC Treaty and Article 20 
of the free trade agreements of the EEC with EFf A countries. There is, 
however, no judicial review on the application of the safeguard clause. We 
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have no established state practice as to the importance of the safeguard 
clause. An in-depth investigation would require an anlysis of the position of 
EEC and EFTA in relation to GATI, with special regard to US-trade and 
space policy. 
The Uruguay-round of the GAIT negotiations sought to include 
services, e.~. software contracts, licencing etc„ in the public procurement 
provisions 7 . A final decision has not yet been taken. 
72 Cf. Sindelar, Das GATI - Handelsordnung für den Dienstleistungsverkehr 1987 p 
149. • ' . 
75 
8. Applicability of State Aid Rules in the EEC· Treaty (Articles 92 - 94) 
to Public Procurement by ESA and National Entities. 
a) Basic principles 
40 We have demonstrated that ESA procurement policy contains certain 
discriminatory and protectionist elements which are based upon the 
industrial policy concept of the ESA Convention. We shall now examine 
whether the funding of ESA by the Member States, the procurement policy 
of ESA itself, and/or the commercial utilization of space systems which have 
been developed by ESA and which are exploited by private enterprise 
might amount to a violation of the state aid rules under Article 92
73
. These 
provisions, of course, apply only to Member States of the EEC, not to 
EFf A countries. They are also not applicable to ESA itself. 
A thorough analysis of this highly complex legal question would 
require an evaluation of research, development, and utilization of space 
systems developed under the ESA scheme. lt is quite obvious that the 
European space industry and space activities could only be established by 
common effort and not by one Member State of ESA alone. This is even 
more true for the ambitious European space programmes put forward in 
1987 (No. 1). At the time of the foundation of ESA (or, respectively its 
predecessors ESRO and ELDO), the EEC had not yet defined a space 
policy; only in 1988 did it formulate its position in space, notably in R & D 
activities 74, without, however, considering appreciable financial 
contributions75. But, even if this basic policy objective will be accepted by 
the EEC, this does not mean that the rules on state aids are not applicable 
to space activities under the ESA Convention or under national schemes. 
The state aid rules of the EEC Treaty impose a review scheme, which 
enables the Commission to avoid distortions of competition within the 
Common Market. Member States may grant aids to undertakings under 
certain qualified conditions, but they must observe a Community review 
procedure and they must not "put their proposed measures into effect until 
this procedure has resulted in a final decision", Article 93 para 3, (3). 
73 Art. 77, relating to state aids in the transportation area, is not applicable here, cf. No. 24. 
74 CC?m-. 88 (~17) final. of .26 July ~988 which, at p. 21, is quite critical to the fair retum 
pnnc1ple without gomg mto deta1ls of the legal analysis. 
75 Cf. the Chat~am House Special Paper, loc. cit. at Fn 2, p. 83 discussing EEC R & D 
programmes m space. 
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b) Different hypotheses on the application of the state aid rules 
to space activities 
As far as the applicability of state rules is concerned, different 41 
alternatives must be distinguished. 
(1) One might think that the discriminatory procurement policy under 
the "fair return" principle not only violates Article 30 and Article 59 ( as far 
as Member States are concerned), but also amounts to an aid to an 
undertaking which is privileged by the industrial policy scheme. Such a 
hypothesis can be ruled out, because the award of contracts by ESA is 
sufficient financial return for being regarded eligible in the tender offer 
procedure. The somewhat discriminatory award of a contract is not 
accompanied by a gratuitious transfer of state funds, the latter always being 
the legal prerequisite for making Art. 92 applicable to such a situation76. 
Therefore the state aid rules will only apply to the procurement policy as 
such, if financial return for the contract placed would be excessive. We have 
no inf ormation that this is the case in the contract policy of ESA or national 
agencies. 
(2) The funding of ESA itself might be regarded as a state aid under 
Article 92 which covers not only state aids, but also aids granted "through 
state resources in any form whatsoever". Payments to ESA for optional 
programmes might in this way be regarded as aids. lt could also be said that 
these aids favour "certain undertakings" under the industrial policy scheme 
or that they favour "the production of certain goods", namely space systems. 
In our opinion, such an interpretation of the state aid rules would be too 
far-reaching. lt would mean that any government purchase would come 
under the state aid rules and that a mere cooperation of governments in the 
form of an international Agency, as in the case with optional programmes of 
ESA, would induce the applicability of Article 92. Such a reading would go 
far beyond the "effet utile" of Article 92 which seeks to prevent distortions 
in competition by state transfer payments without or with insufficient 
financial return. 
76 We therefore need not discuss in detail the relationship between Art. 30 on the one 
hand to Arts. 92 s. on the other, cf. Mattera, loc. cit. Fn M, p. 42 
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(3) A final hypothesis would apply should the government 
contributions to ESA-financed and monitored programmes be regarded as 
state aids to undertakings which later market the space systems, like 
Arianespace or Spot Image. ESA would then be regarded as a type of joint 
venture to relieve undertakings from the costs and risks of research and 
development in space systems which will later be exploited commercially. 
This would especially be true if the development costs would not be 
recovered by the pricing of the space systems in the utilization phase. 
c) State aids to promote commercial activities of undertakings offering 
/aunching or orbital space systems 
42 There is some possibility that the rules on state aid may be applicable 
under the third hypothesis. We cannot definitely answer whether such a 
case could be brought by the Commission against a Member State for not 
having notified its contribution to ESA under the optional programmes. We 
should mention the following settled aspects of Community law which may 
be relevant in this context: 
(a) A state aid, as Article 92 expressly sets out, is also an " ... aid 
granted through state resources in any form whatsoever". The mere fact that 
Member States pay contributions to ESA under the optional programmes, 
that ESA awards contracts for research and development, that ESA buys 
space systems which are utilized by other undertakings on the basis of "no 
loss, no profit'.77, will not per se rule out the applicability of Article 92. The 
Court of Justice has said that Article 92 will also be applicable to 
government established funds78. It will, on the other hand, not be applicable 
to subsidies paid exclusively out of EEC funds 79. 
(b) The state aid must favour certain undertakings or the production 
of certain goods. This problem amounts to the specificity of the support 
granted to undertakings or the production of goods. An early court 
definition on subsidies and aid may be helpful in settling this problem: 
"A subsidy is normally defined as a payment in cash or 
in kind, made in support of an undertaking other than 
the payment by the purchaser or the consumer for the 
goods and services which it produces. An aid is a very 
77 Chatharn House Special Paper, Ioc. cit., p. 75. 
78 1977 ECR 595 - Steinicke. 
79 1982 ECR 3583 - Norddeutsches Viehkontor. 
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similar concept, which, however, places emphasis oll its 
purpose and seems especially devised for a particular 
objective which cannot llormally be achieved without 
outside help. The concept of aid is llevertheless wider 
than that of a subsidy because it embraces not only 
positive benefits, such as subsidies themselves, but also 
interventions, which, in various forms, mitigate the 
charges which are normally included in the budget of 
an ulldertaking and which, without therefore being 
subsidies in the strict meaning of the ~ord, are similar 
in character and have the same effect" . 
In later decisions, the European Court of Justice has made it clear that 
it does not look so much at the purpose, but rather at the eff ects of a 
particular measure81. If the effect of a measure is to grant benefits to an 
undertaking or to the production of certain goods, then it should normally 
be regarded as a state aid, even if such a benefit was not the primary 
intention of the measure. Such a benefit in the case of space activities might 
arise for those undertakings which commercially exploit space systems. This 
form of exploitation is only possible because Member States contribute to 
the optional programmes of ESA, and because ESA develops these 
expensive systems for space activities. A commercial development of these 
systems through the use of normal means of capital subscription by private 
shareholders would be impossible82. 
( c) One might argue that the state aid rules are not applicable because 43 
they are not meant to cover R & D activities. Such a sweeping Statement 
would not be true under the present state of EEC law. Two different 
hypotheses must be distinguished. State aids for basic research, whether 
done in universities, state laboratories or undertakings, will usually not 
constitute an aid because they do not have a commercial purpose or effect 
(c. f. also No. 58). They cannot therefore distort competition. This is the 
case for research programmes like Giotto. If the effect of the aid, however, 
is to serve the development of highly complex technological systems which 
later Oll may be exploited commercially, the state aid rules will remain 
applicable83. 
80 1961 ECR 1 at 19 - Steenkolenmijnen under the ECSC-Treaty. 
81 1987 ECR 901 at 921 No. 8 - Deufil. 
82 1986 ECR 2321 at 2345 No. 16 - Bach; cf. for a more detailed discussion Quigley, ELR 
1988, 242 at 247; Müller-Graff, loc. cit. at 421. 
83 1988 ECR unreported, Cases 62 & 72/87, Judgment of 8 March 1988 - Belgian glass 
industry. 
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In its communication of 11 April 198684 on a "Community framework 
for state aids for research and development", the Commission has 
developed some guidelines which can be applied here. lt insists on the 
applicability of the state aid rules for R & D activities. lt also insists on the 
due observance of the transparency rules and on a Community review 
procedure according to Article 93. 
The following criteria have been drawn up to ensure that R & D 
activities, which benefit from State aids, are acceptable under Community 
law: 
The level of aid for basic industrial research should not 
be more than 50% of the gross costs of the project or 
programme. 
As the activity being aided gets nearer to the market 
place, i.e. covers the area of applied research and 
development, the Commission in its examination and 
evaluation of national proposals will look in principle 
for progressively lower levels of aid. 
The Commission will consider higher aid levels in cases 
where particular projects are recognized to be of 
special economic importance, linked to relevant 
Community projects or programmes, located in the 
least favoured areas of the Community, related to 
specific welfare services or implying very high alld 
specific risks. 
We believe that projects Oll space activities would certainly qualify for 
the last condition and would therefore allow for higher aid levels than those 
which the Community would normally be willing to accept. This would 
require, however, the observance of the review procedures under Article 
93. The lleW rules oll the Internal Market have not changed these basic 
objectives of Community law, but have relldered their enforcemellt more 
important: "lt will be particularly important that the Community discipline 
Oll state aid be rigorously enforced", as the Commission has spelled out in 
its White Paper of 1985 and repeated in its paper Oll space activities of 
198885 . 
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9J C 83/2 of 11 April 1986; a .d~tailed analysis of the Community practice can be found 
m Klodt et aL, .Forschungspohtik un.ter .EG-~ontrolle, Tübingen 1988, showing that the 
EEC Comm1ss1on usually liad no obiect1ons 1f the aid was notified in due time and form. 
White paper oi:i the completion of the intemal market, loc. cit. No. 158, repeated by 
Com. (88) 417 fmal, p. 22 as far as space activities are concerned. 
The applicability of the state aid rules is not excluded by the mere fact 
that the procurement policy of ESA is based on an arms' length principle. 
Even if this is the case, the space systems developed by ESA will not be 
exploited by itself under commercial principles, but by undertakings in the 
utilization phase based on rates which may not allow a return of the 
invested capital into research and development of space systems. If state 
payments to ESA or Member State agencies under the optional 
programmmes are to be regarded as aids to undertakings like Arianespace, 
they have to be notified to the Commission and should not be paid out 
before the review process has started. Every payment to the contrary would 
be illegal and void. The Commission might order its repayment86. As of yet 
there is no settled case law on whether and under what circumstances cases 
an undertaking, having received state aid in violation of the Treaty, can 
invoke a protection of its legitimate expectations (Vertrauenschutz) against 
repayment, but recent case law shows a rather restrictive attitude of the 
Court of Justice87. Concerning ESA and state agency activities, one might 
argue that they had not yet been attacked or even examined under the state 
aid rules and that therefore undertakings could rely on the conformity of 
Member State contributions to the development of commercially usable 
space systems under the optional programmes. 
( d) State aids will only be subject to Article 92 if they "distort or 44 
threaten to distort competition". This was certainly not the case when ESA 
started its first optional programmes because there was no Community 
market for space systems and hence no (potential) competition which could 
have been distorted at this time. One might argue that, once space systems 
are developed and commercially exploited, some (potential) competition 
will probably exist; it may than be distorted by state aids. This is especially 
true in areas where ESA and national agencies develop competing space 
systems which will be used for commercial purposes88. 
86 1973 ECR 813 at 829 No. 13 - Mining aids. 
87 1987 ECR at 927 - Deufil. 
88 Cf. Commission, 17th report on competition policy, 1988, No. 219; Matthies, ZHR 1988 
(152), 442 at 443. 
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( e) In judging the conformity of state aids with the objectives spelled 45 
out in Art. 92 para 3 ( c ), namely the development of certain economic 
activities, the compatability with the Treaty must be "determined in the 
context of the Community and not of a single Member State"89. The 
Commission enjoys a certain discretion which will be respected by the 
Court of Justice. The Commission seems to be willing to specify its 
discretion, by making use of its powers under the R & D policy of the 
Single Act in position papers and guidelines which we have already 
mentionei0. The mere fact that an international agency like ESA is still 
responsible for a European space policy will not prevent the Community 
from being active in this field, if it can prove a non-observance of the state 
aid rules by EEC Member States. 
lt is a matter of fact, however, as to the time and conditions under 
which these requirements of Article 92 are met. The crucial date may again 
be 31December199291. 
89 1980 ECR 2671 at 2692 No. 26 - Philip Morris. 
90 We again refer to Com. 88 ( 417) final of 26 July 1988 at 23, 34. 
91 Cf. Mattera, loc. cit. Fn. 64, p. 83. 
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Chapter II 
ESA CONVENTION AND EEC LAW ON EXTERNAL RELATIONS 
1. The Framework for Analysing the Relationship Between the ESA 
Procurement Rules and the EEC Law on External Relations 
The analysis of the ESA procurement rules in the context of EEC 46 
rules on completion of the Internal Market, the EEC/EFT A agreements 
and the GATT agreement on public procurement, has brought a clear and 
distinct result to light: the ESA procurement rules and the "fair-return" 
principle do not respect the basic rights of every EEC and EFTA 
undertaking to participate in public tender offers. lt makes no diff erence 
whether state or international tender offers are concerned, provided that 
Member States contribute to the financing of the supplied products or 
services. A solution has been found under the auspices of the Interna! 
Market philosophy, by which the EFTA countries could be integrated, 
despite remaining differences between the Treaty of Rome and the EFTA 
Convention. The GA TI agreement on public procurement confirms the 
principle of non-discriminatory public procurement. 
Infringements of EEC law, the EFTA agreement and the GA TI 47 
agreement by ESA procurement rules, concern the Internal EEC as weil as 
the inner European market, composed of EEC Member States and EFTA 
countries. Altogether, these are legally obliged to provide for open 
competitive bidding procedures on the inner European market. But the non-
compliance of the ESAprocurement rules with EEC law, the EEC!EFTA and 
GA IT agreements, do not make them invalid in relation to ESA. ESA is an 
international organisation constituted under international public law. In the 
second chapter, a fundamental issue must be examined, namely, the right of 
the EEC Member States1 to establish rules on public procurement under 
international law while acting within their capacity as members of ESA, 
these rules however deviating from the requirements of primary Community 
law. This essentially concerns the discrepancy between firstly, a Member 
States' autonomous right to shape an industrial policy within ESA ( as a 
member of that organisation) which is based on a "fair-return" principle and 
falls under the scope of international public law and secondly, the 
diametrically opposite EEC policy of open competitive bidding. 
Here, we are setting aside the proble_m of the extent to which the EFTA countries might 
be bound under the EFTA convention to shape a Common Commercial Policy wh1ch 
respects the market entry aspects. 
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Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome the EEC Member States 
are no langer completely free to shape their external relation policies. The 
Treaty provides for a Common Commercial Policy which will be developed 
by all Member States in order to coordinate their external relations and to 
harmonize the rules governing the Internal Market. The existence of a 
Common Commercial Policy requires an analysis of the relationship 
between the EEC Internal Market rules and their repercussions on the 
shaping of a Common Commercial Policy. Are the Member States under an 
obligation to apply the basic economic freedoms, and the right of entry for 
every EEC undertaking, to the ESA procurement rules? In legal terms: 
does the Common Commercial Policy determine and restrict the Member 
States' ability to engage themselves in international organisations which 
establish procurement rules deviating from that policy? And even if 
Member States are bound under Community law to shape a Common 
Commercial Policy which excludes the possiblity of providing for deviant 
procurement rules in the ESA Convention, it might weil be that the 
Member States are free to do so under the rules of international public 
law2. The question then arises whether Community law can restrict the 
Member States' capaci~ to conclude binding international treaties under 
international public law . 
The second chapter will therefore analyze a possible conflict arising in 
the procurement rules which may contradict the shaping of a Common 
Commercial Policy but nevertheless be permitted under international public 
law. The scenario of external relations in Community law differs somewhat 
from the clear and distinct picture provided by the rules governing the 
Interna! Market. Member States traditionally benefit from a greater 
autonomy in external relations than in internal market affairs. The challenge 
will be to make the stringent rules on the internal market compatible with 
the looser principles regulating the EEC law on external relations and its 
interdependence on international public law, without jeopardizing the basic 
political objectives of the Single Act. 
2 
3 
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Th~ re!ationship between Community and i~te~ational law in case of contradicting 
~bhgatmns of. Member States has been and s111l 1s the subject of a controversial debate 
10 legal doctnne; see e.g. Kovar, RMC 1974, 356; M~esen CMLR 1976 485· Zuleeg 
GYI!- 2q (19_77), 259 et seq.; Bleckma_nn, DÖV i978, 392; Zuleei, 1981'. 
Ged~chtmsschnft C::h. Sass~, 59 et seq.; _Downck1 ICLQ 1982, 66; we are looking for a 
solullon 10 developmg spec1fic Commumty rules m order to determine the extension of 
treaties with the COmmunity legal Order; sec in that sense Leenen LIEI 1984 93 et seq · 
Zuleeg, GYIL 27 (1984), 367 et seq. ' ' ., 
Cf. Zuleeg, GYIL 20 (1977), 250; Bernhardt, EuR 1983, 199 et seq. 
In the search for a possible solution to the conflicting procurement 48 
rules of the ESA Convention on the one hand and the EEC Treaty on the 
other, there are two different approaches open in order to decide on the 
Member States' freedom in the ESA Convention to deviate from the Treaty 
ofRome: 
(1) on examining the rules regarding the conflict of 
international treaties and analysing whether the ESA 
procurement rules benefit from priority over the EEC 
procurement rules or vice versa; priority presupposes 
that it is possible to decide whether the Member States 
are free to involve themselves in the ESA Convention 
or not; 
(2) by forming a prospective solution for the conflict by 
elaborating the Member States' obligation to re-
negotiate the ESA Convention in order to reconcile the 
divergent rules of the different treaties and achieve a 
long-term solution; 
Relying on the priority rules mainly concerns discovering whether the 
subject matter of the ESA Convention and the EEC Treaty overlap 4 and if 
so, whether the conclusion of the ESA Convention in 1975 overrules the 
Treaty of Rome, concluded in 1957. This approach may be described as 
having a retrospective nature. Searching for the existence of post 
negotiation duties might be associated with a prospective approach. lt would 
be short sighted to analyze tbe relationship between the ESA Convention 
and the EEC policy on external relations only with a view to the situation 
which existed in the seventies when the ESA Convention was concluded. lt 
is all the more important to look at the state of development of the 
European Community as it stands after the adoption of the Single Act. 
The dynamic extension of the EEC policy on external relations since 49 
the adoption of the Treaty of Rome requires us to analyze the possibilities 
of a prospective solution to the diverging procurement rules. lt might weil 
be that the Member States benefitted up to the late seventies from the 
inactivity of the Community in external relations, in order to formulate their 
policy in the ESA Convention. In other words: the Member States might 
have had the competence in the seventies to regulate public procurement in 
the ESA Convention contrary to the EEC rules, but they would not be 
permitted to establish the very same rules in the eighties because the 
Community has extended its power in external relations in the interim. 
4 And this is not an easy question to answer, see under 4. and 5. 
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50 The issues which must be considered with a view to renegotiating the 
ESA Convention may be grouped into three distinct legal options: 
(1) Renegotiating the ESA Convention presupposes 
that the ESA procurement rules interfere with the 
Common Commercial Policy. A tendency to answer 
this in the affirmative thus emphasises the Member 
States post-negotiation duties. 
(2) Secondly the question of shared or exclusive 
powers of the Community to enter into the process of 
renegotiating the ESA procurement rules in external 
relations - with the perspective of opting for a so-
called "mixed" procedure of joint competence, 
(3) The potentiality of the Member States to justify the 
deviating ESA procurement rules under Community 
law by renegotiating the ESA Convention - with a 
view to accepting derogations from Community law 
until the completion of the Internal Market by 1992 at 
the latest. 
The three options shall be explained with the overall perspective of 
rellegotiating the ESA Convention against a socio-political background in 
order to explain them, before we begin Oll a more thoroughgoing legal 
analysis. This will be done with special emphasis Oll possible or even 
indirect effects of the Single Act in EEC law on external relations and on 
the positioll of the Member States as subjects under international public 
law. 
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a) Interference of the ESA procurement rules with the 
EEC law on extemal relations 
Entering into the different perspectives and conditions for re-
negotiating the ESA Convention, makes sense only if the ESA procurement 
rules affect EEC law on external relations as shaped and confirmed under 
the Single Act. Only if such an overlapping of policies exists, will the 
interrelationship between conflict rules on treaties and the post-
negotiatiation duties of Member States have to be clarified. 
(1) The Single Act has confirmed the overall mandate of the Treaty of 51 
Rome, for the Community, to elaborate a Common Commercial Policy on 
external relations. There are no provisions providing for amendments or 
alterations to the EEC law on external relations. Art. 30 of the Single Act 
concerns itself with closer cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy, but it 
does not affect the basic principles of a Common Commercial Policy as 
formulated in Art. 110 et seq. To solve the problem of establishing whether 
the Community has competence to regulate public procurement in the 
international sphere, one must look to the case-law of the European Court 
of Justice and the legal doctrine relevant to interpreting a system like the 
Common Commercial Policy. 
There are however some amendments made by the Single Act which 
have some relevance to the shaping of an EEC law on external relations. 
They deal with explicit powers given to the Community in newly-established 
policies, like R & D, (Art. 130 N) and environmental protection (Art. 130 
R). Art. 130 N reads as follows: 
"In implementing the multiannual framework 
programme, the Community may make provision for 
cooperation in Community research, technological 
development and demonstration with third countries or 
international organisations. 
The detailed arrangements for such cooperation may 
be the subject of international agreements between the 
Community and the third parties concerned which 
shall be negotiated and concluded according to Art. 
228". 
Art. 130 R ( 5) reads as follows: 
"Within their respective spheres of competence, the 
Community and the Member States shall cooperate 
with third countries and with the relevant international 
organizations. The arrangements for Community 
cooperation may be the subject of agreements between 
the Community and the third parties concerned, which 
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shall be negotiated and concluded in accordance with 
Art. 228. The previous paragraph shall be without 
prejudice to the Member States' competence to 
negotiate in international bodies and to conclude 
international agreements". 
The declaration by the representatives of the Member States provides 
an interpretation, (in the international context) of the purpose of the newly 
established article: 
"The conference considers that the provisions of 
Article 130 R(5), second subparagraph do not affect 
the principles resulting from the judgment ganded 
down by the Court of Justice in the ERTA case" . 
In the light of the ERT A judgment Art. 130 N needs to be analyzed as 
to its possible effects and links with public procurement rules which are 
part of the ESA R & D policy. Art. 130 N might be interpreted so as to 
empower the Community to regulate the procurement rules internationally. 
52 (2) More important than explicit changes resulting from the Single Act 
are the indirect effects of the Interna! Market philosophy on the further 
development of the EEC law on external relations. Art. 113, in laying down 
the Common Commercial Policy, might be understood as the counterpart of 
Arts. 30 and 59. In terms of policy one might assume that the Interna! 
Market will strengthen the Community's powers in developing a Common 
Commercial Policy. The stronger the Member States grow together in the 
Interna! Market, the more necessary it is to act at the international level on 
a common basis. The Internal Market not only restricts the Member States' 
sovereignty with regard to all matters which aff ect the relation between the 
Member States themselves, but also the Internal Market will at the same 
time transform EEC policy and law in external relations. The Member 
States' importance will decrease in the long run and the Community's role 
will be upgraded as a consequence. This shift in competence will not be 
achieved by 1992 automatically6, it must be understood as a constant 
process. The ESA Convention and the rules on public procurement must be 
seen and analyzed in that broader political context. 
5 1971 EC~ 263 ~t 270, concerns the exclusive powers of the Community in Common 
Commerc1al Pohcy, cf. No. 75. 
6 The Interna! Market is not self-executing, cf. No. 12. 
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b) Shared or exclusive powers of the Community in renegotiating 
public procurement in the ESA Convention 
The option makes sense only if we assume that the ESA procurement 53 
rules affect the EEC law on external relations. Therefore, the organ which 
governs EEC procurement rules in external relations and which might be 
entitled to lead the negotiations with ESA, must be identified. lt may be: 
the Community through the Commission and the 
Council i.e. the operation of exclusive power, or 
the Member States themselves (also an operation of 
exclusive power), or 
the paralleVconcurrent power of the Community and 
Member States operating together. 
Therefore, the question is whether the Member States are allowed to 
uphold their exclusive competence as recognised within ESA or are they 
obliged to share their power with the Community or again, have they even 
lost their power to the Community organs? 
The Single Act provides no new incentives to the distribution of power 
in external relations. That is why the rules in the Treaty of Rome apply with 
due regard to the overall objective of completing the Interna! Market by 
1992. Competence is regulated in the context of the subject concerned. Our 
attention is directed to Art. 130 N on R & D and Art. 113 on the Common 
Commercial Policy and even here the text needs interpretation. Once more 
the Court of Justice has taken the lead and formulated the basic principles 
for the distribution of power in the EEC law on external relations. The 
Court's fundamental standpoint is that a Common Commercial Policy can 
only be realized under the exclusive competence of the Community7. 
However, in attaining this competence it recognises the notion of "mixed 
procedure" especially for the transitional period. The leadership of the 
Court of Justice explains the declaration by the Member States in the Single 
Act not to amend the principles defined by the Court in the ERTA 
judgment. These principles will be transferred to the procurement rules and 
will be integrated in a thoroughgoing legal analysis of the interrelationship 
between the procurement rules and R & D under Art. 130 N, and the 
Common Commercial Policy under Art. 113. 
The stated Member State policy of respecting the legal critera which 
define competence in public procurement is not easily reconciled with the 
numerous interventions made in external relations by the Council of 
7 1971ECR263. 
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Ministers at different Summit meetings. There is no precedent to be found 
in public procurement matters but intervention can be reported from the 
International Agreements on Raw Material (No. 78). The rules to be 
applied balance out the conflicting interests of the Community and the 
Member States apart from the question of distribution of power in the 
Treaty. Any analysis of competence in public procurement must consider 
the fact that questions of competence are very sensitive and must be 
understood outside of their pure legal context. This is all the more true with 
regard to the political process of renegotiating the ESA Convention. 
c) Possible justifications for derogation from primary Community 
law in the ESA procurement rules 
When entering into negotiations with ESA, the Member States might 
be tempted to justify the deviating ESA procurement rules under existing 
EEC law. The question is whether the Member States are entitled under 
EEC law to reconcile the conflicting procurement rules by exempting 
international tender offers from the market entry rules governing the 
Interna! Market. If so, there would be no need to renegotiate the ESA 
Convention. But the question remains what kind of arguments could be 
brought forward to justify derogations from primary Community law. 
54 The analysis ofthe EEC Member States and EFTA countries capacity 
to derogate from primary Community law or from the EEC/EFT A 
agreement respectively, has clearly shown that exemptions from the basic 
economic freedoms can be justified for non-economic reasons only. We 
wonder however whether such a rigid solution can be upheld within the 
objective of building up a European space industry which is able to 
compete on the world market. The question arises whether the ESA 
procurement rules can be justified for the sake of making the European 
space industry competitive. Such an approach should encompass the 
examination of employment policies and the regional distribution of 
employment as possible economic justifications for the maintenance of the 
"fair return" principle. 
The Single Act does not consider the problem of possible economic 
barriers to trade as a result of justification for building up competitive 
European industries. Nor does it look to the long-term effects of the 
Interna! Market on global economy. The ever growing influence of the EEC 
might even result in a review of EEC status within the GATT. The Single 
Act, outside Art. 130 A, also neglects the role of employment policy and 
regional distribution of employment in particular (No. 14). There are no 
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mechanisms available under the Single Act for coordinating regional 
policies of the Member States with regard to the external relations of the 
Community. 
As in any other area of the Com.mon Commercial Policy possible legal 
justifications for the Member States' efforts to use the "fair return" principle 
in order to protect their home industries and to guarantee job security, 
must be found in the Treaty of Rome. There are no explicit rules in the 
Treaty nor in the Single Act for reconciling the difficulties resulting from 
regional policies. Essentially, the Member States trust in the regulating 
forces of the market. This is made clear in Art. 8 C which accepts only 
temporary derogations from the free circulation of goods and services. Art. 
8 C is certainly not applicable to the EEC law on external relations. The 
Treaty provides for exemptions in cases of deflection of trade, and thereby 
indirectly allows the protection of home industries (Art. 115), if the 
Commission grants the respective authorization. One could interpret Art. 
115 as an attempt to uphold the primary responsibility of the Member 
States for employment and regional development in external relations. The 
similarities with the rules on state aids, Art. 92 (3) are striking (No. 41). 
Subsidies where allowed are bound, however, to a specific procedure. 
We will examine the possibility of deducing a generally applicable 55 
principle from Art. 115, i.e. that derogations from primary Community law 
in the ESA procurement rules might be justified for economic reasons in 
order to build up a European space industry. Art. 115 would then become 
the counterpart of Art. 113. Its fundamentally transitional character would 
not undermine, but rather confirm the Community's overall mandate to 
shape a Common Commercial Policy within the framework of the GATT. 
Art. 115 would allow the Member States to uphold the ESA procurement 
rules till the end of 1992, but urge them to renegotiate the ESA Convention 
for the time after the completion of the Interna! Market. 
91 
2. Renegotiating the ESA Convention and the Importance of 
the Priority Decision 
558 Our hypothesis runs as follows: Whatever the result of the application 
of priority rules might be, the conflict between the divergent procurement 
rules can only be overcome by way of negotiation procedures between the 
different contracting partners, the ESA and the EEC as subjects under 
international public law, who respect the specific obligations of EEC 
Member States under Art. 5 (No.19). 
This must be explained more clearly. Two alternatives should be 
considered: firstly the ESA Convention might supersede the EEC law on 
external relations. Such an understanding would refute any attempt by the 
Community's organs to interfere with ESA activities. The completion of the 
Interna} Market, however, and even more the overall perspective of 
transforming the EEC into a political union, requires the Member States to 
look for possibilities to reconcile the ESA Convention and the EEC Treaty, 
at least in the long run. The second alternative could be the converse, i.e. 
that EEC law on external relations supersedes the ESA Convention and 
requires the Member States to apply the basic rules on the economic 
freedoms to the ESA Convention i.e. to harmonize the ESA rules on public 
procurement with the respective EEC rules. 
There are strong legal arguments for promoting the predominant role 
of renegotiating the ESA Convention as the only possible and feasible 
solution: the fact remains that Member States when acting as subjects of 
international public law are still bound to EEC law. lt is weil accepted that 
the priority rules do not lead to the nullity of the superseded treaty8. 
Member States remain bound to both treaties, the ESA Convention and the 
EEC Treaty. Priority, however, obliges the Member States when dealing 
with third parties not to refer to the agreement to which priority has been 
denied. Third parties, mainly the EFTA countries under the ESA 
Convention9, are then entitled to claim performance of the ESA 
Convention even if EEC law supersedes the ESA Convention, provided that 
the EFTA countries are acting in good faith (No. 55g). As priority does not 
make the superseded agreement void, the conflict prevails and a solution 
must be found only by bringing all the contracting parties together. They 
are under a legal obligation to find a solution which reconciles the divergent 
procurement rules. lt is exactly here, where the dynarnics of the EEC law 
come into play ( 49). 
8 See Zuleeg, loc. cit. Fn. 3, p. 248 et seq. 
9 And perhaps even the ESA itself, thereto Zuleeg, GYIL 27 (1984), 369. 
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a) Post negotiation duties of the Member States under EEC law 
The Single Act does not provide help for defining the scope and 55b 
content of the post negotiation duties of Member States. Reference can be 
made, however, to general Community law, namely to Art. 5, 11610 and 234. 
Art. 234 of the Treaty of Rome offers a solution to our question as far as 
those agreements are concerned which have been concluded by the 
Member States bef ore the enactment of the Treaty of Rome. lt begins from 
a "do ut des" philosophy: the Community is oblif ed to respect those 
agreements and not to impede their performance1 , the Member States 
correspondingly must use their influence to align such agreements with the 
basic requirements of Community law, Art. 234 para 2. 
The ESA Convention was concluded after the enactment of the 
Treaty of Rome. Legal doctrine interpretes Art. 234 as being applicable to 
agreements concluded after 1958 by analogy12. The Community, however, 
would be bound to respect the ESA-Convention only if it (the Community) 
had not yet received the power to regulate public procurement in 
international organisations at the time the Convention was concluded. 
Under these circumstances the situation would be similar and comparable 
to the purpose for which Art. 234 has been shaped. If, however, the 
Community already held the competence to regulate public procurement in 
international organisations in 1975, the ESA Convention could not be 
binding on the Community, at least not under Art. 23413. Whatever the 
solution might be, the Member States would be in any case under an 
obligation to align the ESA Convention to the basic ru1es of the EEC 
Treaty. 
Art. 116 concems mostly the duty of the Member States to take at least a common 
position c:specially when the Community has no! yet. been transferred the power to 
conclude mte~ati~na.I agreernent~. But ~· 116 will gam rnore and more importance as 
a general rule mstttutmg cooperatton duties of the Member States under the auspices of 
the Community, Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 116 Rdnr. 1, 10. 
Cf. Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 4, 5. 
Cf. Vedder in: Grabitz, Art 234 Rdnr. 20 et seq. and Petersrnann in: Grabitz, Art 234 
Rdnr.18. 
We will not go into the details of what .. is meant bv the binding and direct effects of 
international agreernents cf. Zuleeg, ZaORV 1975, 3'41; Petersrnann ZaÖRV 1975 213· 
Pescatore, ELR 1983, 137; ~verling, in: FS H. Mosler, 1983, 173; a~d Pescatore„ i~: FS 
H. Mosler, 1983, 661; Ev_erlmg, 1!1: FS K 0trstens, 1984, 95 et seq.; Schilling, ZaORV 41 
(1988), 637 et seq. The 1ssue m1ght be d1scussed at a later stage in the project for the 
analysis of the possibilities for undertakings to invoke the ESA procurement rules 
against the EEC rules on extemal relations. 
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55c The existence of post negotiation duties might be backed by Art. 5 
(No. 19)14. Art.5 imposes on the Member States a general duty to 
contribute to the achievement of the common, or respectively the Interna! 
Market15. However there is no case law available which has instituted such 
a post negotiation duty. There is still some uncertainty as to the scope of the 
duties, mainly on the question of whether the objective i.e. to develop a 
Common Commercial Policy suffices to implement the cooperation duties 
or whether the objectives of the Treaty first need to be concretized by EEC 
regulations16. Legal doctrine derives a general consultation duty for the 
Member States from Art. 5, which must be observed before they enter into 
negotiations on the conclusion of an international agreement17. The Court 
has not gone so far, but it has made clear that the Member States should 
refrain from entering into international obligations which might impede the 
Community in achieving its policy in the respective field18. The case-law 
allows us to conclude that the Member States are under an obligation not to 
endanger the development of a Common Commercial Policy. Therefore 
Member States have to avoid all activities which might aggravate the 
conflict between the ESA-Convention and the EEC Treaty. They are at 
least under a stand-still obligation not to increase the return coefficient as 
they have done in 1987 (No. 8). Such a broad notion of cooperation duties 
would institute post negotiation duties independent of the priority decision. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
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Although the importance of Art. 5 is recognized, there are few studies available, most of 
them written oy Gennan Iawyers, cf. Söllner, Art. 5 EWG-Vertrag in der 
Rechtsprechung des Europäischen Gerichtshofs, p. 2 
Söllner, Ioc. cit. p. 3 
See the overview in Bleckmann, RIW 1981, 653. 
Cf. Bleckmann, DVBI 1976, 483 at 487; Söllner, Ioc. cit. p. 59 et seq.; in the same 
direction Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 6. 
1976 ECR 1279 at 1312, 1313 - Kramer. 
b) Importance ofthe violation of EEC law in 1975 
The position of the Community in renegotiating the ESA Convention 55d 
might be strong, if the Member States violated Community law whilst 
concluding the ESA Convention in 1975. The applicability of Art. 234 on 
international agreements concluded after 1958 makes clear that a possible 
violation of EEC Jaw depends entirely on the scope of the Community's 
competence to regulate public procurement in external relations at the time 
the Convention was concluded: 
if the Community's competence arose after 1975, the 
Member States would not have violated the EEC law in 
external relations, or, conversely; 
if the competence already ex:isted in the early seventies 
then the Member States would have violated EEC law 
on external relations. 
Possible future competence in external relations, which was 
objective/y foreseeab/e at the time when the Member States adhered to the 
ESA Convention is the yardstick taken by legal doctrine19. Criteria have to 
be developed in order to determine whether foreseeabilty concerns the 
development of secondary Community law only or whether foreseeablity 
covers the development of the case-law of the Court of Justice as weil. 
Legal doctrine takes a rather narrow view, only those actions are not 
objectively foreseeable which are based on Art. 23520. A possible 
development of the case-law in external relations would not exclude 
foreseeability. If the question of foreseeablity has to be answered in the 
affrrmative, the Commission would even be entitled to initiate infringement 
procedures under Art. 16921 . 
19 Cf. Petersmann, in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 18; Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 20-22. 
20 Cf. Vedder, Ioc. cit. Art. 234 Rdnr. 21; Petersmann, loc. cit. Art 234 Rdnr. 18. 
21 Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr.6. 
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c) lmportance of the priority rnles in the process of renegotiating 
the ESA Convention 
55e The decision on who supersedes whom, the ESA Convention the EEC 
rules in external relations or vice versa, determines the starting position of 
both the Member States and the Community when it comes to renegotiating 
the ESA Convention. 
The question of priority has to be decided according the rules on the 
conflict of treaties concerning different contracting parties. lt has first to be 
checked whether the conflicting agreements provide for a clear answer on 
the priority question. Art. 234 of the Treaty of Rome might be understood 
as such a rule which reiterates the public international law principle of 
pacta sunt servanda22. If one accepts the application of Art. 234 to 
agreements concluded after 1958, priority would go together with the 
decision on a possible violation of Community law. If the Member States 
have not violated Community law, because the extension of the 
Community's competence in external relations was not objectively 
foreseeable, the ESA Convention would supersede the EEC law and vice 
versa. Tue decision on priority would be coupled with the rather 
sophisticated analysis of what the Member States should and could have 
known in 1975 on the extension of the EEC law in external relations. 
One might also seek the solution of the priority question in the general 
rules governing the conflict of treaties in public international la~3 . The 
decisive question will then be whether the lex posterior rule is applicable to 
the relationship between the ESA Convention and the Treaty of Rome. As 
the contracting parties are not identical, the lex posterior rule might only 
apply between those EEC Member States who are at the same time 
member of the ESA Convention and of the Community24. Such an 
understanding, however, sets aside possible effects of the ESA procurement 
rules on those EEC Member States who have not joined the ESA and the 
Community itself. These side effects of the double engagement of 
ESA/EEC Member States on Non-ESA/EEC Member States explain why 
legal doctrine tends to deny the applicabilty of the /ex posterior rule in 
conflicts with different contracting parties25• 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 1. 
Which presupposes that Art. 234 cannot give an appropriate answer to the arising 
contlict between the ESA Convention and füe Treaty of Rome; different conflict rules 
apply dependant on the existence or the lack of a stipulation governing the conflict, 
Zuleeg, loc. cit. Fn 3. 
Zuleeg, loc. cit. Fn. 3, p. 264/265. 
Seidl-Hohenveldern, in: FS Luther, 1978, 178 at 183; und Zuleeg, Joc. cit. Fn. 3, pp. 
264/265. 
The solution might then be found with reference to the "political 
decision" the States have taken in entering into two contradictory 
international agreements26. This is not an easy category to apply. The EEC 
Member States by joining ESA, have made clear that they intended to 
maintain their power to use public procurement as a means of industrial 
policy, at least in the field of space activities. They have aligned the EEC 
law to the ESA procurement rules by providing for the necessary exemption 
rules in the different directives on public work and public supply (No. 35). 
This might be understood as the political decision to give priority to the 
ESA rules. The Member States, however, might run into a conflict with 
Community law. The Court seems unwilling to accept the Member States 
attempts to circumvent primary Community law by providing for 
derogations in secondary Community law (No. 23). lt is true that the 
extension of the EEC law on external relations was executed by the Court 
of Justice against the opposition of the Member States27 and the same kind 
of conflict is foreseeable on the admissability of exemption rules in the 
directives on public work and public supply. Consistency with EEC law can 
only be achieved, if the Member States accept that they are no longer 
politically free to set aside Community law in international agreements. 
They cannot escape primary Community law by providing for exemptions in 
secondary Community law. The Member States have adopted the Single 
Act, thereby confirming the rules governing the Internal Market, including 
the role and function of the European Court of J ustice. Therefore, Member 
States remain bound to the EEC law, but have they really taken a "political 
decision" on the priority of the EEC law on the ESA procurement rules? 
26 As to the role and importance of the "political decision" as an approJ:'riate means to 
solve the conflict between contradictory rules in international treatles, Zuleeg, loc. cit. 
Fn. 3, p. 267 et seq. 
27 See the analysis of Stein, Am.J.Int.L. 1981, 1 et seq. at 22 et seq. 
d) Is the EEC bound by the ESA Convention? 
55f Whilst the foregoing analysis of a possible violation of the EEC law on 
external relations and the application of priority rules seem to strengthen 
the Community's position in the process of renegotiation, we have to 
consider the possibility that the Community itself is bound by the ESA 
Convention. Art. 234 might be interpreted so as to oblige the Community to 
respect the ESA Convention and not to impede its performance. Art. 234 
however, does not hinder the Community from extending its policy in the 
very same field and to bring the Member States post negotiation duties up-
to-date28. That is why Art. 234 does not bind the Community to the rights 
and duties of the ESA Convention. Such a consequence might be possible 
under the case law of the Court of Justice even if the Community is not a 
member of an international organisation, as the Court has said of GATI29. 
The obvious contradictions between the ESA procurement rules and the 
EEC rules exclude such a transfer of arguments from the GA TI to the 
ESA Convention. 
e) Ihe rote of the EFTA countries in the process of renegotiating 
the ESA Convention 
55g Our analysis has focussed so far on the role of the Member States of 
the EEC and the Community itself in the possible process of renegotiating 
the ESA Convention, without respecting the position of the EFf A 
countries. The arguments which the EFf A Countries can bring forward 
against a possible amendment of the ESA Convention will largely depend 
on whether they acted in good faith when they concluded the ESA 
Convention - although they might have already realized that there is a 
contradiction between the ESA and the EEC procurement rules as early as 
in 1975. 
Art. 234 protects the EFTA countries as third states who can rely on 
the binding effects of international agreements which have been concluded 
before 1958. The application of Art. 234 to the relationship between the 
ESA Convention and the EFTA countries makes it necessary to analyze the 
EFTA countries capacities to refer to the ESA procurement rules, in the 
light of the state of the development of the EEC law in external relations at 
28 Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 5 
29 Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 17, 18; Petersmann, loc. cit. Art. 234 Rdnr. 10 et seq. 
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the time when the ESA Convention was concluded. L~al doctrine refers to 
the applicability of Art. 46 of the Vienna Convention . The question then 
arises whether the EFTA countries operated in "good faith", a legal 
category which has to be weighed against "objectively foreseeable". Can 
both categories be put on an equal footing or should the EFTA countries 
be given more "freedom" than the Member States (No. 74)? 
30 Vedder in: Grabitz, Art. 234 Rdnr. 20-22; Petersmann, Ioc. cit. Art. 234 Rdnr. 18. 
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3. Competence of the EEC to Regulate the ESA Public Procurement Rules 
under R & D, Art. 130 N 
The Member States' post negotiation duties are dependant upon the 
Community's competence of regulating the ESA procurement rules under 
the scope of Art. 130 N (No. 50). We are looking at a possible link between 
R & D activities, the rules on public procurement and the "fair return" 
principle. Such an approach presupposes familiarity with the main 
principles determining the ESA R & D policy. Only if such a link exists, 
does the question have tobe raised as regards time when the Community's 
competence arose, namely before or after 1975. 
a) Preliminary definition of the ESA activities - R & D only? 
The European Space Agency figures under the heading of an 
international research and development organisation. We wonder whether 
that presumption is correct and do not hesitate to strike a critical note on 
the pretended non-commercial character of ESA's R & D policy. The 
conclusion can be drawn from the Convention itself. 
56 (1) First criterion for the shaping of ESA activities: the purpose of the 
Convention as defined in Art. II: 
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"The purpose of the agency shall be to provide for and 
to promote for exclusively peaceful purposes co-
operation among European States in space research 
and technology and space application, with a view to 
their being used for scientific purposes and for 
operational space applications systems, 
a) by elaborating and implementing a long-term 
European space policy, by recommending 
space objectives to the Member States and 
by concerting policies of the Member States 
with respect to other national and 
international organisations and institutions; 
b) by elaborating and implementing activities 
and programmes in the space field; 
c) by coordinating the European space 
programme and national programmes, and 
by integrating the latter progressively and as 
completely as possible into the European 
space programme, in particular as regards 
the development of applications satellites; 
d) by elaborating and implementing the 
industrial policy appropriate to its 
programme and by recommending a 
coherent industrial policy". 
Art. V distinguishes, as already noted (No. 4), between two kinds of 
activities: mandatory and optional ones. Mandatory activities may be 
summed up under the heading of non-commercial activities with a mere 
scientific character to the forefront of any future commercialisation. 
Optional activities are all those research activities which are directed to the 
further commercial use of the findings (No. 2-7). 
(2) The second criterion which shapes ESA activities is the attention it 57 
devotes to industrial policy31 . The spirit of the industrial policy is 
ambiguous: it pretends to cover both fields of activities: basic research and 
commercial application, but indeed puts emphasis on the optional 
programmes; it underlines the necessity of competitive bidding as an 
essential tool for achieving international competitiveness, but it develops at 
the same time specific rules on "fair return" for the Member States' financial 
contributions. The "fair return" principle should be understood as a sort of 
hinge which connects basic research with application of the space 
technology. 
(3) Conclusion: In terms of policies it seems difficult to associate the 58 
given concept of space activities entirely with the R & D sector. lt is 
inseparably linked to an industrial policy concept favouring specific regional 
needs of the Member States and justified by financial contributions. lt is at 
the same time related to trade policy in broad terms, as the "fair return" 
principle affects the free circulation of goods and services within the 
territories of the Member States to the Convention. Although the 
Convention undoubtedly aims at coordinating R & D policy, it cannot be 
regarded as a body which restricts its activities to this particular sector of 
policy. This diversity of policies needs to be analysed when it comes to 
considering the Community's competence in the field of R & D. 
31 See for a distinct description of the industrial policy Nos. 2-11. 
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b) Explict and implied powers of the Community in the R & D sector 
What lies behind the distinction between explicit and implied 
competence of the Community in external relations ? Explict powers mean 
those provisions of the Treaty which literally enable the Community to take 
action in the external relations. Implied powers are those which may not be 
derived directly from the Treaty but which result from the context laid 
down by the provisions of the Treaty. 
59 (1) Until its insertion in the Single Act, the Community was not vested 
with explicit powers in the R & D policy, Art. 130 N. One might be tempted 
to conclude that R & D remained in the hands of the Member States until 
the adoption of the Single Act. The only - explicit, if we may say so -
possibility for regulating R & D before the insertion of Art. 130 N came 
from Art. 100/235. Art. 100/235 serve as a general basis for all those fields 
of activities which are not directly covered by the Treaty, but which the 
Member States agree to have regulated in a common way. As the 
Community has not made use of its competence in Art. 100/235 the 
question remains whether the ESA activites are covered by Art. 130 N. 
The importance as weil as the scope of application of Art. 130 N are 
not yet clear. In its communication of 11 April 1986 the Commission has 
developed for the first time some guidelines on the R & D policy in the 
context of state aids (No. 43). The multiannual framework programme as 
mentioned in Art. 130 I has not yet been elaborated on. The different 
provisions, namely Art. 130 F and G are very broad and one might assume 
that the ESA activities could come under the EEC R & D policy one day. 
At the moment it is far too early to give more than a prelimina~ statement 
of the EEC's possible role in the R & D field on space activities . 
32 In a broader context, A.Fuchs, Kartellrechtliche Grenzen der Forschungskooperation, 
1988. 
102 
(2) In the meanwhile our attention should focus on the question of 60 
whether the EEC's competence to regulate R & D could result implicitly 
from the Treaty33. All provisions of the Treaty relating to R & D and public 
procurement could serve as a possible basis. The question is not an 
academic one, Oll the contrary, it is highly political. lt became practical in 
the early seventies. The Member States and the Council, as their 
representative organ, defended the idea that the Community should have 
power only as far as the Treaty explicitly provided for that contingency. 
The intention was clear: the Member States - through the Council -
wanted to restrict the Community's competence in external relatiolls and at 
the same time to safeguard their sovereignty. The Commission's view Oll the 
insertion of implied powers in external relations beyond the rather narrow 
reading of the Treaty, started from the idea that the Community was the 
competent organ to represent the Member States in external relations and 
to shape a Common, in the direct sense of the word, Commercial Policy 
whenever the Treaty requires even implictly for such a coordinated 
approach, in order to realize the idea of a common market. 
The Commission's view was confirmed by the ERTA-judgment already 
in 1971: "Such authority (to enter into international agreements H.-W.M.) 
arises not only from an express conferment by the Treaty - as in the case 
with Art. 113 and 114 for tariff and trade agreements and with Article 228 
for association agreements - but may equally flow from other provisions of 
the Treaty and measures adopted, within the framework of those provisions, 
by the Community institutions"34. A possible Community power for 
regulating R & D public procurement in the ESA Convention, besides the 
explicit powers givell under the Single Act, Art. 130 N, could theoretically 
be deduced from quite a number of the Treaty's provisions. In other words: 
the ERTA judgment allows the shaping of R & D in external relations 
outside the explicit powers in the Treaty of Rome. 
33 Stein, loc. cit. 
34 Case 2200, 1971 ECR 263 at 274, No. 16 - ERTA. 
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c) Implied Community powers for regulating R & D under Art. 30/59 
A suggested operational basis could be the Community's jurisdiction 
under primary Community law: Art. 30 and 59. These provisions establish 
the common, or respectively, Interna! Market. In relation to R & D, the 
question following questions have to be raised: 
(1) whether the powers given to the Community under 
Art. 30 and 59 may cover or may have covered 
activities in the R & D sector because such measures 
are inherently bound to the free trade of goods or 
services and, if so, 
(2) whether or not the implicit competence deduced 
from Art. 30/59 comprises the regulation of R & D in 
extemal relations. 
61 (1) lt has been shown that the scope of application of Art. 30 and 59 in 
the case-law of the Court of Justice cannot be limited to measures directly 
restricting the free circulation of goods and services (Nos. 15-20). For this 
reason, all those R & D measures could fall within the ambit of Art. 30 and 
59 which only indirectly effect the free trade of goods and services. The 
ESA procurement rules as embodied in its industrial policy, form the basis 
of the whole ESA Convention. The completion of the optional as well as the 
mandatory programme is bound by these rules (Nos. 3-4). We might 
therefore understand the ESA procurement rules as being part of the 
R & D policy. In this capacity they affect the free trade of goods and 
services and come under the scope of application of Art. 30 and 59 (Nos. 15 
ss.). Such a verdict does not cover the ESA R & D policy as a whole. lt 
concerns only the procurement rules and the "fair return" principle as an 
integral part of ESA's R & D policy. 
62 (2) lt remains to be seen whether Art. 30 and 59 are the appropriate 
provisions to apply to the EEC rules on public procurement in extemal 
relations. As we have stated earlier, Art. 30 and 59 have Art. 113 as their 
counterpart in the EEC law on external relations (52). We are reluctant to 
deduce a Community power to regulate public procurement as part of the 
R & D policy, based on Art. 30 and 59 in connection with Art. 100 A. Such 
an understanding would lead to an overlapping of the scope of application 
of Art. 30 and 59 on the one hand and Art. 113 on the other. Although the 
ESA procurement rules form an integral part of the R & D policy, we 
assume that the emphasis must be put on the commercial eff ects of these 
rules. That is why the solution must be found in the interpretation of Art. 
113 and not in a further extension of Art. 30 and 59. 
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(3) Conclusion: The analysis has made clear that the powers given to 63 
the Community under Art. 30 and 59 cover activities in the R & D sector, 
but they do not comprise the implicit competence of regulating R & D in 
external relations. This might be different once the Interna! Market has 
been completed. The overall importance of Art. 30 and 59 could then be 
used to align the notion of a "Common Commercial Policy" with the 
meaning given to "measures having an equivalent effect". Such a perspective 
might have far-reaching effects on the concept of R & D beyond the 
attention devoted here to the procurement rules as part of the ESA's 
R & D policy. As the Community does not have the implict competence 
deduced from Art. 30/59 to regulate R & D in external relations there is no 
need to discuss the consequences of an application of Art. 234, and mainly 
the question of what the Member States should have known when 
concluding the ESA Convention in 1975. 
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4. Competence of the EEC to Regulate the ESA Procurement Rules under 
the Common Commercial Policy? 
The Member States' post negotiation duties are dependant upon the 
Community's competence to regulate the ESA procurement rules under the 
Common Commercial Policy. The ESA rules on public procurement could 
come today ( or could have already come in 1975) under the Community's 
competence in regulating the Common Commercial Policy, Art. 113. In the 
latter case priority for the ESA procurement rules would be denied and the 
Community would be in a strong starting postion in the process of 
renegotiating the ESA Convention. If the ESA procurement rules, however, 
supersede the Common Commercial Policy, the Member States would be at 
least under an obligation to align the ESA Convention to the Treaty of 
Rome provided that the Community has been transferred the competence 
after 1975. Our analysis is limited to the ESA procurement rules and sets 
aside all those commercial activities of ESA which might also fall into the 
ambit of Art. 11335. 
Art. 113 is the key provision on external relations. The Common 
Commercial Policy does not distinguish between goods and services. Seen 
as a counterpart to Art. 30 and 59 the Common Commercial Policy should 
cover the rules on entry under Art. 30 as well as the rules on the freedom to 
provide services. Only such an understanding could encompass all phases of 
contracts concluded in the realization of the optional programme (Nos. 5-
7). We will have to examine whether the Common Commercial Policy can 
be understood and interpreted so as to comprise services (No. 70). 
The real problem in the interpretation of the Common Commercial 
Policy concerns the lack of case-law similar to Art. 30/59 - which helps to 
shape its meaning. There are only some ten judgments dealing with the 
Common Commercial Policy. lt is true that most of them are quite 
outspoken and require acceptance of the rulings laid down as "acquis 
communautaire" - basic principles valid far beyond the subject at stake. 
This handful of judgments cannot yet be regarded as a well developed 
concept on external relations. The trends, however, are evident in the case-
law of the Court of Justice, and they permit a definite response to the 
question of who holds the competence. 
The analysis will be done in three steps: first, to examine whether the 
ESA procurement rules interfere with the Community's competence in 
Common Commercial Policy. Here we have to consider the importance of 
ESA's R & D activites in relation to Common Commercial Policy. Put 
35 Namely those mentioned under Nos. 5-7. 
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simply: are the Member States allowed to escape the Community's 
jurisdiction in the Common Commercial Policy by referring to the R & D 
character of the ESA activites? The second step concerns the role and 
importance of the exemptions provided in the different directives on public 
work and public supply. These exemptions might provoke the argument that 
the Community's competence in regulating the Common Commercial Policy 
under primary Community law can be shaped and restricted by exemption 
rules of secondary Community law. The third step evaluates the option for 
the Member States to reject the application of Art. 113 by pointing out that 
the ability of the Community to assume competence on international 
agreements in the space sector depends on the preceding enforcement of 
internal rules relating to the matter contemplated. Last but not least and 
provided that the Community holds the competence, the date of the 
transfer from the Member States to the Community has been determined in 
the light of the meaning given to the application of Art. 234 for 
international agreements concluded after 1958. 
a) Scope of the Community powers - Common Commercial Policy and the 
ESA procurement rules 
Art. 113 gives a very broad interpretation of the Common Commercial 
Policy, mainly referring to the EEC's role in. reducing customs tariffs and 
barriers to trade in order to enable the free circulation of goods and 
services world-wide. The Court and legal doctrine facilitates the integration 
of procurement rules within the Common Commercial Policy by 
maintaining a broad concept of the latter. Member States, however, have 
made and are still making efforts to narrow down the notion of the 
Common Commercial Policy, in order to protect their own competences. 
The conflict which arises, and which we must consider, concerns the 
scenario of a proper understanding of the Common Commercial Policy. 
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65 (1) The Council and individual Member States wished to restrict the 
Common Commercial Policy to measures reducing customs tariffs36. Such 
an understanding of the Treaty would exempt the procurement rules in the 
ESA Convention from the scope of Art. 113. The Court of Justice has 
rejected attempts to reduce the scope of application of Art. 113 in opinion 
117537. The Court gives a broad notion to the concept of the Common 
Commercial Policy which must have "in the Community sphere a meaning 
which cannot be construed more narrowly than in the context of the 
international action of a State and which no doubt covers e~ort policy, 
including the matters of export credits which were at stake here" 8. 
66 (2) Opinion 1175 has triggered off a far reaching conflict between the 
Commission and the Council on the scope of the Community power in the 
Common Commercial Policy39. The Commission began with the idea that 
Art. 113 covers all measures being a specific instrument to regulate 
international trade40. The Council on the contrary concentrated on the 
purpose and aim of the measure. lt falls therefore within the ambit of Art. 
113, if it affects the volume and the patterns of trade. Transferring this to 
the ESA Convention: following the Commission's interpretation the 
commercial rules on procurement and "fair return" would probably be 
considered as instruments for regulating international trade; whereas 
according to that of the Council, one might argue that the very same rules 
are not covered by the Common Commercial Policy because their purpose 
has never been to impede international trade. 
36 Cf. Gilsdorf, Die Grenzen der Gemeinsamen Außenhandelspolitik, 1988, p. 8 with 
references in Fn. 10. 
37 1975ECR1355 at 1356- Understanding on Local Costs Standards. 
38 Part 8, 1 of the opinion, Pescatore, CMLR 1979, 615 at 621. 
39 Cf. Gilsdorf, loc. cit. Fn. 36, p. 5 et seq.; Timmermanns, La Libre Circulation des 
Marchandises, 1986 p. 94. 
40 Cf. Ehlermann, EuR 1982, 285. 
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The political implications of the diverging attitudes held by the 67 
Commission and Council are reflected in opinion 117841. The Commission 
bad requested to be informed "whether the international agreement on 
rubber comes as a whole or at least in essentials within the sphere of the 
"Common Commercial Policy" referred to in Article 113 of the Treaty "42. 
The Council argued that Art. 113 should not be interpreted so as to render 
meaningless other provisions of the Treaty, in particular those dealing with 
general economic policy, including the supply of raw materials within the 
power of the Member States and for which the Council has only, under 
Article 145, a power of "co-ordination"43 and more specifically ... " the 
agreements contain elements of "non-reciprocity" which are typical for 
development aid (policy)"44. The Court clearly rejected any attempt by the 
Council to narrow down the scope of Art. 113 by construing links between 
commercial policy and development problems: 
"lt is not possible to lay down, for Art. 113 of the EEC 
treaty, an interpretation the effect of which would be to 
restrict the common commercial policy to the use of 
instruments intended to have an effect only on the 
traditional aspects of external trade to the exclusion of 
more highly developed mechanisms such as appear in 
the agreement envisaged. A common commercial 
policy understood in that sense would be destinated to 
become nugatory in the course of time. Although it 
may be thought that at the time when the Treaty was 
drafted liberalization of trade was the dominant idea, 
the Treaty nevertheless does not form a barrier to the 
possibility of the Community's developing a 
commercial policy aiming at a regulation of the world 
market for certain prof_!ucts rather than at a mere 
liberalization of trade 4 . Art. 113 empowers the 
Community to formulate a commercial policy based on 
uniform principles thus showing that the question of 
external trade must be governed from a wide point of 
view and not having regard to the administration of 
precise systems such as customs and quantitative 
restrictions. The same conclusion may be deduced 
from the fact that the enumeration in Art. 113 of the 
41 1979 ECR 2871 - International Agreement on Natural Rubber. 
42 Loc. cit. No. 37. 
43 Loc. cit. No. 39. 
44 Loc. cit. No. 40. 
45 Loc. cit. No. 44. 
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subjects covered by commercial poli~y ... is conceived 
as a non-exhaustive enumeration ... "4 . 
Then the Court refuted the Council's attempts to withdraw the 
Community's competence by referring to the exclusive competence of the 
Member States in the general economic policy: 
" ... the considerations set out above47 form to some 
extent an answer relating to the distinction to be drawn 
between the spheres of general economic policy and 
those of the common commercial policy since 
international co-operation would be confused with the 
domain of general economic policy. If it appears that it 
comes, at least in part, under the common commercial 
policy, as has been indicated ... , it follows clearly that 
it could not, under the name of general economic 
policy, be withdrawn from the competence of the 
Community1148• 
The opinion lends the impression that the Court is willing to follow the 
Commission in a wide-embracing understanding of the Commercial Policy 
per Art. 113. The Court rejects the Council's intention of focussing entirely 
on the purpose of the respective measure, but on the other band does not 
consider this approach to the purpose of a measure, to be meaningless49. 
The Court of Justice, however, does not go as far as the Commission. The 
Com.mission's interpretation would lead to an extremely broad notion of the 
Common Commercial Policy covering all measures which only indirectly 
affect the international trade like regulations on health, safety and the 
environmenr5°. 
68 What does the Opinion on the International Agreement on Natural 
Rubber contribute to the question if the commercial rules of the ESA 
Convention come under the scope of Art. 113? The extensive analysis of 
EJC case-law makes clear that: 
The Member States, whilst negotiating the ESA 
Convention, cannot evade the scope of Art. 113 by simply 
referring to the R & D purpose of the agreement which is 
not yet covered by the Treaty. The competence newly 
46 Loc. cit. No. 45. 
47 Loc. cit. Nos. 44/45. 
48 Loc. cit. No. 48. 
49 Cf. Timmermanns, loc. cit. p. 95. 
50 Cf. Gilsdorf, Ioc. cit. p. 19. and Timmermanns, loc. cit. with reference to Ehlermann, 
EuR 1982, 285-287. 
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established in Art. 130 N underlines our understanding 
of the dynamic character of the Common Commercial 
Policy as a Community. 
The ''fair retum" principle and the restrictions on the 
competitive bidding affect the Community's competence 
under Art. 113. The case law of the Court of Justice 
allows us to draw such a conclusion even if the 
Member States have not explicitly aimed at influencing 
the international trade by laying down provisions on 
fair return of the funds invested and on the bidding 
procedure. 
lt might weil be that the Member States of the ESA 
Convention pursue the objective of establishing, at the 
same time, a common industrial fiolicy to coordinate 
space activities, which as a whole 1 is still outside the 
Community's competence. The cumulation of policies 
does not lead to a withdrawal of the Community's 
competence52, if only parts of the activities come under 
the jurisdiction of Community law. 
(3) Although the case-law leaves no doubt as to the Community's 69 
competence, the internal conflict between the Commission and the Council 
on the scope of Community power in external relations is far from being 
solved. lt might come up again if the Commission asks the Council for a 
mandate to enter in negotiations with the ESA. The Council's intention is to 
escape the broad notion of Art. 113 as presented at the Court of Justice by 
basing measures concerning external relations on Art. 23553. The Council's 
approach is based on the understanding that only those measures whose 
explicit purpose is to regulate international trade actually concern the 
Common Commercial Policy. By referring to Art. 235, the Council seeks to 
withhold its power of defining the scope of the Common Commercial 
Policy. The Commission is not willing to accept the Council's policy of 
requirin,f unanimity, and has decided to refer the matter to the Court of 
Justice5 . 
51 lncluding regional distribution of employment, No. 14. 
52 Cf. Opinion 1/78 1979 ECR 2871. 
53 Cf. Timmermanns, loc. cit. p. 95 with reference to Directive 83/129. 
54 1987 ECR 1493; thereto Gilsdorf, loc. cit. p. 2. 
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70 (4) One problem remains to be solved: phase A and B under the 
industrial policy of ESA must be regarded as service contracts (Nos. 5-7). 
The issue then arises as to the extent to which trade and services and the 
trade in goods must be differentiated in the regulation of the Common 
Commercial Policy. Since the Court has not, until now, ruled on the issue, it 
might weil be the case that a similar discussion commences, as with the 
meaning of the Common Commercial Policy with regard to international 
trade in goods. The integration of services in the Uruguay-round is, 
however, too strong an argument to assume that the Council would 
resuscitate its' old concept of the Commercial Policy as a mere tool for 
reducing customs. There seems to be a common preparedness in this 
doctrine, to ensure integration of services within the scope of Art. 11355. 
Services should fall into the ambit of Art. 113 as far as the Cornmunity has 
vested powers to regulate internal trade in services. 
b) S cope of the Community powers - the Common Commercial Policy and 
the exemptions in the directives on public work and public supply 
71 There is much to be said for the application of Art. 113 to the 
commercial activities of ESA because of its trade-related character, namely 
the procurement rules. This leads to the assumption that the EEC holds the 
competence to regulate public procurement under the Common 
Commercial Policy, at least today. Member States, however, could reject a 
possible application of Art. 113 by pointing out that the ability of the 
Community to assume authority for procurement rules in the space sector 
internationally, contradicts the exemption rules in the different directives on 
public work and public supply. The internal conflict between the notion of a 
Common Commercial Policy and the exemption rules in the directives has 
far reaching effects on the distribution of competences between the 
Member States and the Community. lt predetermines the position of the 
Member States and the Community in the renegotiation of the ESA 
Convention. 
Two alternatives should be distinguished: either the Member States 
are free under EEC law to define the scope of application of Art. 113 by 
way of exempting international public procurement from the Common 
Commercial Policy or Member States are bound to the primary Community 
law as defined by the Court. Their only opportunity of escaping the 
55 Cf. Timmermanns, in: Liber Amicorum Pierre Pescatore, 1987, 675-689; in the same 
sense Gilsdorf, loc. cit. p. 28 et seq.; see also Lauwaars, in: J. Schwarze (ed.) 
Discretionary Powers in the Field of Economic Policies and their Limits under the EEC 
Treaty 1988, 73 at 80 et seq.; and Hilf, in: J. Schwarze, loc. cit. 1988, 91 et seq. 
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applicability of the EEC rules on the Common Commercial Policy would 
then be to submit the exemptions provided for in the directives to the 
justification procedure of Art. 115. In the first alternative Member States 
can use secondary Community law to maintain their competence in 
regulating the ESA procurement rules, in the second alternative Member 
States are bound to the primary Community law even if they try to escape 
its grasp by setting into motion the authorization procedure of Art. 115. 
Competence has then been transferred to the Community. 
(1) The conflict has not yet been discussed in the law on external 
relations56. We should however remember the Court of Justice case-law on 
Art. 30, mainly the two famous judgments Dassonville and Cassis-de Dijon. 
Here the Court has given a very broad interpretation of "measures having 
equivalent effect", but has at the same time extended the opportunities for 
the Member States to justify possible derogations from Art. 30 beyond the 
rather narrow scope of Art. 36. In the light of the rulings laid down for the 
regulation of market entry rights to the Interna! Market, we should consider 
a solution for the law on external relations. 
(2) A long term perspective must reconsider the categories under 
which the scope of application has been discussed so far. The conflict 
between the Commission and the Council, on whether the purpose of a 
certain measure or rather its nature as an instrument should decide on the 
applicability of Art. 113 seems to have reached a deadlock. The Court is 
weil advised when it avoids entering the conflict on the very same 
categories. The Court starts from the basic idea that only a Common 
Commercial Policy can implement the objectives of the Interna! Market. lt 
is exactly this relationship between the rules on the Interna! Market and the 
rules on external relations which has been used in the legal doctrine as a 
starting point for defining the scope of application of Art. 113. 
Gilsdorf7 links the content of the Common Commercial Policy to the 
ongoing process of completing the Interna! Market. The Common 
Commercial Policy should be seen in the overall framework of the Treaty. 
Timmermanns58 defines the decisive question in the following way: 
"La question de savoir si la notion de la politique 
commerciale commune ne devrait pas etre definie en 
tenant compte des particularites de la division des 
56 With the exception of Vedder, in: Grabitz, who mentions the Member States' capacities 
to align contracting international agreements by making use of secondary Community 
law, Art.234 Rdnr. 5 et seq. 
57 1988, loc. cit. p. 9/10. 
58 Loc. cit. p. 96. 
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competences entre la Communaute et ses Etats 
membres sur le plan interne merite d'etre 
approfondie ... " 
Both authors pursue a common objective: they consider that the 
competence in external matters should be coextensive with the 
Community's powers for internal purposes. This idea as expressed in the 
Latin phrase: in foro intemo, in foro extemo dates back to 195359. lt would 
lead to a parallelism of the Community's powers in regulating the Intemal 
Market and shaping external relations. The same thinking can be found in 
the Single Act Art. 130 Q and N. lt confers powers on the Community to 
regulate R & D in the Interna! Market, Art. 130 Q and in external relations, 
Art. 130 N. 
72 What should be understood by "parallelism"? When has the moment 
arrived for the Community to claim its power to regulate external relations? 
Is it on the establishment of a procurement policy for the Interna! Market in 
Directive 77/6260 or alternatively, after adopting the Council Decision 
80/27161 concerning the conclusion of the Multilateral Agreement or again 
after publishing the Council Resolution of 22 July 198062 based on Art. 113 
(No. 37) concerning the access to Community public supply contracts for 
products originating in third countries? 
The Directive 77 /62 regulated procurement for public supply in the 
Interna! Market for the first time. The Decision 80/271 approves inter alia 
the GATT agreeroent on public procurement. The Resolution of 22.7.1980 
intends to safeguard the interests of the Member States' producers by 
enabling thero to participate in public contracts awarded by the various 
third countries63. The idea of parallelism requires engagement of the 
Comrounity in external relations. That is why we would assume the 
Community's competence existed under Art. 113 in 1980. The two measures 
taken by the Community indicate that it has definitely decided to integrate 
the regulation of public procurement when shaping a Common Commercial 
Policy in 1980. 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
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Cf. Pescatorei. CMLR 1979, 615 et seq. at 618, Fn. 5 with reference to the forerunner of 
the doctrine, rau! Reuter. 
OJ L 13/34, 15.Jan.1977 
OJ L 71/1, 17.Mar.1980. 
OJ C 211/2, 19.Aug.1980. 
We are not going into details here. 
c) Virtua/ capacity or f actual capacity of the Community to regulate public 
procurement in the space sector 
The last opportunity for the Member States (so far) to invoke their 73 
competence in regulating the ESA procurement rules could be through 
claiming that the Community has assumed the power to regulate public 
procurement but that it has waited until 1988 to formulate a procurement 
policy in the space sector which is still very vague and does not yet indicate 
what the Community's objectives are (No. 40). Briefly: in such a situation 
the Member States remain competent for the regulation of public 
procurement in the space sector. 
In the Kramer case64 the parallel problem arose. The Court concluded 
that "the Community has authority to enter into international 
commitments1165, although it has not made use of the powers provided for in 
the framework of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention66. Perhaps 
the most outspoken dictum of the court relating to the problem of a virtual 
versus afactual jmwer of the Community under Art. 113 can still be found 
in opinion 1/766 : 
" ... The Court has concluded inter alia that whenever 
Community law has created for the institutions of the 
Community powers within its internal system for the 
purpose of attaining a specific objective, the 
Community has authority to enter into international 
commitments necessary for the attainment of that 
objective even in the absence of an express provision in 
that connection68. 
This is particularly so in all cases in which internal 
power has already been used to adopt measures which 
come within the attainment of common policies. lt is, 
however, not limited to that eventuality. Although the 
internal Community measures are only adopted when 
the international agreement is concluded and made 
enforceable, as is envisaged in the present case .. „ the 
power to bind the Community vis-a-vis third party 
countries nevertheless flows by implication from the 
provisions of the Treaty creating the internal power 
and in so far as the participation of the Community in 
64 1976 ECR 1279 at 1305. 
65 Loc. cit. Nos. 30-33. 
66 Pescatore, loc. cit. Fn. 59, p. 620. 
67 ~977 ECR 741 at 754, - Draft agreement establishing a European laying-up fund for 
inland waterway vessels. 
68 Loc. cit. No. 3. 
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international agreement is, as here, necessary for the 
attainment ~f one of the objectives of the 
Community"6 . 
The Court has neither withdrawn nor corrected its view, although the 
occasions on which the Court could have acted were rather limited. 
Pescatore concludes "that the existence of a virtual capacity is sufficient in 
this respect, even if it has not yet been exercised for internal purposes1170• 
Based on the case-law in the light of the interpretation given to the notion 
of Common Commercial Policy, the objections which could be raised by the 
Member States remain meaningless. The non-exercise of the Community's 
competence on public procurement in the space sector does not lead to an 
automatic re-transfer of competence to the Member States. 
d) The Community's competence in regulating the procurement rules on an 
international level and the importance of Art. 234 
Our analysis has demonstrated a constant expansion of the 
Community's competence in the Common Commercial Policy. Since 1980 
we must assume that the Community is competent to regulate public 
procurement at an international level. The Community can build up its 
strategy in the foreseen difficulties with the Member States on a possible 
mandate to renegotiate the ESA Convention on this date. But can the 
Community go a step further and blame the Member States for having 
violated EEC law whilst concluding the ESA Convention because the 
emergence of the Community's competence in the Common Commercial 
Policy to regulate public procurement was objectively foreseeable for them? 
(No. 55d). Is the Community even entitled under international public law, 
to claim priority for the EEC law on external relations over the ESA 
procurement rules? (No. 55e). 
69 
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Loc. cit. No. 4. 
CMLR 1979, 621, sceptical Gilsdorf, loc. cit., see furthermore Groux, CDE 1978, at 32; 
Philip, RMC 1978, at 152. 
(1) Foreseeability requires us first to determine that which should have 74 
been foreseen by the Member States, the extension of the case-law of the 
Court of J ustice in external relations or the development of secondary 
Community law, mainly Council Decision 80/271 and the Council 
Resolution of 22 July 1980 (72). There is no precedent on this particular 
problem to date. We wonder whether it is possible to separate the 
development of primary Community as exercised by the Court from the 
development of secondary Community law. The Commission might feel 
encouraged by basic jugdements of the Court and initiate new directives or 
decisions under Art. 100, 113 and 235. Foreseeabiltiy should be coupled 
with the development of the Common Commercial Policy as a whole. lt 
seems to be somewhat arbitrary to connect the foreseeability to the choice 
of the regulatory means and to the legal basis on which there were based. 
Then, however, it comes down to determining the precise date from 
which Member States could have been aware of the extension of the 
Common Commercial Policy as exercised by the the Court. The Convention 
was concluded in 1975 and ratified in 1980. This appears to be the first 
problem, as both dates might be considered appropriate to serve as a 
yardstick 71 , and the second follows suit. The predictability of the case-law 
development requires us to assess the different judgments and to draw them 
together with the Member States capacity to arrive at the right conclusions. 
Only then would we be in a position to decide whether the Member States 
have infringed the rules on the Common Commercial Policy whilst 
negotiating the ESA Convention. 
Legal doctrine which has introduced the idea of applying Art. 234 to 
agreements concluded after 1957 does not, by analogy, consider the 
evolutionary character of the Common Commercial Policy. The rules of the 
Treaty are in a constant process of change and extension. If 1980 should be 
the point of departure, Member States must be considered to have violated 
EEC law when ratifying the Convention. If 1975, the date of the conclusion 
of the Convention, should be the starting point, a possible infringement of 
EEC law would have tobe discussed in the light of the ERTA judgement 
which was handed down in 197172. To our mind such a retrospective 
analysis is not very helpful, not even in light of renegotiation the ESA 
Convention. The Community could strongly invoke its regulatory 
competence in respect of the procurement rules in external relations since 
1980. 
71 
72 
Zuleeg, loc. cit. Fn. 3, p. 262 et seq., pleads for the date of the conclusion (Annahme), in 
order to the decide the question of priority. 
1971 ECR 263. 
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(2) What has been said with reference to a possible violation of the 
Member States' duty not to impede the achievement of the development of 
a Common Commercial Policy, is grosso modo valid for the deciding 
whether the ESA Convention supersedes the EEC law or vice versa. Art. 
234 as a rule which governs the decision on the contradictory treaties would 
lead to the same result. Priority is bound to the date since the Community's 
competence in regulating public procurement in external relations was 
objectively foreseeable (No. 55e). The reference to the "political decision" 
does not very much enlighten the problem of priority. The analysis of the 
development of the Common Commercial Policy has underlined the 
predominant role of primary Community law in external relations as shaped 
by the Court of Justice. That is why Member States efforts to exempt the 
ESA procurement rules from the application of primary Community law, 
can not be used as an argument to back political decisions which indicate 
priority of the ESA rules over the EEC rules. Our construction of the 
development is as follwos: Member States when entering the ESA 
Convention have taken the political decision to establish within ESA 
procurement rules which deviate from the EEC law in order to guarantee 
the proper fonctioning of the European Space Agency. This political 
decision has come more and more under pressure from the Community and 
the adoption of the Single Act must be understood as some kind of a 
revision of the earlier decision. Only such a perspective enables the 
Member States and the Community to reconcile the divergent rules in the 
ESA Convention and the EEC law in external relations. 
(3) Once the issue of renegotiating the ESA Convention has emerged 
the question arises whether the EFf A countries can reject a revision of the 
ESA procurement rules. Their legal arguments might be built on the rule of 
good faith as laid down in the Vienna Convention (No. 19) 73. Here again 
the problem arises of the understanding tobe given to "good faith". lt might 
be considered whether the EFf A countries are bound by the EEC/EFf A 
agreements to accept the extension of the Community's competence in 
external relations. Such a reading of the agreements seems to be possible as 
they profit from the concept of an inner European market which guarantees 
access to all undertakings irrespective of whether they are located in an 
EEC Member State or an EFTA country. Then, however, one might argue, 
they have to bear the burdens which result from the growth of the 
Community's powers in public procurement. This seems tobe all the more 
true as the EFf A countries are linking their economy more and more to the 
idea of having one Inner European and not simply one Interna! Market. 
73 Cf. Petersmann in: v.d. Groeben et al., Art. 234 Rdnr. 18. 
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5. Exclusive or Shared Powers for Regulating Public Procurement at the 
International Level 
The applicability of Art. 113 entails as a possible consequence that the 75 
Community must step into the renegotiation procedure of the ESA 
Convention. What does that mean? Has the Community become the only 
competent organ under Community law, or are Member States eliminated 
from the procedure or has a joint competence been formed? Two 
possiblities must be clearly distinguished to determine the distribution of 
powers: 
(1) the ESA Convention, as concluded in 1975, may involve 
matters simultaneously belonging to the jurisdiction of the 
Community, the Common Commercial Policy, and other issues 
coming, at least nowadays, under the authority of the Member 
States (R & D). The Convention does not respect the dividing 
line between Community and national spheres as delineated by 
the Treaty and by practice. In such a case, resort has to be made 
to a "mixed procedure"74 according to which the Community and 
its Member States appear jointly as contracting parties; 
(2) once the jurisdiction of Community law has been established 
and this conclusion must be drawn from our analysis insofar at 
least as the Common Commercial Policy is concerned, it must be 
inquired whether the existence of the Community power excludes 
a concurrent or parallel power of the Member States. "This is the 
most touchy issue of the whole complex" of external relations75• 
Though Member States could rightfully claim respect for their 
own jurisdiction i.e. in the R & D sector, they may not necessarily 
claim to share competence in the ESA Convention or such parts 
of the Convention as come under the jurisdiction of the 
Community i.e. Common Commercial Policy. 
The case law of the Court of Justice on the so called mixed procedure 
as weil as on the exclusive power of the Community shows a common 
tendency. The füst statements, set out in the early seventies start from the 
distinct perspective of restricting mixed procedures and to extend the 
74 
75 
Blec.kmann EuR 1?76, 301; Meesen, EuR ~980, 36; Behr EuR 1983, 128; Stein, Der 
gemischte Vertrag im Recht der Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft ~~~k , 
Cf. Pescatore, loc. cit. 622. 
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Community's exclusive powers76. Later cases indicate a growing 
preparedness to respect the Member States authority in external relations 
and to come to joint solutions.77 
a) Exclusive competence of the Community in regulatingpublic procurement 
76 In the ERTA judgmeot78 the Court, on concluding that the subject-
matter of the contemplated agreement falls within the ambit of the 
Community, says: 
"These Community powers exclude the possiblity of 
concurrent powers on the part of the Member States, 
since any steps taken outside the framework of the 
Community institutions would be incompatible with the 
unity of the Common M8,f;~et and the uniform 
application of Community law" . 
In its Opinion 117580 the Court reiterated its broad and outspoken 
interpretation of the Community's competence in external relations: 
". . . lt canoot therefore be accepted that, in a field 
such as that governed by the Understanding ( on Local 
Cost Standard) in question, which is covered by export 
policy and more generally by the Common Commercial 
Policy, the Member States should exercise a power 
concurrent to that of the Community, in the 
Community sphere and in the international sphere. 
The provisions of Articles 113 and 114 concerning the 
conditions under which, according to the Treaty, 
agreements on commercial policy must be concluded 
show clearly that the exercise of concurrent powers by 
the Mem~er States and the Community is 
impossible" 1. 
The judgment triggered off a flood of comments, also critical ones on 
the exclusive nature of the Community's competence in the Common 
Commercial Policy. In the late seventies one might assume an acquis 
76 
77 
78 
79 
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Opinion 1n6, 1977 ECR 741 at 754 - Draft Agreement establishing a Euro1;>ean laying 
fund for inland waterway vessels and; and to confer the exclusive power m extemal 
relations to the Commumty Judgment of 1971ECR263 at 270- ERTA. 
According to Weiler, in: O'Keefie/Schermers;., Mixed Agreements 1983, 35 at 83: "mixed 
agreements are apt to bind the main actors, L.ommunity and Member States, and make 
the European Foreign Policy more effective and thereby more coherent". 
1971 ECR 263 at 270. 
Loc. cit. No. 31. 
1975 ECR 1355 at 1356 - Understanding on Local Cost Standard. 
Loc. cit. No. B 2 at 1364. 
communautaire just like Pescatore by saying: "in other words, whenever and 
so far as the matter belongs to the Community's sphere, jurisdiction over it 
is exclusive of any concurrent power of Member States"82. The ERTA 
judgment could lead to the conclusion that the Community holds the 
exclusive power since 1980 ( ... ) . 
The Kramer judgment83, however, modifies the ERTA doctrine to 77 
some extent. The Court considered the Community the proper authority to 
enter into the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention signed in London 
in 1959. All present members of the Community except Italy and 
Luxembourg were initial parties to the Convention. The Court based its 
judgment on a thoroughgoing analysis of the primary and secondary 
Comunity law and concluded by saying: 
". . . In these circumstances it follows from the very 
duties and powers which Community law has 
established and assigned to the institutions of the 
Community on the internal level that the Community 
had the authority to enter into international 
commitlßents for the conservation of the resources of 
the sea" . 
Such a reading followed the common approach of the Court to 
parallelize internal and external powers of the Community. However the 
Court then turned to the question "whether the Community institutions in 
fact assumed the functions and obligations arising from the Convention and 
from the decisions taken thereunder1185. Simply stated: the Community was 
not a member of the Fisheries Convention, but had obtained the respective 
powers in the Interna! Market and now it had to be considered whether the 
Community might even act on behalf of the Member States although the 
Community had no vested power to do so. Here the Court ( apparently in 
contradiction to the ERTA judgment) upheld the competence of the 
Member States. 
The case-law on the exclusive competence of the Community appears 
in a different light if one considers the judgments on the scope of 
application in the so-called mixed procedure. For us the relationship 
between the shaping of jurisdiction and the sovereignty of financing is 
striking. The Court seems to be much more reluctant to assume the 
82 CMLR 1979, 624. 
83 1976 ECR 1279 at 1305. 
84 Loc. cit. No. 33. 
85 Loc. cit. No. 34. 
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exclusive power of the Community once the judgment entails burdens on 
behalf of the Member States. 
b) Joint competence of the Member States and the Community in the 
regulation of public procurement within ESA ? 
78 In its Opinion 1/76 the Court strikes a rather critical note on the 
concept of shared powers. The participation of the Member States as 
contracting partners in an agreement contemplated with Switzerland 
alongside of the Community, says the Court, could be justified only in view 
of the necessity for removing legal obstacles arising from prior Conventions. 
However: 
"The participation of these States in the Agreement 
must be considered as being solely for this purpose and 
not as necessary for the attainment of other features of 
the system ... lt may therefore be said that, except for 
the special undertaking mentioned above, the legal 
effects of the Agreement with regard to the Member 
States result in accordance with Art. 228, para 2 of the 
Treaty, exclusiv~ly for the conclusion of the latter by 
the Community" 6• 
Pescatore summarizes: "in other words, apart from one very particular 
aspect of the matter, Member States had no right to participate in the 
contemplated agreement and the "mixed procedure" was therefore to be 
ruled out in principle1187. The next occasion for the Court to further develop 
the relationship between Member States and the Community concerned 
Opinion 1/78 on the International Agreement on Natural Rubber88. After 
giving a wide notion to the Common Commercial Policy under Art. 113 the 
Court had to decide whether the participation of the Member States in the 
agreement was necessary. The crucial point concerned the financing of the 
so-called buffer-stock. 
" ... The Council and those of the governments which 
have supported its views state that since those 
negotiating the agreement have opted for financing by 
means of public funds, the finances of the Member 
86 Loc. cit. Nos. 7 and 8. 
87 CMLR 1979, 623. 
88 1979 ECR 2871. 
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States will be involved in the execution of the 
agreement so that it cannot be accepted that such 
undertakings could be entered into without their 
participation. The Commission for its part takes the 
view that the question of competence precedes that of 
financing and that the question of Communtiy powers 
can therefore not be m~~e dependant on the choice of 
financial arrangements" . 
". . . The Court feels bound to have regard to two 
possible situations: one which the financial burdens 
envisaged by the agreement would be entered into the 
Community budget and one in which the burdens 
would directly be charged to the budgets of the 
Member States. The Court itself is in no po~tion to 
make any choice between the two alternatives" . 
The parallel to the ESA optional programmes is obvious. The solution 
to the distribution of competences might already be found. This seems to be 
all the more true as the Council has transformed the Rubber judgment into 
a generally applicable rule, the so-called PROBA 20 formula, as proposed 
by the Commission91 . The basic principles concerning participation in 
international negotiation on Raw Materials are defined as follows: 
"The essential element upon which the deal put 
forward by the Commission is based on consists in the 
leaving out of any legal or institutional consideration 
with regard to the respective powers of the Community 
and the Member States. 
lt has been agreed that 
there shall be joint participation of the 
Commission and the Member States in all 
agreements in which both wish to 
participate. 
this participation shall be in the form of a 
joint delegation which will express the 
common position through a single 
spokesman". 
89 Loc. cit. No. 53. 
90 Loc. cit. No. 58. 
91 Translation from the French text in Völker/Steenbergen, Leading cases and Materials 
on the External Relations Law of the EC, 1985, p. 48. 
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79 One might summarize the Council's and even the Courts attitude as 
80 
follows: "he who pays the piper calls the tune!". The only problem to be 
solved concerns the possible tranference of the rulings found for the 
financing of raw materials to the space sector. Opposition has been voiced 
against the possibility of generalizing the judgment as well as the Council's 
rules. The opinion 1/78 has been heaviliy criticised for putting it into the 
hands of the Member States to decide whether an agreement comes under 
the exclusive competence of the Community. By simply refusing financing 
throu~ the Community, Member States could circumvent its' exclusive 
power 2. Gilsdorf joins the Commission's view when he claims the 
Community's exclusive competence in all cases where financing is necessary 
to realize measures related to the Common Commercial Policy. lt is true: 
the PROBA a~eement reflects neither the Treaty nor the case-law of the 
Court of Justice93. The agreement however sets out the framework by which 
a joint shaping of the Common Commercial Policy though perhaps not 
legally required is nevertheless politically sound. Opinion 1/78 has paved 
the way for such a joint approach by the Member States and Community in 
regulating public procurement. The mixed-procedure can be accepted at 
least for the actual process of renegotiating the ESA Convention (No. 92). 
c) The evolutive character of Community case-law 
The Court has underlined in several ludgments what is known as the 
evolutive character of Community law9 . The Court emphasises the 
transitional character of joint competence and the long-term perspective of 
the Community's exclusive jurisdiction. The Kramer case may serve as an 
example for the Court's attitude. After conferring the power on the 
Member States, it continued by saying: 
" ... it should be stated first that this authority which 
the Member States have is only of a transitional nature 
and secondly that the Member States are now bound 
by Community obligations in their negotiations within 
the framework of the Convention and of other 
comparable agreements"95. 
92 Cf. Gilsdorf, Ioc. cit. p. 27, who does not discuss the PRO BA agreement. 
93 Cf. Ehlennann ,in: O'Keefie/Schenners, Mixed Agreements, Leiden 1983, p. 8 and 
Petersmann, ZaORV 1975 p. 217, 267. 
94 Pescatore, CMLR 1979, 624. 
95 1976 ECR 1279 at 1310 No. 40. 
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Similar wording can be found in the ERT A judgment. Both judgments 
may be considered as a type of prospective ruling insofar as the Court has 
found that the actual facts had to be judged from the point of view of a 
transitional situation where the transfer of powers to the Community had 
not yet been accomplished. 
Against the background of the Court of Justice case-law on the so-
called mixed procedure as well as on the exclusive power of the 
Community, one might come to the following conclusions with regard to the 
Community's role in renegotiating the public procurement of space 
activities within ESA. The Court begins from the idea that the transfer of 
powers from the Member States to the Community must be seen as a 
process which might undergo three stages of development: 
(1) in the beginning exclusive competence of the Member 
States - mostly in fields where the Community has not 
yet vested powers; 
(2) in a transitional phase shared powers of the Member 
States and the Community - the division might be the 
result of a political self-restraint or of overlapping 
competences between the Community and the Member 
States; and 
(3) in the end exclusive powers of the Community. 
Procurement policies in the space sector should be 
associated with the second phase. The Community is 
empowered to regulate the commercial activities under 
Art. 113 and to lead the negoatiation with ESA, the 
Member States remain competent for R & D. 
The second message of the Court of Justice case law concerns the 
conditions under which the change from the second to the third stage, from 
the concept of shared powers to the concept of exclusive Community 
powers might occur. Having the two opinions 1/76 and 1/78 in mind, one is 
of the impression that the Court is willing to accept a certain autonomy 
from the Member States in deciding if they accept the transfer of the 
regulatory power to the Community alone. Even if measures relating to the 
Common Commercial Policy lead principally to a transfer of power from 
the Member States to the Community, the Member States are permitted to 
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escape the exclusive competence of the Community by retaining financing 
in their hands. The question of competence might not precede that of 
financing, at least not in the present state of the Community's development. 
The completion of the Interna! Market gives the opportunity to re-consider 
the Court's view. In other words: Member States are legally permitted to 
finance ESA directly. They may reject any attempt by the Community to 
obtain the exclusive power to regulate the commercial activities of ESA. 
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6. Possible Justiflcation for Derogation by the ESA Procurement Rules 
from EEC Law - Exemptions under the Common Commercial Policy 
and the Directives on Public Work and Public Supply 
Our foregoing analysis shows that the ESA rules are not compatible 
with Art. 113. They affect the Community's joint competence in external 
relations. The rules on the basic economic freedoms, Art. 30 and 59 provide 
principally for the application of the EEC procurement rules. Deviating 
ESA rules do not come under the justifications of Art. 30/36 and 59/62 
(Nos. 21-23, 27), because the procurement involved also carries economic 
aspects. If this conclusion can be transferred to the EEC law on external 
relations, there would be no opportunity for the Member States to defend 
the derogations in the process of renegotiating the ESA Convention. 
(1) The situation in the law on external relations, however, is different. 81 
There are no rules similar to Art. 36, 56 and 66 and there is no Court of 
Justice case law simililar to the Cassis-de Dijon doctrine submitting 
Common Commercial Policy to a rule of reason test (No. 22). There are 
efforts in the legal doctrine to apply Art. 36 and probably Art. 56 and 66 to 
the notion of a Common Commercial Policy in order to put the concept of 
the Interna! Market and the external relations on an equal footing96: 
". . . la voie la plus simple (pour harmoniser les 
differentes comptences de la Communaute et des Etats 
Membres H.-W.M.) serait ... , d'interpreter l'article 
113, c'est-a-dire la notion de la politique commerciale 
commune, en y incorporant les clauses d'exception 
analogues, d'abord a celle prevue a l'Art. 36, ensuite 
egalemellt a celle consacree par la jurisprudence 
Cassis-de-Dijon et la jurisprudence ulterieure". 
Such an interpretation (which has not yet been approved by the Court 
of Justice) does not contribute to a solutioll of our problem. Due to the 
non-economic character of the possible justifications, evell a broad 
interpretation would not allow the exemption of ESA rules from the 
collcept of a Commoll Commercial Policy which provides for similar rules 
Oll the Interna! Market as weil as in external relatiolls. We wonder however 
whether the "harmonisatioll" of the rules Oll the Interna! Market and the 
rules on external relations might exclude any possibility for the Member 
States as weil as the Community to justify derogatiolls from basic EEC law 
for economic reasolls like, for example, industrial policy. One might argue 
that the essential idea of Art. 36, transferred to the Common Commercial 
96 Timmermanns loc. cit. p. 96 and Gilsdorf loc. cit. 1988. 
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Policy requires a less stricter application than in the context of the Internal 
Market. The issue will be further discussed in the context of Art. 115 (Nos. 
83 ss.). 
82 (2) A possible justification for the derogation by the ESA rules on 
public procurement from basic EEC law might be founded on the 
exemptions provided for under the directives on public work and public 
supply (Nos. 34-36a). The question has been dealt with in the analysis of the 
relationship between ESA rules and the Interna! Market. Here the answer 
seems to be clear. The Directive 77/62 implicitly excludes ESA 
procurement from the application of the directive although Directive 88/295 
and Com (88)378 final show a clear tendency to narrow down the 
exemptions (No. 36a). Member States however are not allowed to escape 
the rule of primary Community law (Art. 30 and 59) by formulating 
exemptions in the directives which are contrary to the basic economic 
freedoms of the Internal Market. The exemptions must be interpreted 
narrowly in the light of Art. 30 and 59, which means that the exemption of 
ESA only concerns the specific transparency obligations of the Directive, 
not the application of primary Community Iaw (No. 35). 
Here, however, we are concerned with the Common Commercial 
Policy. This is not a matter of the effects of exemptiolls to the Interna! 
Market, but rather the capacity of Member States to exclude space 
procurement rules in their external relations from the Common 
Commercial Policy, for economic and political reasolls. There is no 
consistent case law at hand which discusses the ability of Member States 
and the Community to deviate in secondary Community law from the 
Common Commercial Policy, which in principle requires the same rules Oll 
public procuremellt for external relations as for the Interna! Market97. 
The ~roblem has beell raised by the Advocate General in the TEZI 
case 59/84 8. He argued that Ollce a Common Commercial Policy has beell 
established in a specific sector, the Community and the Commission could 
not reintroduce rules which deviate from the Common Commercial Policy 
and allow for national derogations. The Court has avoided taking a view oll 
the rather sensitive relationship between an established Common 
Commercial Policy and possible exemptions therefrom under secondary 
Community law by simply stating that the Commoll Commercial Policy was 
not yet accomplished. An incomplete Common Commercial Policy however 
97 Petersmann, Joc. cit. Art. 234 Rdnr. 7 et seq„ discusses the opportunity of the Member 
States to use the secondary Community law as an instrument to solve the conflict 
between divergent international public law rules and Community law. 
98 1986 ECR 887 at 905/906. 
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permits exemptions99. Although the Court had no opportunity to further 
develop its understanding of the relationship between the Common 
Commerical Policy and possible derogations therefrom, we would like to 
draw attention to the very cautious approach of the Court. Completeness as 
a criterion enables the Court to decide case by case and to consider a 
certain discretion for the Member States and the Community in shaping the 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy. The Court has developed its 
understanding in the context of Art. 115. That is why we are somewhat 
reluctant to justify the ESA rules by referring to the incomplete character of 
the Common Commercial Policy in the field of space activities. (For further 
details see Nos. 89 ss.) 
99 We will come back to the prob lern of completeness of the Common Commercial Policy, 
Nos. 89 et seq. 
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7. "Block Exemptions" for the ESA Procurement Rules under Art.115 
83 Art. 115 must be understood as the counterpart of Art. 113. lt allows 
the Member States to derogate from the Common Commercial Policy in 
order to protect their home industries against economic difficulties 
resulting from imports, namely those of non-Member State origin in free 
circulation, if so authorized by the Commission. A parallel should be drawn 
with Art. 92 (3) which allows for state aids but binds the Member States to 
pursue a specific procedure. The legitimate reference to Art. 115 would 
strengthen the Member States position within the process of renegotiating 
the ESA procurement rules. They would be allowed to maintain the 
derogations from primary Community law and could refute the 
Community's request of amending the ESA procurement rules at least till 
the end of 1992. 
For our analysis a whole set of questions arises as to the importance of 
Art. 115, which might be summarized as follows: 
Are the Member States entitled to justify the ESA 
procurement rules under Art. 115 in order to protect 
their national space industries against economic 
difficulties resulting from an open competitive bidding 
in which the undertakings of other Member States, of 
EFTA countries and of third countries like the United 
States and Japan participate? 
What type of explanation should they be allowed to 
submit in order to justifying the derogations from 
primary Community law, e.g. their fmancial 
contributions to ESA? 
Have they already done so by exempting international 
organisations from Directive 88/295 (No. 36a) - "block 
exemption"? 
Last but not least, does the "block exemption" in 
directive 88/295 cover only trade in goods - phase C to 
F or does it embrace likewise trade in services - phase 
A and B. 
Art. 115 has to balance out the conflicting objectives of the overall 
principle of free trade with open rules on competitive bidding and 
legitimate protectionism - if such a concept can be said to exist -
undertaken by the Member States in order to restrict application of the 
procurement rules to their home industries. There is little or no case-law at 
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hand contributing to a solution for our problem. The constantly growing 
number of authorizations given by the Commission under Art 115 
underlines the overwhelming importance of this article in shaping the 
Common Commercial Policy100• The Commission's efforts are directed, 
with a view to 1992, towards a reduction of the exemptions granted under 
Art. 115101. Art. 115 seems to have become the key provision in the law on 
external relations which defines, restricts and determines the Common 
Commercial Policy of the Community102. The reasons for this development 
are manifold: the crumbling situation of some home industries of the 
Member States which are not competitive on the international level, the 
Member States efforts to protect their home industries in order to ensure 
job security and fight against unemployment, to build up an industry 
competitive with the United States and Japan, and last but not least, the 
extension of the Common Commercial Policy of the Community which 
seems to call for a flexible rule to compensate for the strict requirements of 
Art. 113. 
To analyse the rather complicated provision of Art. 115 more 
concisely, we have divided the items of interest into four issues: 
(1) The scope of application: Art. 115 uses the term "deflection of trade". 
(2) 
(3) 
100 
101 
102 
This term needs to be described and applied to ESA procurement 
rules. Art. 115 might concern the procurement rules between Member 
States and third countries only or the procurement rules between 
Member States as well; 
The possibility of a "block exemption" justified under Art. 115, but 
contradicting the Community's joint competence under Art. 113 to 
define public procurement rules similar to the rules governing the 
Interna! Market; 
The reasons which might be invoked by the Member States to justify 
the "block exemption" sought, (i.e. what is meant by economic 
difficulties ?); 
Latest statistics Neme, RMC 1988, 578 at 579, and Hailbronner/Bierwagen, NJW 1989, 
1385 at 1388. 
Cf. Commission decision of 22.Juli1987, 87/433/EWG OJ L 238/26 of 21.Aug.1987; as 
amended OJ L 36/23 of 8.Feb.1989; see in this context the analysis of 
Hailbronner/Bierwagen, loc. cit. 1389. 
Tue majority of the legal doctrine does not discuss Art. 115 in such a broad perspective. 
lt focusses on the classical situation of deflection of trade and rejects the possiDility of 
linking Art. 113 and Art. 115 together in one concept. Tue Overall situation 1s, to narrow 
down the importance of Art. f15 and to defend the idea of a Common Commercial 
Policy which should be developed by the Community, cf. Vedder, in: Grabitz, Art. 115 
Rdnr. 1; Emst/Beseler m: v.d. Groeben Art. 115i,:Rdnr. 3.; Neme, RMC 1988, 578; 
Lauwaars in: J. Schwarze (ed.) op. cit. 1988, 83; ttailbronner/Bierwagen, NJW 1989, 
1385 at 1388. 
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( 4) The procedure to be followed if the Member States wish to obtain an 
authorization. Does it fit into the overall concept of Art. 115 to grant 
"block exemptions"? 
Last but not least, it has to be kept in mind that the completion of the 
Interna! Market should be achieved by 1992 and the question arises to what 
extent "block exemptions" can be maintained beyond that date. 
a) Scope of application - deflections of trade in the space sector 
84 Art. 115 empowers the Member States, upon authorization by the 
Commission, to close their borders to indirect imports through other 
Member States where they have been brought into free circulation, namely 
those goods of non-Community origin. Its function is to ensure that the 
execution of commercial policy measures, taken in accordance with this 
Treaty by Member States, is not obstructed by deflections of trade. Art. 115 
infringes the fundamental principle of free movement of goods laid down in 
Art. 9 of the Treaty. That principle applies to products originating within 
the Community, as weil as to products coming from third countries if 
brought into free circulation in any Member State. 
85 (1) How can we envisage deflections of trade occurring in the space 
sector? There are no problems in cases where supply contracts are 
involved, e.g. in phase C and namely in phase D and E once the full 
commercialisation of a project has begun. Phase A and B however concern 
service contracts. Although there are no objections in principle to applying 
Art. 115 to services (No. 70), there are some difficulties in imagining 
deflections of trade resulting from the import of services. Phase A and B 
concern pre-feasibility and feasibility studies. One might assume that 
deflections of trade could result from services off ered across frontiers by an 
international supplier to possible customers in the EEC Member States, 
without having an established business seat or subsidiary in that country103. 
Although one needs some imagination to conjure up incidents in the space 
sector which could come under the scope of application of Art. 115, it 
cannot however be excluded from applying Art. 115 to the ESA 
procurement rules. 
103 See for the different alternatives to shape the intra-community supply of se:rvices No. 26. 
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86 (2) To whom is Art. 115 addressed? 
(a) only third country imports; or 
(b) imports of Member State origin, also? 
The first reading of the text as weil as the example given seems to 
indicate that Art. 115 applies only to imports from non-Member States. 
Legal doctrine has raised the issue of whether Art. 113 could or should 
cover Member States imports104. Such considerations have been fuily 
refuted and indeed the numerous and ever-increasing number of 
h .. d nl f C . '' 105 Th aut onzations concern goo s o y o non- ommumty ongm . e 
consequence seems to be clear: Art. 115 covers deflections of trade 
resulting from imports by EFTA countries and from the United States and 
Japan, but is not applicable to the trade in those goods which are of 
Community origin. Therefore we will have to examine whether the different 
agreements concluded between the Community and the EFTA Countries as 
weil as the GATT rules on public procurement necessitate a different view 
on the applicability of Art. 115. We wonder whether the restriction might be 
maintained if one assumes the applicability of Art. 115 to the Common 
Commercial Policy (No. 90). The multiple purposes of the exemption 
provided for in the directives might be endangered if one requires free 
competitive bidding in the Interna! Market. That is why the possible scope 
of application of Art. 115 must be tied together with the reasons which the 
Member States may invoke to justify the exemption in Directive 88/295 
(Nos. 91 ss.). 
104 Cf. Kretschmer in: v.d. Groeben et al„ Art. 115 Rdnr. 21, as weil as Weber, EuR 1979 n , 
105 Cf. Vogelenzang, loc. cit. p. 177 Fn. 19 where a !ist of the number of authorizations is 
added. 
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b) Applicability of Art. 115 to the Common Commercial Policy 
87 Art. 113 requires a Common Commercial Policy and empowers the 
Community to take the necessary measures once the jurisdiction of the 
Community has been established in public procurement. Such a mandate as 
weil as its' prospect is hardly compatible with the objective of Art. 115 
whose aim is to grant the Member States authorization for setting up 
national procurement rules for building up their space industries and 
protecting their industries against economic difficulties. Such a view, 
although weil settled in the legal doctrine, creates a somewhat artifical 
contradiction between the two provisions. When discussing the scope and 
meaning of Art. 113 we have tried to make clear that only a broad concept 
similar to Art. 30 is appropriate for achieving the overall ojective of a 
Common Commercial Policy. Such a broad concept, however, requires 
flexible rules for justifying exemptions. lt is based on a line of thought 
similar to the reasoning in the Cassis-de Dijon doctrine which in turn 
should apply to the notion of a Common Commercial Policy. In the law on 
external relations, economic justifications cannot be ruled out per se. The 
question is much more one of integrating them into a procedure in order to 
create transparency. lt is against that background that we will try to 
delineate the relationship between Art. 113 and Art. 115. 
88 (1) The relationship between the contradictory objectives of Art. 113 
and 115 have fi.rst been considered in the Court's judgment in Case 41/76 
Donckerwolcke106. The Court has been said to apply an either/or 
philosophy. Once Art. 113 applies when the jurisdiction of the Community 
has been established, there is no longer an opportunity to apply for the 
exemptions under Art. 115. The rulings laid down in this context are still 
valid and may be understood as the basic and nearly commonly agreed 
understanding of the relationship between Art. 113 and 115. Since those 
passages from the judgment in Donckerwolcke featured prominently in the 
assessment of any conflict, the relevant paragraphs are quoted in full: 
"25. The assimilation to products originating within the 
Member States of goods in free circulation may only 
take full eff ect if these goods are subject to the same 
conditions of importation both with regard to customs 
and commercial considerations, irrespective of the 
State in which they were put in free circulation. 
26. Under Article 113 of the Treaty this unification 
should have been achieved by the expiry of the 
transitional period and supplanted by the 
106 1976 ECR 1921. 
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establishment of a common commercial policy based 
on uniform principles. 
27. The fact that at the expiry of the transitional period 
the Community commercial policy was not fully 
achieved is one of a number of circumstances 
calculated to maintain in being between the Member 
States diff erences in commercial policy capable of 
bringing about deflections of trade or causing 
economic difficulties in certain Member States. 
28. Article 115 allows difficulties of this kind to be 
avoided by giving to the Commission the power to 
authorize Member States to take protective measures 
particularly in the form of derogation from the 
principle of free circulation within the Community of 
products which originated in third countries and which 
were put into free circulation in one of the Member 
States. 
31. First of all it should be stressed with regard to the 
scope of such provisions, that under Article 115 
limitations may only be placed on the free movement of 
goods enjoying the right to free circulation by virtue of 
measures of commercial poliy adopted by the 
importing Member state in accordance with the Treaty. 
32. As full responsibility in the matter of commercial 
policy was transferred to the Community by means of 
Article 113 (1) measures of commercial policy of a 
national character are only permissible after the end of 
the transitional period by 1Jiftue of specific 
authorizations by the Community"1 . 
Transferred to the ESA procurement rules one might assume the 
application of Art. 113 and exclude the application of Art. 115. We wonder 
however how such a reading of the Treaty complies with the GATT 
agreement on public procurement and the exemptions provided for under 
Directive 88/295 (No. 36a). There remains a short statement in para. 27 
which casts some doubt on this conclusion. The Common Commercial 
Policy must be accomplished in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the 
Community. Indeed precisely this problem of completeness came up in the 
Court's judgment in the case 59/84 and 242/84 TEZI108. 
107 These rulings have been r~peated by the Advocate General Verloren van Themaat in 
the TEZI case 59/84, 1986 ECR 887 at 901 et seq. 
108 1986 ECR 887 at 923 et seq. 
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89 (2) The Court reconsidered the fore-mentioned either/or philosophy 
of the Donckerwolcke case and took an attitude of compromise. Instead of 
schematic alternatives, it allowed for the application of Art. 115 as long as 
the Common Commercial Policy in a given field has not been completed. 
The Court had to decide whether the Community already bad established a 
Common Commercial Policy in the field of textiles, under the auspices of 
the second Multi-Fibre Arrangement, thereby excluding the applicability of 
Art. 115 in the trade of textiles or alternatively whether the Multi-Fibre 
Arrangement must be understood as an incomplete agreement thereby 
leaving room for the application of Art. 115. 
(a) The Advocate General struck a rather critical note on the Member 
States attempt to saf eguard the application of Art. 115 notwithstanding the 
conclusion of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement. He went beyond existing case 
law and formulated as a rule that Art. 113 must be understood as a legal 
obligation to establish a Common Commercial Policy109: 
". . . I do not regard the attainment of a genuinely 
uniform commercial policy pursuant to Art. 111 and 
the Court's decisions ... as an ultimate ideal and an 
objective for the future but as a legal duty which ought 
to have been fulfilled by the end of the transitional period 
( emphasis by H.-W.M. ) ... " 
Such an understanding brings Art. 113 near to Art. 30, in terms of 
scope and mainly in its effects. The concrete shaping of the procurement 
rules would be of no account. Member States would be obliged to develop a 
Common Commercial Policy parallel to the procurement rules on the 
Interna! Market thereby avoiding distortions of competition between them. 
lt goes without saying that completeness of the Common Commercial 
Policy could never be an argument for the Advocate General to escape the 
legal obligation under Art. 113: 
" ... it is still not possible to infer from the mere fact 
that the policy is incomplete any direct legal 
consequences which may be invoked before national 
courts; whether such legal consequences may flow from 
specific measures of commercial policy must be 
inferred from the wording of the measures 
themselves11110• 
109 1986 ECR 887 at 904. 
110 Loc. cit. at 905. 
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The only way to maintain the application of the authorization 
procedure of Art. 115 could theoretically be to refer to the rules of the 
Second Multi-Fibre Arrangement and to check whether they provide for 
the possiblity of allowing distortions to the Common Commercial Policy. 
Transferred to the space sector: Are the exemptions for international 
procurement. as laid down in the different directives on public procurement 
to be understood as legally permitted derogations from primary EEC law ? 
The Advocate General refuted the argument put forward by the 
Commission and some Governments to the effect that disparities in 
commercial policies brought about by the Community itself might justify the 
application of Art. 115111: 
"I also consider that it would be incompatible with the 
system of the Treaty, especially with its standstill 
provisions - here I am thinking in particular of Art. 31 
and 32 - for the Community to make it possible in that 
way for the Member States to introduce new opß1acles 
to trade (with the Commission's authorization)" . 
If we understand the Advocate General correctly, we should assume 
that there is no opportunity for the Member States to escape the 
application of primary Community law i.e. Arts. 30 and 59, to the 
procurement rules in the formulation of the directives relating to public 
procurement which provide for exemptions at the international level. 
(b) The legal doctrine departs from the socio-economic context of Art. 
115's scope of application. Timmermanns is correct when he states: 
"J'ai plutöt l'impression que la pratique maintenant 
devenue frequente, de protection regionale s'explique 
en tant que solution facile de compromis qui permet 
de reconcilier en matiere de politique commerciale les 
points de vue souvent diametralement opposes des 
Etats Membres, certains preconisant une politique de 
libre-echange, 1'~utres plus seduits par des approches 
protectionistes" 1 . 
Indeed, any effort to found wide Community powers on the Treaty 
cannot escape the political reality which sets the tone for understanding the 
relationship between the objective of a Common Commercial Policy and 
the competence of the Community to grant exemptions therefrom. There 
are authors like Timmermanns who draw a legal argument from the Treaty 
111 The issue is discussed in the legal doctrine under the heading of "irreversibilitC", see 
Timmermanns, loc. cit. p. 101. 
112 Loc. cit. at 906. 
113 Loc. cit. p. 104. 
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which supports the Advocate General's analysis114. There are others who 
underline the Member's autonomy in sha~ing a Common Comercial Policy 
whilst referring to the very same articles11 . Legal doctrine is not yet settled. 
(c) The Court in the TEZI decision takes a rather pragmatic view on 
the controversy. lt avoids intervening in the highly political field of 
protectionism and free trade, and whilst upholding the rulings laid down in 
the Donckerwolcke case, it starts from the analysis that a Common 
Commercial Policy which is incomplete allows for the application of Art. 
115 even after the expiry of the transitional period: 
"In the same judgment (Donckerwolcke), after 
observing that, despite the expiry of the transitional 
period, a Common Commercial Policy based, in 
accordance with Art 113. (1) of the Treaty, on uniform 
principles had not yet been fully achieved, the Court 
recognized that the incompleteness of the Common 
Commercial Policy, together with other circumstances, 
was likely to maintain differences in Common 
Commercial Policy between Member States capable of 
causing deflections of frade or economic difficulites in 
some Member States"1 6. 
For the Court's approach the problem of completeness turns out tobe 
the crucial point for the relationship between Art. 113 and Art. 115117. Such 
an interpretation of the Treaty confers a wide discretionary power on the 
Commission outside of any judicial control. "Completeness of the Common 
Commercial Policy" opens up opportunities to decide that a Common 
Commercial Policy has not yet been achieved, whenever it appears to be 
politically wise for the Community organs not to infere with Member States 
autonomy. 
114 Loc. cit. p. 101 et seq. 
115 Cf. Kretschmer, in: v.d. Groeben et al., loc. cit. Art. 115. 
116 1986 ECR 887 at 923 No. 32. 
117 See Lauwaars, op. cit. p. 84, in: J. Schwarze (ed.). 
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(3) What consequences has the scope of application according to the 90 
TEZI judgment for the effects of the ESA procurement rules? Must the 
EEC's policy on public procurement be regarded as complete in the sense 
of the TEZI judgment? The very same judgment makes clear that the Court 
hesitates from striking down the Member States' capacity in defining their 
own national approach. The Court's approach raises the problem of what 
the yardstick should be: the procurement rules as such or the EEC's 
engagement in the space sector. Taking the procurement rules as a basis 
one might assume completeness - just as we have presupposed the 
Community's competence in the regulation of public procurement -
despite the exemptions provided for in the directives. The solution would be 
different if we start from the EEC's role in the space sector. The 
Commission has now taken the initiative on integrating the space policy in 
the Common Commercial Policy118. lt intends to bring primary community 
law to bear on the Interna! Market. The communication must be 
understood as the Commission's intention to step into the space sector. 
Such a statement of purpose can hardly be regarded as establishing a 
comprehensive policy. 
In our opinion the complications can be avoided by referring to the 
relationship between the broad range of the Common Commercial Policy 
and the applicability of Art. 115. lt would be contradictory to opt for a 
broad application of Art. 113 and at the same time to narrow down possible 
justifications available through Art. 115. That is why we plead for the 
applicability of Art. 115 in the regulation of public procurement. Our 
conclusion might be somewhat confirmed by referring to the Council 
Resolution of 22 Juit; 1980 which provides for the application of Art. 115 in 
public procurement 19. 
118 Cf. Com (88) 417 final of26July.1988. 
119 Cf. OJ C 211/2, of 19.Aug.1980. 
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c) Economic reasons f or justifying the "block exemption "? 
What are the arguments on which the Member States could base their 
call for an authorization prior to the establishment of the measures 
concerned? Are they definitely allowed to refer to "economic problems" in 
sensitive regions, as in Bremen for example? And can they justify the 
application of the ESA procurement rules in the Interna! Market? Art. 115 
indicates two kind of grounds which the Member States could invoke: 
(1) the execution of measures of commercial policy 
taken in accordance with this Treaty by any Member 
state should not be obstructed by deflections of trade, 
or 
(2) differences between such measures should not lead 
to economic difficulties in one or more Member States. 
Quite a number of questions have been raised, namely for the purpose 
of checking the conditions under which deflection of trade might be 
justified120. They remain more or less useless, at least for the problem with 
which we are concerned121. Today both alternatives under Art. 115 
culminate in one particular question: whether the given "economic 
difficulties" justify the application of Art. 115122• Are the Member States 
entitled to maintain the ESA procurement rules simply by referring to their 
financial contributions to ESA or are they obliged to base a possible 
exemption on R & D policy and regional policy? 
120 Cf. Weber, loc. cit., and Kretschmer, loc. cit. 1983. 
121 They concentrate on efforts to restrict the scope of application of Art. 115; cf. 
references, loc. cit. Fn. 102. 
122 This tendency is not given enough weight in a recent analysis of Art 115: 
Hailbronner/Bierwagen, loc. cit. 
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There is little evidence in the Court rulings as weil as in the legal 91 
doctrine as to the interpretation of "economic difficulties"123. Along the line 
of the general acceptance that Art. 115 is an exception to the objectives in 
the Treaty's provision on free trade rules, even world-wide, the 
Donckerwolcke-judgment as supported by legal doctrine calls for a 
restrictive interpretation of "economic difficulties"124 with a view to limiting 
derogations from the free trade principle. In that context legal doctrine 
accepts the reference to regional policies and refers to the Commission's 
decision 80/47125. The latter tends to grant authorizations in cases where 
the dero~ations are justified by the interest of protecting regional 
industries 26. The Court has not yet officially recognised regional policies as 
falling under the heading of "economic difficulties" but there exists some 
"fear" that the Court is not far from doing so127. 
As there is no case-law as yet which discusses the precise meaning of 
"economic difficulties" and which simultaneously determines the role of 
regional policies, we must base our evaluation on the general framework 
into which we have integrated the Common Commercial Policy and its 
possible exemptions. This is true for the scope of application of the possible 
exemptions: whether it concerns the external relations of the EEC Member 
States only with the EFI'A countries, Japan and the United States or 
whether it might be put forward to justify derogations from primary 
Community law in the Interna/ Market, too. 
lt lies within the logic of our argument that the notion of "economic 
difficulties" should be given a broader scope of application in indirect 
effects on trade than in the classical field of deflection of trade. Member 
States and the EFI' A Countries are bound to the same destiny (No. 74). 
The alternative under Art. 115 would then be (1) either to restrict 
derogations from primary community law to the relation of EEC/EFTA 
countries exclusively, leaving outside the rest of the world or (2) to extend 
the derogations from primary Community law in the directives to the Inner 
European (not only the Interna!!) Market128. The solution to be found is 
strongly linked with the reasons which Member States ( and the EFTA 
123 Cf. Vedder, in: Grabitz, Art. 115, Rdnr. 21 "entzieht sich einer abstrakten 
Umschreibung" 
124 Tue importance of this rule is elaborated in Vogelenzang, loc. cit. p. 182 et seq. 
125 At 4 and 5 in relation with 8; see Vedder, in: Art. 115 Rdnr. 12. 
126 This is the overall message of Vogelenzang, loc. cit. p. 169 et seq. 
127 Cf. Timmermanns, loc. cif. p. 107: "La jurisprudence TEZI fait craindre que Ja Cour ira 
aussi loin"; Lauwaars in: J. Schwane (ed.) op. cit 84 et seq. 
128 We do not discuss the impact of the exemptions on the GATT. This might be done at a 
later point. 
141 
countries!) might bring forward to justify the derogations in Directive 
88/295 and under the foreseen amendment Com (88) 378 final (No. 36a). If 
they are permitted to invoke regional policies against risks resulting from 
the application of the EEC procurement rules in external relations, it would 
not make sense to impose on them the obligation to provide for open 
competitive bidding in the inner European (not the Interna!) Market. Such 
a duty would run counter to their pretended legitimate interests. So it is all 
the more important to decide on the function of regional policy in the 
interpretation of Art. 115. 
92 The Commission's, not the Court's standpoint is clear. lt is willing to 
accept regional policies so as to justify derogations from the free trade 
principle in external relations. Regional policy then emerges as a bullwork 
against a tax-payer mentality. That means, Member States cannot simply 
invoke their financial contributions to justify the "fair-return", they have to 
make clear that the ESA procurement rules are necessary to build up a 
competitive space industry and that this infant industry can only be set up 
by protecting regional industries and guaranteeing job security. Only such a 
set of argument might suffice to justify derogations from Directive 88/295 in 
open competitive bidding, although the draft directive narrows down the 
margin for exemptions. Within this context, it goes without sa~~ that 
"block exemptions" can be considered only for a transitional period12 : that 
is, for long as the measures protecting the home industry are necessary for 
setting up a competitive European space industry. The moment to 
reconsider the exemptions will come once the directives on public 
procurement will be renegotiated. This will happen long before 1992 in 
connection with the completion of the Interna! Market when all the other 
exemptions granted to public services should be revoked (cf. similar 
propositions for state aids No. 54). The proposed draft Directive Com (88) 
378 final on telecommunication makes clear that the Commission has 
already started to review its exemption policy in external relations 130. 
129 See in that context especially the recital of the decision of the Commission 87/433 loc. 
cit. and Hailbronner/Bierwagen, loc. cit. 1389. 
130 Mattera, Le Marche unique Europeen - Ses regles, son fonctionnement, 1989, p. 543 
starts from the idea that Art. 115 will no longer be applicable after 1992, at least not in 
the sense given to that rule. Without discussing our suggestion as to a block exemption, 
he comes to the very same conclusions. 
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d) "Block exemptions" under the authorization procedure 
Exemptions from the free trade principle are bound to an ex ante 
authorization procedure. Does the "block exemption" in the Directives 77/62 
and 88/295 (No. 35) and in the proposed Directive Com (88) 378 final 
suffice for the requirements of the authorization procedure or must there 
be an individual, explict and distinct authority in each and every case 
provided for under secondary Community law? Does it cover the trade in 
goods only - Phase C to F, or the trade in services, Phase A and B also? 
The case law of the Court of Justice has undergone two stages of 
development, although a clear concept does not seem to exist. The 
possibility of a "block exemption" under Art. 115 has not been discussed so 
far131. 
(1) The basic procedural requirements have first been formulated in 93 
three judgments, Bock, Kaufhof and Donckerwolcke. In Bock the Court 
struck down a Commission authorization under Art. 115 because it found 
that its coverage of pending imports was unnecessary in view of the 
negligible quantity of those imports132. In Kaufhof the Court came to the 
same conclusion, due namely to the Commission's failure to independently 
review the necessity of applying Art. 115133. These first two judgments led 
judge Pescatore to the opinion that the rather restrictive application of Art. 
115 withholds the Community's exclusive power to formulate the Common 
Commercial Policy once the subject has come under its jurisdiction134. 
Donckerwolcke as handed down in 1979 seemed to confirm such a reading. 
Here the Court dealt with the permissibility of requiring declarations of 
origin and im~ort licenses in the administration of Art. 115. Although 
Vogelenzang13 has become much more sceptical on the possibility of 
deriving such a view from these judgments, he nevertheless points out that 
all three contain substantially the identical phrase: 
"Because they constitute not only an exception to the 
provision of Art. 9 and 30 of the Treaty which are 
fundamental, but also an obstacle to the 
implementation of the common commercial policy 
131 Helpful Neme op. cit. 582 in her considerations on the future importance of Art. 115 
and Mattera, loc. cit. 
132 1971 ECR at 909 No. 15. 
133 1976 ECR at 443 No. 6. 
134 Cf. the short analysis of the Court of Justice Case-law in extemal relations, CMLR 1979, 
loc. cit. 
135 CMLR 1981, p. 182/183. 
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provided for by 113, the derogations ailowed ß~der 
Art. 115 must be strictly interpreted and applied"1 . 
This mandate of strict interpretation and application led to a weil 
developed EC monitoring system. The court has mandated close 
supervision of all actions taken by the Member States under Art. 115. This 
provides that the necessity to grant an authorization arises only after an 
independent review of the need to take such action and requires a distinct 
authorization by the Commision instead of a blanket authorization137. In 
other words: the Court demonstrated its willingness to accept a broad 
application of the authorization mechanism even in cases where regional 
policies played an important role. But this political self-restraint was 
accompanied by attempts to tighten the procedural requirements for 
obtaining an authorization. The exemption formulated in the directives 
might then be understood as an unlawful blanket exemption which cannot 
justify the deviating ESA procurement rules. 
94 (2) Recent developments indicate a change in the Court's attitude 
similar to the shift from the Donckerwolcke judgment to the TEZI 
judgment. In the Bulk-Oil judgment138 the Court seemed to have 
surrendered the idea of linking the broad scope of application to 
sophisticated rules on procedure. 
The United Kingdom imposed export restrictions on trade with Israel. 
The decisive question was whether the UK was allowed to do so although 
the Member States bad formulated a Common Commercial Policy. An 
affirmative answer to the question under weil established Court of Justice 
case-law shows that Member States may adopt national measures only if 
specifically authorized to do so by Community institutions139. The Court 
understood Art. 10 of the generally-formulated Regulation 2603/69 on the 
export policy of the Community to serve as a basis for national export 
restrictions taken in 1979. This decision has been interpreted as a shift in 
the Court of Justice case-law, away from the three above mentioned 
judgments requesting a distinct authorization by the Commission and a 
return to some kind of a blanket authorization which does not allow for any 
Community monitoring over measures taken by the Member States140. The 
136 This quotation is taken from Donckeiwolcke, 1976 ECR 1921 at 1937 No. 29; identical 
languaze appears in 1971 ECR 897 at 909 No. 14 - Bock and 1976 ECR 431 at 443 No. 
6. - Kaufliof 
137 Cf. Vogelenzang, loc. cit. p. 196. 
138 1986 ECR 559; thereto Lauwaars, loc. cit. in: J. Schwarze (ed.) op. cit. 1988, 85 with 
reference to Feenstra, 35. S.E.W. 1987, 152. 
139 1986 ECR559 at 585 No. 26. 
140 Cf. Timmermanns, loc. cit. p. 101. 
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Court does not really discuss the issue. It refers in the same context to its 
well-established case law without quoting specific decisions and without 
quoting the rule on the strict interpretation and application of Art. 115. 
Timmermanns found a change in policy. 
(3) Transferred to the exemptions provided for under the directives on 95 
public procurement, one is tempted to conclude that the Member States 
would not even need a specific authorization by the Commission in order to 
exclude EFTA-Countries or other third countries like the United States and 
Japan from the participation of public procurement. The parallel between 
Regulation 2603/69 and Directive 88/295 is striking. It is only one step 
further from the Bulk-Oil judgment to the assumption that block 
exemptions as such comply with the authorization procedure of Art. 115. 
The early efforts of the Community to restrict the exemptions would be 
watered down to the benefit of integrating regional policy, competition 
policy and industrial policy in one and the same procedure. It is bound, 
however, to the legitimacy of arguments which Member States have invoked 
when pushing for the exemptions provided for under Directive 88/295 and 
under Com (88) 378 final. Art. 3 of Directive 77/62, stipulating the 
exemption of public supply contracts which are awarded in accordance with 
the particular procedure of an international organization, remained 
unchanged in 1988. Contrary to Directive 77/62, Directive 88/295 refers in 
the recitals to the relationship between national procurement rules and the 
"regional development". Despite some doubts we assume that the "block 
exemption" suffices to justify the derogation from primary Community law 
although the policy issues are not really discussed therein. This is true for 
three reasons: 
(1) the overall perspective of protecting the home 
industries and guaranteeing employment in specific 
regions is obvious and; 
(2) Member States might legitimately invoke the rule of 
good faith. The exemption dates back to the early 
seventies and the justification has never been 
challenged so far. 
(3) The Internal Market sets a new tone, however, 
which needs to be considered in the process of 
renegotiating Directive 88/295 and its exemptions with 
the view to amending the ESA Convention. 
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96 (4) A second problem emerges as to the scope of the exemption rule. 
Directives 77/62 and 88/295 regulate public procurement only as far as 
goods or services related to goods are concerned. Services alone, as 
provided for in Phase A and B, are definitely not covered by Directive 
88/295. Here the Member States have to choose whether they provide for 
open competitive bidding within ESA or whether they request the 
Commission to grant them an authorization which can be given in the form 
of a "block exemption". Member States would then have to call upon ESA 
Council and its IPC which monitors the "fair return" principle (Nos. 3, 5, 8). 
The latter alternative would then enable the Member States to ensure that 
the doubts raised on the quality of arguments presented in Directive 88/295, 
might be dispelled. If the Member States have equipped the Commission 
with the necessary arguments and if they have requested an authorization 
for exempting services contracts in Phase A and B from Directive 88/295, 
the ESA procurement rules might be regarded as respecting Community 
law for a transitional period of time. Since they have not done so they have 
an obligation under primary Community law, namely through Art. 5, 116, 
234 (Nos. 19, 27) to insist on open competitive bidding for service contracts 
by ESA in the industrial committee, thereby initiating the process of 
renegotiating the whole procurement rules with a view to the completion of 
the Internal Market. 
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